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ABSTRACT
Mexican Petroleum: Catalyst for a New Relationship Between
the United States and Mexico?
(February, 1982)
Manuel R. Millor, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard J. Wiarda
If a factor were to be singled out as a useful means to understand
U.S. -Mexico relations during the twentieth century, that factor most
likely would be petroleum. Ownership, exploitation, and commercial-
ization of the Mexican petroleum industry have been at the fore of some
of the most intense episodes of conflict and cooperation between the
two countries since the beginning of the century. At stake have been
issues such as Mexico's economic and political independence, the reach
of American power in its sphere of influence, and the friction between
national and private interests in the United States.
This study analyzes the overall impact of Mexico's newly flour-
ishing petroleum industry on Mexican development, and on the relations
between the United States and Mexico. Since the mid-1970's, the
existence of huge reserves of oil and natural gas in southeastern
Mexico has brought about a radical reassessment of these relations,
in terms of: a new delineation of the goals and expectations of both
nations vis a vis each other; and a new perception, by both, of the
national capabilities of Mexico.
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The operational context is complex. Petroleum circumscribes an
assortment of issues as yet unresolved between the United States and
Mexico, and it is a watershed in bilateral relations. For the United
States, it means a change in its conduct and patterns of action
towards Mexico and, for the latter, a definition of its project
as a nation.
If an association based on mutual interests and benefits is to
evolve, the U.S. government must understand and accept the changes
that are taking place in Mexico, and the emergence of the Mexican
state as a middle power with autonomous goals of its own. Under
other circumstances, the temptation of economic and political
interventionism may effectively obstruct this unique opportunity.
In this context, petroleum is both a source of confidence, and a
quandary. It may turn out to be a propelling force, or a quagmire.
It corresponds to decision makers in both nations to seize this
historical challenge and convert it into a stepping stone for
cooperation.
vii
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Cultural Heritage and Dependency
The understanding of the Latin American region has often been im-
paired by ethnocentrism. Scholars and public officials have tended to
view the area with preconceived values and notions about development de-
rived from the historical experiences of the United States and Western
Europe. And the result has usually been misconceptions about Latin
American society and politics, and frustration with policy failures.
Perhaps the most relevant example of the ethnocentric North Ameri-
can interpretation of Latin America is the Diffusion Model. This model
assumes a continuum whose two poles are tradition and modernity. The
concept of tradition implies backward, archaic, and static structures.
Modernity is viewed in terms of social and political mobility, the com-
plexity of the social structure, the degree of specialization of roles
and institutions in the political and social spheres, "democratic" forms
of government, and indicators such as urbanization. According to the
Diffusion Model, underdevelopment is a condition which has been experi-
enced by all nations at one time or another. The concept of "progress,"
usually seen in terms of economic growth and industrialization, involves
the passage from the traditional to the modernity end of the continuum.
Obviously, this process is of a teleological character. In North Ameri-
can social science, structural-functional ism in the writings of
Gabriel Almond and G. Brigham Powell exemplifies this emphasis on
1
2development as a linear progression from traditionalism to modernity.
Likewise, Walt W. Rostow applies the same conceptualization to the
stages of economic development. Other theoretical levels of the Diffu-
sion Model include: a preoccupation with stability and orderly change;
the decline of ideology as modernization and technology advance; and the
notion of development through the spread of knowledge and benefits from
the developed to the underdeveloped areas.
^
According to the Diffusion Model, "...the solutions to the problems
and conditions of underdevelopment must originate from beyond the borders
of Latin America."^ This notion triggered during the 1950 's and 1960 's
a substantial amount of literature that praised investments in capital
and technology from the United States to Latin America, as decidedly ben-
eficial to the development of the latter.^ Social and political stabil-
ity in Latin America was, of course, a precondition for a greater par-
ticipation of foreign enterprise.
By the end of the 1960 's the Diffusion Model was in crisis. The
Cuban Revolution proved to be a profoundly disturbing event for U.S.
policymakers. The answer by the American government to the challenges
posed by the Cuban Revolution was the Alliance for Progress. But the
Alliance failed to promote consistent socioeconomic development and po-
litical democracy.^ Throughout the 1960's, in response to real and
imaginary constitutional and socioeconomic crisis, and to the fear of
communism, many Latin American governments were successively taken over
by the military, as it happened in Brazil in 1964, in Argentina in 1966,
and in Peru in 1968.^ In less than a decade, scholars switched their
appreciations of Latin America in reaction to these various events. As
the forebodings about violent upheavals to come, publicized in the
"scare" literature of the early 1960's.^ failed to materialize, the
scholarly pendulum swung to a vision of an "unrevolutionary society,"^^
where the structural and institutional obstacles to change were quite
resilient.
As the previous expectations of orderly democratic progress have
subsided, as well as the immediate fear of revolution, shrouded by the
ascent of the military, various observers have undertaken the analysis
of the authoritarian-corporatist regimes as a possible dominant model
for understanding Latin America. Among the main contributors to this
approach are Howard Wiarda. James Malloy, Philippe Schmitter, Ronald
Newton, and Frederick Pike.
James Malloy sees corporatism as an authoritarian mode of organiz-
ing state and society in Latin America. Regimes such as those of
Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Mexico would seem to share certain basic
elements of the corporative model, such as: no competition; interest
representation based on enforced limited pluralism; statism; ex officio
membership; and co-optation. The recognized groups in the corporate re-
gime are organized in vertical functional categories rather than hori-
zontal class categories, and interact with the state through the desig-
12
nated leaders of authoritatively sanctioned interest associations.
However, there are variations in the corporatist model. For exam-
ple, Guillermo O'Donnell differentiates between the populist authoritar-
ianism of Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil, the mil-
itary-populism of Peru after 1968, and the bureaucratic-authoritarianism
of Brazil since 1964.^^ Alfred Stepan makes a distinction between
4"inclusionary" corporatism which would correspond to the populist re-
gimes, and "exclusionary" corporatism, which would conform with the char-
acteristics of the bureaucratic-authoritarian period. Philippe
Schmitter approaches the question by referring to two types of corporat-
ism, state and societal, that would discern the relative power of govern-
ments and pressure groups.
The theoretical perspective of corporatism in regards to the role
of the state in Latin America, as well as the relationship between state
and society, is heavily indebted to those who stress the cultural heri-
tage of Latin American countries as the key factor in understanding the
region. From this perspective, the corporate tradition, since the con-
quest and colonization of the area by Spain and Portugal, has consisted
of a complex amalgam of social, cultural, religious, legal, philosophi-
cal, and moral principles which support the notion of a functional so-
cial hierarchy.
The explanation for current manifestations of corporatism in Latin
America can be derived from historical and cultural antecedents. Cul-
tural relativism affords an apparently logical perspective for contempo-
ary authoritarianism. Howard Wiarda argues that Latin America has taken
shape along distinct lines of societal structure, organization, and
functions. The Latin American colonies were established during the
1500's, on the basis of feudal and medieval institutions very much in
force in Spain at the time. This fact gave rise to political, economic,
and social constants that, to a varying degree, are still present in the
area, including: absolutist, hierarchical, elitist, and bureaucratic-
patrimonial political bases; semifeudal, mercantilist, and monopolistic
economic policies; a rigid, stratified, closed social system; and a re-
ligious tradition of Catholic hegemony and absolutism.
Glen Dealy maintains that Latin American society is structured ac-
cording to a monistic tradition, just as the United States has followed
a liberal, pluralistic tradition. Expressed in other terms, this would
mean that while North American institutions tend to reflect a Lockean
prospect, Spanish American institutions share a Thomist outlook. Two
of the central principles of Thomist political thought are organicism
and patriarchal ism. First, society is based on hierarchy; casuistry
plays a more important role than law or rational behavior. Second, there
are inequalities inherent in society, which imply the acquiescence of its
members; thus, conflict is resolved by "public acceptance of the supreme
power.
"^^
Wiarda would seem to agree with John Mander in referring to Latin
America as a historically conservative and nonrevolutionary area, "in
the sense of having been cut off and only marginally affected by the
1 Q
great transformations that molded our modern world." In the view of
Stein and Stein. Latin America has never been able to escape its colo-
20
nial legacy. Louis Hartz has added insight to this stance with his
concepts on the fragmentation of European culture and ideology. Detached
from the originating center, says Hartz. that part of the European na-
tion "loses the stimulus toward change that the whole provides... (and)...
lapses into a kind of immobility."^^ Robert Adie and Guy Poitras de-
velop the notion of the "politics of immobility" by stressing the resis-
tance to change and to effective government by the politically predomi-
22
nant groups in Latin American society. According to Wiarda, the dis-
tinctively Iberic-Latin tradition has proven to be quite resilient.
Through its corporate-organic mold it blended "the traditional regard
for order and hierarchy with the newer imperative of change and modern-
ization." Thus, positivism was assimilated within the prevailing tradi-
tion, and liberalism was seldom successful .^^
The historical cultural explanations suffer from the "fallacy of
the single factor." Undoubtedly, cultural heritage is an important fac-
tor in understanding Latin America, but not the only one. Douglas
Chalmers warns against the temptation to conclude too soon that "author-
itarian-corporatist" regimes are here to stay. Change may be the endur-
ing quality of contemporary Latin American politics. In what may be
considered as a supplement to historical-cultural explanations. O'Donnell
sees the bureaucratic-authoritarian state as a response to modernizing
pressures, including the "extended political activation of the popular
25
sector." Other authors point out that recent military coups have been
26
the result of group conflict. Schmitter delineates state corporatism
or "corporatism from above," as that type most appropriately associated
with modernizing societies, and with the phenomenon of delayed dependent
27
development.
The ideas of these authors constitute a link between the cultural
heritage approach and the imperative of the developmental process.
Malloy sees the emergence of authoritari an- corporatist regimes as "re-
sponses to a general crisis of public authority brought about by the mul-
28
tiple effects of delayed dependent development." An attempt to under-
stand the nature and shortcomings of this process of development is the
dependency model
.
Most "dependentistas" seem to agree on four basic themes:
1- Underdevelopment is the result of a certain type of relations between
expanding industrial capitalist nations and peripheral countries.
2- Development and underdevelopment are two components of the same sys-
tem, two simultaneous and intimately related faces of the same global
process.
3- Underdevelopment is not a temporary, evolutionary stage, but a persis-
tent, natural condition.
4- There are external and internal factors that determine dependency.
The interaction between internal domination and external dependency,
is deeply embedded in the structures, institutions, and processes of
each Latin American national system.
There are differences between the "dependentistas" in regards to the
analytical approach and the solutions perceived to the problems of under-
development. The "Conservative" approach includes scholars such as
Raul Prebisch, Miguel Wionczek. and Anibal Pinto. The "Prebisch the-
30
sis" took as its starting point the deteriorating terms of trade for
Latin America, as a result of low income elasticities of demand in its
exports, and high income elasticities in its imports. From there it
evolved into recommendations to push import-substitution industrializa-
tion, encourage economic integration among Latin American countries and
obtain a higher reciprocity in dealing with developed nations. Prebisch
and Wionczek have no abiding fears of foreign investments, although these
should be more selective and controlled. Wionczek emphasizes the possi-
bility of solutions to the economic problems born out of Latin America's
own initiatives.^^ Some Marxist "dependentistas" such as Ronald H.
8Chilcote view this "Conservative approach" as a mere variant of the Dif-
fusion Model, and dismiss the expectations of attaining economic indepen-
dence and national development within the capitalist framework.
The "Moderate" dependency current tends to place the blame for un-
derdevelopment on internal as well as on external factors. They differ
from Prebisch in believing that foreign aid investments, as well as trade
negotiations, constitute policy weapons used consciously by the center
against the peripheral economies. Some of the members of this group
are Helio Jaguaribe, Osvaldo Sunkel , Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo
Faletto, Celso Furtado, and Theotonio dos Santos. Sunkel sees develop-
ment as a deliberate process which must have as its final consequence the
equalization of social, political, and economic opportunities, internally
as well as in relation to more developed societies. In a historical
analysis of development in Latin America, Cardoso and Faletto perceive as
the basic problem the fact that political power has never been able to
overcome the contradiction between national society and dependent econ-
35
omy. Jaguaribe analyzes the structural problems of Latin America ac-
cording to three main aspects: economic, political, social and cultural
stagnation; marginality, internal as well as in relation to the developed
nations; and economic, cultural, and political -military denationaliza-
3f5
tion. These three categories define the interaction between internal
domination and external dependency. Jaguaribe sees a basic alternative
37
between dependency and autonomy. In general, however, the moderates
are rather vague about policy prescriptions.
The "Radical" dependency approach includes Andre Gunder Frank,
Octavio lanni, James Cockcroft, and James Petras. among others. This
group sees the interests of Latin America and those of the center powers,
especially the United States, as intrinsically contradictory. According
to Frank, the colonial and neocolonial relationship to the capitalist me-
tropolis has shaped the economic and class structure, as well as the cul-
ture, of Latin American society. In this context, there are well defined
class interests for the dominant sector of the bourgeoisie. These class
interests of the local capitalists perpetuate the imbalance of the econ-
omy, as well as the repressive central governments. National capitalism
and the national bourgeoisie do not and cannot offer any way out of un-
38derdevelopment. Octavio lanni elaborates further on the historical and
structural conditions, internal and external, that generate repression
and bourgeois violence. It is clear that the Radicals pay much closer
attention to class conflicts than the other dependency currents. Radi-
cals favor social revolution as the only way out of underdevelopment.
As can be easily seen from above, there is no unified theory of de-
pendency. However, by necessity a dependency approach to politics must
be historical: the axis of Latin American dependency has changed, from
Spain and Portugal, to Great Britain, and to the United States. Like-
wise, the structural and historical arguments central to the dependency
approach imply a theory of conflict. Dependentistas could be spread
along most points of the political spectrum, in regards to their atti-
tudes towards the role of the state and of social classes in national de-
velopment. In this context, Chilcote sees a basic difference within the
dependency perspective, between the bourgeois and the Marxist conceptions
40
of development and underdevelopment in Latin America.
The controversy between the cultural relativists and the dependen-
10
tistas is more apparent than real. To be sure, there are differences be-
tween the two. Whereas the first emphasize culture and tradition, many
"dependentistas" share the assumption that economic arrangements are the
primary determinants of political, social, and cultural forms. On the
other hand, the corporative model seems to share with the moderate and
the conservative conceptions of dependency an appreciation of the role
of the state as the protagonist in Latin America's societal transactions.
In various ways the cultural-corporative and the dependency approaches
are not exclusive, but complementary. Both cultural and economic factors
must be taken into account to understand Latin America. However, the de-
pendency approach would seem to have an advantage, that is, the fact that
it affords a more dynamic analysis of both the external influences and
internal changes that, through time, have contributed to shape Latin
Americas society.
From the dependency perspective, direct proximity with the United
States has cost Mexico the loss of more than half of its original terri-
tory, various military interventions, repeated interference in its domes-
tic political matters, and economic penetration at all levels. Mexico's
economy has advanced to higher levels of specialization and complexity,
but not along lines of self-sufficiency and economic autonomy. And eco-
nomic dependency has obvious political implications.
But in order to understand Mexico one must also look at the cultur-
al-historical patterns that have conformed it. The continuance of bu-
reaucratic-patrimonial political arrangements can be traced from colonial
institutions to the present-day one-party system, the institution of the
"compadrazgo" and the role of the president as the supreme arbiter of all
11
political conflicts. Octavio Paz refers to the Mexican national charac-
ter as a mask that shields from external pressures but at the same time
prevents the true identity from surfacing,^^ and stresses that "...the
Mexican is not an essence but a history. "^^ And the great Mexican
scholar Alfonso Reyes talks of the "age" of the Mexican people as that
"when all time meets in the present, bringing vapors out of the past and
a breeze from the future."
Research on the questions of dependency and cultural heritage must
be undertaken from an eclectic perspective. Only an integral approach of
political science, economics, and sociology can begin to elucidate the
complex reality of Latin American countries. The problem of exclusivity
and narrow specialization permeates the social sciences nowadays. How-
ever, to give only one example, in the analysis of dependency theory both
comparative politics and international relations play a role. Dependency
theory itself underlines the fact that there is a somewhat arbitrary dis-
tinction between these two subfields of political science.
Development
The distinctive cultural and developmental patterns of Latin Amer-
ica have given rise to the idea that the region represents a "Fourth
World of Development," that corresponds neither to the earlier capital-
ist or socialist models, nor to the "new nation" model of Africa and
Asia.^^ In this respect, the corporative-cultural approach is useful,
indeed, in analyzing these unique characteristics inherent in Latin
America's process of development.
Latin American countries are still in search of models of develop-
12
ment appropriate to their own reality. Since their inception as indepen-
dent republics they have tried to copy models such as liberalism and pos-
itivism, that are inadequate to deal with the problems of the area and
result in distortions. At the same time, most of the prominent develop-
ment theorists, such as Gabriel Almond, Cyril Black, Karl Deutsch, and
W. W. Rostow, have tended to omit Latin America from their "universal"
models.
The contemporary definitions of development that are not of much
benefit for the study of Latin America tend to reflect the bias of for-
eign schemes and solutions. The Diffusion Model falls within this
group. Latin American countries are not following the same "progressive"
trajectory or stages that the developed nations went through, because the
conditions are simply different. By this time it seems clear that the
future of most Latin American political systems will not be the "ideal"
type of Anglo-Saxon democracy. Likewise, Marxism does not lend itself
easily to the analysis of Latin American society and politics: "The cat-
egories of Marxian analysis apply to the area at best imperfectly and
through some elaborate stretching that at times leaves them all but un-
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recognizable." The radical dependency approach which pretends to fit
all facets of dependency neatly into Marxist theory usually rely more on
ideology than factual analysis. On the other hand, the "moderate" depen-
dency and the corporative-cultural approaches, even though not all-in-
clusive, provide useful insights to understand Latin American reality.
In the history of the Latin American countries, since the middle of
the nineteenth century, there have been three vital objectives that
emerge once and again, as imperatives in the process of consolidation of
13
their respective societies: national unity; modernization and develop-
ment; and regional integration. The two first objectives are intimately
tied. It is indispensable to arrive at a general definition of what de-
velopment must mean for Latin America, in the context of these three ba-
sic goals. And it means, basically, the conjunction of economic, social,
and political advancement. The relationship between these three aspects
is basic. A true process of development would tend to spread in an equi-
table way through all the sectors in society the benefits obtained by
economic growth, thereby promoting the social welfare of the population.
Implicit in this definition is the assumption that Latin American govern-
ments would uphold sovereignty as an essential element of the state, to
be either maintained or achieved by all means. This assumption, how-
ever, could be effectively challenged to varying degrees in most Latin
American countries, according to the dependency model.
Still pending would be the necessity to conceptualize what is meant
by "advancement." And this task is unavoidably qualified by value judge-
ments. Perhaps the best way to proceed would be through the analysis of
some key elements in each of the three broad categories of development:
economic, social, and political.
With respect to economic development, three basic groups of indica-
tors come to mind first:
-Rate of economic growth; per capita and national income.
-Relative weight of primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors.
-Infrastructure (communication, transportation, etc.).
However, these economic indicators should be qualified by two addi-
tional considerations:
14
-Penetration of foreign capital, especially through multinationals.
-Distribution of income.
In regards to economic performance, countries such as Mexico and
Brazil score high, with impressive growth indexes. However, the "eco-
nomic miracles" of Mexico and Brazil have been accompanied by a disturbing
phenomenon: the increasing control by foreign capital of the most dy-
namic sectors of their economies. In these as in most Latin American
countries, national income is distributed very unevenly.
With respect to social development, most of Latin America suffers
the effects of a structural dichotomy: a small, modern developed, indus-
trialized, urban sector, and a sizeable backward, archaic, rural, and
static sector. This division hinders an effective national integration.
However, there is a process of social change all throughout the region,
in varying degrees of intensity. In this context, development must be
measured in terms of social change: a society is developed to the extent
that it guarantees equality and effectiveness of social benefits to all
of its members.
The third great category of development, i.e. political, confronts
us with contradictory views on the nature of political change. Kalman
Si 1 vert maintains that asymmetry, clashes and conflicts characterize
Latin America's politics; there is no time for peaceful adjustments of
AO
political relationships. Martin Needier distinguishes among three
states of stability of the Latin American polity, "stable," "evolving"
(i.e. changes towards increasing harmony among the members of the pol-
ity), and "permanent instability" (i.e. persistent inconsistency among
the elements), and concludes that the patterns of "permanent instability"
15
accurately describe the political life of most of Latin American coun-
tries since independence.^^ Fred W. Riggs suggests that instability may
be a permanent feature of developing countries. Riggs' conception of the
"prismatic society" revolves around what he denominates as the "elect,"
a ruling group that reflects the social cleavages and is, thus, incapable
£ . 50
of compromise. Ben Burnett and Kenneth Johnson would seem to concur
with this assessment.
Opposite to the previous view is the idea that development must be
understood in Latin America's own terms. Howard Wiarda maintains that
"...the question has been not so much one of 'development' or 'moderniza-
tion' but of reconciling.
. .the static and vegetative features of the
older, patrimonial-corporate state with the imperatives of a modern, ur-
52
ban, industrial order." It is a matter of "blending the traditional
regard for order and hierarchy with the newer imperative of change and
53
modernization." Another scholar, Albert Hirschman, points out that
"the very forces that are responsible for stagnation in one period can
54
make for progressive change in the next." In this context, Charles
Anderson has characterized Latin American politics as a "living museum,"
where old as well as new power contenders find accomodation and continue
55
to exist, operate and interact with each other.
In dealing with political change one must keep in mind the trans-
plantation and adaptation of European political categories to Latin
America. In his theory of "secondary development," Richard Adams talks
about this phenomenon in terms of assimilation and reorganization, not
of innovation. But, it should be added, there must always be frictions
in this process, and the end product will not be the same as any of its
16
components. The contemporary political crisis in Latin America must be
defined in terms of the necessity to create new models of development,
which do not ignore those already existent under different historical
settings, but attempt to adapt, readjust, and incorporate some of their
features with a view towards new results. This constitutes the sce-
nario for Latin America's political process.
Pressure groups constitute one of the fundamental channels of polit-
ical action in Latin America. In the comparative setting of the region,
specific government policies are not extrapolative, but would rather re-
flect the constantly changing conformation of pressure groups in society.
Another avenue of political change is that of political parties. But at
present, with a few exceptions, mainly Venezuela, the power of other po-
litical contenders, especially the military, and the growing importance
of the centralized, authoritarian state, make it more worthwhile to ana-
lyze parties in function of their relation to pressure groups, and to the
58
entire political system.
A useful approach to pressure groups is Abraham Lowenthal's "bu-
reaucratic politics model." Lowenthal argues against the "rational pol-
icy model" of decision-making, and suggests that the policies of any
given country are not the result of a single or even a few policymakers,
but the product of a series of interlocking bargaining within the system
among different agencies, groups, and individuals. The outcome of this
59
political process would depend on the relation of forces at the time.
Using a similar approach, Guillermo O'Donnell reaches different con-
clusions. O'Donnell analyzes the emergence of what he calls the "bureau-
cratic authoritarian" state (BA), in countries such as Brazil, Argentina,
17
and Chile. The BA is characterized by: control of higher governmental
positions by persons from complex, bureaucrat! zed organizations such as
the armed forces, the public bureaucracy, and large private finns; polit-
ical and economic exclusion of the popular sector; and depoliticization.
i.e. reduction of social and political issues to "technical problems. "^^
"The BA is a system of exclusion of the popular sector, based on the re-
action of dominant sectors and classes to the political and economic cri-
sis to which populism and its developmental ist successors led."^^ Mex-
ico, according to O'Donnell, would be a BA which established control of
the popular sector before the new expansive trends of world capitalism
that started in the 1950's.
At the vertex of action by the politically relevant groups in Latin
American countries is the state. Regardless of the various ideological
orientations, the state is today the protagonist of the process of devel-
opment in most Latin American nations. Only the state can face the enor-
mous task of gearing development within the framework of sovereignty. It
must confront the challenges of internal antagonisms, foreign penetration
CO
and clientelism.
The process of socioeconomic development in the Latin American coun-
tries is fostering an ever-higher degree of political awareness among all
sectors of the population. This phenomenon galvanizes political action
towards the expansion of the existing levels of participation. Legiti-
macy, in the end, rests "on the possibility of identifying the locality
CO
with the center." Development must lead to equitable economic, social,
and political advancement. Only in this context can the categories of
political freedom have definite meaning. However, at present, political
achievement in the Latin American nations seems to be a measure of the
relative portion of the population who enjoy economic and social prerog-
atives, and these are, to a varying degree, always a minority.
Mexico as a Case Study
A pertinent means to study the previous approaches and variables re-
lated to dependency and development, would be the consideration of spe-
cific Latin American cases. A framework for analysis is needed that
takes fully into account both domestic development and foreign relations,
especially with the United States. At present, Mexico constitutes an
ideal case to illustrate these areas: the context, cause, and effects
of dependency, vis a vis the process of national development; and the im-
pact of this amalgam on U.S. -Mexican relations. At present, Mexico's pe-
troleum boom deeply permeates these issues.
If a factor were to be singled out as a useful means to understand
U.S. -Mexico relations during the twentieth century, that factor most
likely would be petroleum. Ownership, exploitation, and commercializa-
tion of the Mexican petroleum industry have been at the fore of some of
the most intense episodes of conflict and cooperation between the two
countries since the beginning of the century. At stake have been issues
such as Mexico's economic and political independence, the reach of U.S.
power in its sphere of influence, and the friction between national and
private interests in the United States.
The primary objective of the present study will be to analyze the
overall impact of Mexico's newly flourishing petroleum industry on Mexi-
can development and on the relations between the United States and Mex-
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ico. Since the mid-1970's, the existence of huge reserves of oil and
natural gas in Mexico has brought about a radical reassessment of these
relations, in terms of: a new delineation of the goals and expectations
of both countries vis a vis each other; and a new perception, by both, of
the national capabilities of Mexico.
But the operational context is complex and, as yet, not determined
by far. The thesis will be advanced that, far from representing a clear-
cut case of positive development for Mexico, and a healthier association
with the United States, petroleum may bring about, on the one hand, dis-
torted development and increasing dependency in Mexico, and on the other,
a tortuous and perilous period in U.S.
-Mexican relations.
At present, Mexico's petroleum circumscribes the complex assortment
of issues as yet unresolved between the United States and Mexico, includ-
ing: illegal migrant workers, drug traffic, the terms of technical and
scientific cooperation, the restrictions in the United States market to
Mexico's exports, and Mexico's more assertive foreign policy. Petroleum
may be the catalyst for better and more amicable relations, or for a re-
crudescence of misunderstanding and conflict. The result will be con-
tingent upon the conduct of the respective governments, and of all the
various pressure groups that compete for attention and for the enactment
of specific policies in both countries.
The setting is thus ready for closer friendship or escalating con-
frontation in the relations between the United States and Mexico. In the
present context, petroleum will be the main propelling factor for these
relations, as the governing political circles in both countries adjust
their decision-making capabilities towards cooperation or conflict.
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CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
A Historical Persppctive on United States-Mexico Relations
The nature and reach of Mexico's development, and its relations
with the United States, are two closely related phenomena in Mexican
history, and both have followed unsteady courses. Because of a situa-
tion of political impasse at home during a good part of the nineteenth
century, Mexico was in a comparatively defenseless position to safe-
guard its territorial integrity. The result of the lack of even a mod-
icum of national political consensus was the loss of more than half of
its territory to the United States in 1848.
Even though U.S. historians have tended to consider "Manifest
Destiny" as a non-imperialistic course of demographic expansion, as
compared with the more clearly imperialist era of Theodore Roosevelt,^
it is indeed difficult, from the perspective of Mexico's territorial
dismemberment, not to regard the episode as a part of an imperialistic
design. The recollection of the Mexican-American War is still deeply
embedded in Mexico's national conscience: the official name for the
conflict of 1846-1848, "the war of the North American invasion," is a
reflection of public sensitivities in Mexico.
Geopolitical accommodations between the two countries during the
nineteenth century effectively established, for purposes of future eco-
nomic exchanges, the predominance of the United States. The takeover
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of its territory deprived Mexico of any future aspirations to great-
power status, which were by that act transferred to the United States,
and left Mexico prostrated and subjected to the will of its northern
neighbor. The war between Mexico and the United States, and its fate-
ful climax, were not isolated actions. They must be considered within
the context of the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1824, the Gadsden
Purchase of 1853, and the McLane-Ocampo Treaty of 1859; the latter,
among various dispositions, gave the United States the right of transit
through the Istmus of Tehuantepec.^
The Civil War in the United States meant a pause in the expansion-
ist action towards Mexico. However, those were bitter years for Mex-
ico, too, during which the efforts of Juarez's Reform Movement at na-
tional reconstruction had to be channeled into a desperate struggle
against French imperialism, allied with Mexico's conservative elements.
In short, the period between 1830 and the 1860 's in Mexico, char-
acterized internally by political chaos and economic stagnation, and
externally by the loss of half of the national territory to the United
States and a series of punitive expeditions staged by European powers,
effectively turned Mexico into an appendage of rapidly expanding for-
eign industrial economies.
The period after the Civil War in the United States, one of rapid
industrial growth, coincided with the era of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico,
during which "peace" and "progress" were the catchwords. Towards the
end of the nineteenth century, accordingly, U.S. policies with regard
to Mexico shifted to a significant degree from a political to an eco-
nomic motivation. Throughout 30 years, from 1880 to 1910. Diaz and
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his "positivist" advisers opened the doors of Mexico to foreign capital
and technology. American companies invested heavily in Mexican rail-
roads, mining operations, and petroleum exploitation. U.S. trade with
Mexico had amounted to 7 million dollars in 1860. It doubled to 15
million by 1880, doubled again to 36 million by 1890, and nearly dou-
bled again to 63 million by 1900. During the early 1890's, Mexico im-
ported 56% and exported 67% of the total of its foreign trade, from and
to the United States; by 1910 these figures had risen, respectively, to
63% and 76.4%. U.S. direct foreign investment rose from 200.2 million
in 1897 to 672 million in 1908. Of the total investment of the United
States in other countries in 1908. 26.62% was located in Mexico.^
By 1910-1911, foreign capital had controlling interests in 130 of
the 170 biggest corporations in Mexico; this represented 77.7% of the
total capital of the 170 firms. Foreign investment came mainly from
three countries: the United States, Great Britain, and France. U.S.
companies controlled 44% of the total capital investment, that is, they
had by far the preponderant share. Some of the most important U.S. cor-
porations were: in mining, the American Smelting and Refining Co.; in
oil, the Mexican Petroleum; in railroads. National Railroads of Mexico
and Kansas City Railroad. By contrast, Mexican capital had a share of
4
only 23% of the total capital of the biggest 170 corporations.
Representative of some of the views about Mexico prevalent in the
United States during those years is the following statement by Wil-
liam J. Bryan, which dates from 1908:
"Before twenty years. North America will have
swallowed Mexico. The absorption of that country
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by ours is necessary and inevitable, for eco-
nomic as well as political reasons. It will
take place in a natural and peaceful way, and
will mean the perfection of our natural accom-
modation.
.
.
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Previously, U.S. pressures had affected Mexican territory; now,
U.S. business and commercial interests began to affect Mexico's na-
tional resources and communications, both of which passed increasingly
into foreign concerns, mainly American. In this process of penetra-
tion. Diaz's government sponsored the activities of foreign capital,
while the nascent Mexican bourgeoisie was clearly subordinated to them.
The peaceful conquest of Mexico, i.e. dollar diplomacy, economic con-
quest through growing ownership of natural resources, by means of sales
and concessions of lands and mining interests, continued unabated dur-
ing this period. Internally, the price was excessively high. The
Dfaz's regime meant the denial of elementary justice to the majority
of the population. The accumulation of social discontent, and the in-
creasing political awareness of a small middle class, were the main
factors that led to the upheaval of 1910.
The regime of Porfirio Diaz came to an end with the Mexican Revo-
lution of 1910. which also marks the birth of modern Mexico. The Mexi-
can movement of 1910 was an authentic revolution. It altered com-
pletely the social structures and destroyed the old aristocracy; it
created the instruments for an economic transformation of the country;
and it eliminated the oligarchy which had monopolized political power.
The Mexican Revolution was a far-reaching effort in a process dating
back to the struggle for independence, to bring into being an entity
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which could be properly called the Mexican nation. It was not a sim-
ple, clearly defined movement; the revolution did not have a mono-
lithic character, not did it evolve in a single direction. It was a
tentative, experimental and pragmatic movement absent, to a great ex-
tent, of a prior or even accompanying ideology.
The period between 1910 and 1940 could be characterized as an in-
tense struggle to achieve structural changes in the economic, social,
and political spheres. The actors were, on the one hand, newly mobi-
lized social groups, such as the small middle class, organized labor,
and peasants. On the opposite side stood conservative groups that had
survived the onslaught of the revolution and wanted to restore the old
status quo. and external forces, represented largely by U.S. business
interests, which persisted in their efforts to preserve and strengthen
their controlling position in Mexico.
To a varying degree, from 1910 until the government of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, U.S. administrations repeatedly intervened in the Mexican
revolutionary process, in defense of American business corporations.
These interventions ranged from subtle campaigns of destabilization to
outright military invasions. The following cases illustrate U.S. inter-
ference in Mexico during this period:
-Mexican President Francisco Madero. who for certain was no radi-
cal, in 1910 made clear his intentions to pursue certain nationalistic
policies and to deny privileges to foreign capital; for example, he es-
tablished the first tax on petroleum. As a result, U.S. President
William H. Taft, acting on behalf of American companies, alternatively
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stationed sizable contingents of troops along the Mexican border and
sent ultimatums to Madero, threatening with military intervention.^
-U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, incensed by
Madero's refusal to acquiesce in the activities of foreign capital, by
1912 began to show the symptoms of a phobia against Madero. Appar-
ently following orders from President Taft's State Department, Wilson
plotted to bring about the downfall of Madero's government, and turned
the American embassy in Mexico City into a center of intrigues and con-
spiracy against the Mexican leader. Finally, through an alliance with
General Victoriano Huerta. known as the "Pact of the Ciudadela," Wilson
succeeded: in February, 1913, Madero was first overthrown and then mur-
dered, together with his vice-president.^
-Under the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, several
grave incidents took place, such as the armed occupation by U.S. marines
of the Mexican ports of Tampico and Veracruz in 1914. and General
Pershing's punitive expedition from mid-1916 until early 1917 in pursuit
of Mexican revolutionist Francisco Villa, who had previously raided the
American border town of Columbus, in New Mexico.
-Warren G. Harding's government extended strong official support
to the claims of U.S. corporations, and pressured the Mexican government
in 1922 to accede to the payment of what the Mexicans thought to be an
exorbitant foreign debt, in return for U.S. recognition. During the
Bucareli Conferences of 1923, the U.S. government pressured Mexico's
Obregon administration to recognize the unaffectabil ity of the holdings
g
of the U.S. petroleum corporations in Mexico.
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In spite of U.S. interventions and pressures, the Mexican Revolu-
tion fulfilled significant goals. Above all, it became a rallying point
for Mexican nationalism and a symbol of national unity. In more con-
crete terms, the highest point of achievement was reached with the Con-
stitution of 1917, which stands as the most radical document of its
time. It embodied the revolutionary doctrine that the common welfare
takes precedence over the parochial rights of the individual. And. per-
tinent to future relations with the United States, the Constitution of
1917 gave ample flexibility and power to the Mexican State to define,
modify, and extend its authority in a wide variety of functions.
The Travails of the Mexican Petroleum Industry: 1901-1938
The development of the Mexican oil industry, between the years 1901
and 1938, could be divided into four stages.^ The first stage is the
period from 1901 to 1910 when, under Porfirio Diaz, production in-
creased at a modest but steady rate; during these years the industry was
for the first time economically important. The second stage runs from
1911 to 1921, when the highest level of production was reached: Mexico
was responsible for up to 25% of the world's supply; only the United
States produced more oil. During the third stage, from 1922 to 1933,
production suffered a dramatic drop. And the fourth stage, from 1933
to the expropriation in 1938, was a period of relative improvement in
the levels of production.
Traditionally, Mexican oil exploration followed the practices in-
herited from colonial times: ownership regulations established that
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property of the subsoil was never separated from the Crown, which held
it for the "public good;" the owner of the surface rights never acquired
property rights over the resources in the subsoil. This precedent was
reinforced during the Reform Movement in Mexico in the 1860's, when the
Juarez's administration made clear in 1863 that "...coal and petroleum
constitute part of the dominion of the nation.
In a series of laws, Porfirio Diaz altered the concept of national
ownership over subsoil deposits. The "Mining Law of 1884" made petro-
leum and other minerals the exclusive property of the owner of the land.
The "Mining Law of 1892" restricted the surface owner's right to ex-
ploit fully certain minerals, but permitted free exploitation of com-
bustible minerals, including petroleum, without need for concessions.'^^
The "Petroleum Law of 1901," concerned itself with concessions rather
than titles to the land, and gave the Executive Branch the power to
grant permits to explore certain lands and waters under federal juris-
diction. This law extended to the companies which discovered successful
oil wells, the privilege of exclusive rights to surrounding lands.
Finally, the "Mining Law of 1909" reaffirmed the ownership of deposits
12
of mineral fuels by the owner of the surface.
As a result of these laws, by 1910 landowners had all rights to the
subsoil; foreign purchasers of Mexican lands acquired subsoil as well as
surface rights, a practice which was actually the Anglo-American system,
and contrary to the Mexican tradition. Through these laws foreign oil
companies bought large holdings, in the hope that they would prove to
have a rich subsoil. In the case of federal lands, the Executive could
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issue permits for unrestricted exploitation, which were tantamount to
ownership. Besides subsoil rights. Dfaz granted foreign oil companies
other privileges. Exempt from import taxes was the machinery brought
into the country for the development of the oil fields. By-products of
oil were not taxed, and neither was the capital invested in oil. While
Dfaz was in power, there was no export tax on oil. The oil fields them-
selves were taxed, but at the rate of cheap agricultural lands, with no
consideration given to their subsoil wealth.^^
In this way, large petroleum properties passed into the hands of
American and British corporations. The aforementioned laws would later
be the cause of many problems between foreign oil companies and the
post-revolutionary governments of Mexico.
Incipient exploration had taken place before 1900, but steady ex-
ploration and exploitation did not come until after the turn of the cen-
tury. Two Americans, Edward L. Doheny and Charles A. Garfield, and two
British. Weetman Pearson and Lord Cowdray. established themselves as the
leaders of the Mexican petroleum industry during this period; together
they controlled 98% of the oil production. Doheny founded the Mexican
Petroleum Company, which would later be sold to Standard Oil; Pearson
founded the Pearson and Son Ltd., which would be sold to the Royal
Dutch-Shell. Production during the first decade of the century was
about 13 million barrels of oil a year.^^
Around 1910 huge new reserves were discovered in the Mexican state
of Veracruz, which rapidly raised the level of production. By 1917.
Mexico occupied the third place in the world as an oil-producing nation,
with 55,292,767 barrels annually; oil became the principal Mexican
export. By 1921. foreign producers were pumping out and exporting
193,397.586 barrels per year, about 25% of the entire world output at
the time, which gave Mexico the second place as an oil-producing coun-
try. The companies based in Mexico supplied most of the oil imports by
the United States.
There are several reasons that help explain the fact that, while
the Revolution brought havoc on the Mexican economy, the oil industry
was actually enjoying a boom. The oil industry was located mostly
along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, far from the main battlegrounds,
and did not rely on inland transportation. Besides, the most important
oil-producing area at the time. Tuxpan and Tampico, enjoyed "revolu-
tionary protection" by the troops of General Pelaez.-^^ On the other
hand, the world demand due to increasing industrialization and to the
First World War promised high profits.
The Constitution of 1917 was a direct challenge to the established
practices and activities related to the petroleum industry in Mexico.
The land reforms which had attracted the foreign oil companies were re-
pealed, and restrictions to their investments were added. The subsoil
became again the inalienable property of the nation. In Article 27 of
the Constitution, all resources lying in a natural state in the na-
tional subsoil, such as petroleum and minerals, were thereby declared
to be the property of the nation and not of the person or corporation
that owned the surface above it. This was a reversion back to the old
system of land ownership that had existed prior to the regime of
Porfirio Dfaz. Article 27 enunciated the following:
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"The ownership of lands and waters... is vested
originally in the nation which... has the right
to transmit title thereto to private persons...
(however) the nation shall have at all times
the right to impose upon private property such
restrictions as the public interest may require...
in order to conserve and equitably distribute
the public wealth... In the nation is vested
direct ownershio of all minerals or substances
(in the subsoil) .. .sol id mineral fuels; petro-
leum and all hydrocarbons, solid, liquid or
gaseous The ownership of the nation is
inalienable and imprescriptible.
.
."18
The same article specified that concessions to own or exploit na-
tural resources could be granted only to Mexican citizens or companies.
The State could grant similar rights to foreigners, as long as they
agreed to be regarded juridically as Mexicans in their operations, and
to waive all right of appeal to foreign nations for protection. For-
eigners were forbidden to acquire ownership of lands and waters within
a one-hundred kilometer zone from the national boundaries, or within
in
fifty kilometers from the seacoast.
The general consensus was that Mexico had the right to nationalize
those petroleum deposits not already in private hands. However, the
crucial point was whether Article 27 of the Constitution was retro-
active or not. The reach of the doctrine of property set forth in
Article 27 was limited somehow by a provision to the effect that no mea-
sure would be applied retroactively, but there was a qualifying clause
that permitted revisions of past concessions which were deemed to be
harmful to the public interest. Thus, in reality, it was left up to
the Mexican President to determine the path to follow in reasserting
national ownership of natural resources.
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Mexican President Carranza had at first privately promised that
Article 27 would not be applied retroactively, but in 1918, as a facet
of his running confrontation with the United States government, he pro-
ceeded to decree that, after all. it was indeed retroactive. The issue
remained unresolved for the next two years. In 1920, Carranza was over-
thrown by General Obregon, who then became President of Mexico. Obregdn
reaffirmed the promise of not applying Article 27 retroactively, but
refused the request of U.S. Secretary of State Hughes to put it into a
formal treaty. It was for this reason that Hughes effectively blocked
U.S. recognition of Obregon 's government. Obviously, there was a degree
of correspondence between the actions of the U.S. government, and those
of U.S. private companies with interests in the Mexican economy.
In a series of legal cases dealing with the rights of the foreign
oil companies, the Mexican Supreme Court, in apparent contradiction with
the Constitution, stated the "positive acts" principle. This meant that
Article 27 was not retroactive on lands where "positive acts," such as
drilling a well, had been performed by owners before 1917; if this was
the case, then full ownership could not be questioned. However, if no
20
such act had been performed, then the owner forfeited subsoil rights.
This compromise would have been acceptable to the U.S. State De-
partment if its permanency could have been guaranteed. But Obregon was
fearful that if he yielded too much to the U.S. government, domestic
repercussions might ensue; therefore, he still refused to make a treaty
with the United States. However, Obregon did enter into an "extra-
official" pact, known as the "Bucareli Agreement," which embodied the
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"positive acts" principle. The agreement led to the official recogni-
tion of Obregon by the U.S. government on August 31. 1923.^^
Obregon's successor. Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928). adopted
at first a tough stance in the continuing negotiations with the U.S.
oil companies. In 1925 the Mexican Congress passed a petroleum law
limiting the ownership of oil rights acquired before 1917 to fifty
years. Thus, the Bucareli Agreement was considered to be no longer in
effect. The foreign oil companies protested accordingly, expressing
their dissatisfaction, and bringing about new negotiations.^^
After a long process of bargaining, in December, 1927, the Mexican
Congress adopted a new "Petroleum Code," which embodied the terms of
the Bucareli Agreement. This new code satisfied the U.S. State Depart-
ment, as American concerns could now rely upon the Mexican courts for
protection. Based on this code, shortly thereafter, in 1928, the
Morrow-Call es Act went into effect, under which U.S. oil companies
could no longer look forward to expanding their activities in Mexico.
On the other hand, those properties on which they had performed "posi-
tive acts" before 1917 were tacitly theirs for intensive development to
perpetuity. The oil companies had, in exchange, implicitly agreed that
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subsoil deposits were nationally, and not privately owned resources.
If the Mexican petroleum industry gained importance during the
period 1911-1921, its decline between 1925 and 1927 was equally dras-
tic. As a result of the unstable conditions in Mexico regarding prop-
erty rights in the oil industry, foreign oil companies started turning
their attention to Venezuela, which at the time was far more "coopera-
tive" than Mexico, and appeared to have more petroleum, anyway. Large
discoveries of oil in Oklahoma and Texas also made operations in Mexico
less important. In any case, the length of time during which Mexico
could continue to supply new reserves for exploitation seemed to be un-
certain. The decline in production in the Tampico fields appeared to be
directly related to the controversy over the Mexican legislation of
1925. But there were other, more ominous reasons, for the decline and
for Mexico's future as an oil-producing nation. In the rich fields of
Tuxpan, for example, the foreign oil companies had exploited the wells
irrationally, at full capacity, bringing about the filtering of salt
water into the oil deposits and their subsequent destruction.^^
The oil companies had been steadily losing importance in the Mexi-
can economy since 1921. In that year, when the highest peak in produc-
tion was reached, the industry accounted for 6.92% of Mexico's 6NP; by
1936 it had slipped to only 1.83% of the total GNP. During the period
of peak production, the petroleum industry employed between 30,000 and
50.000 workers, or about 0.7-0.8% of the Mexican labor force. By 1936,
only 14,000 workers were employed, that is, approximately 0.23% of the
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work force. In 1922, the Mexican treasury had received 88 million
pesos in taxes from the oil companies; this figure dropped to 19 mil-
lion pesos by 1927.^^
Foreign investments in the petroleum industry fell from a total of
862 million pesos in 1923 to a mere 107 million at the time of the ex-
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propriation in 1938. Towards the end of 1924, capital investment in
the Mexican oil industry was estimated to be around 800 million pesos.
Of this sum, American capital represented 57.46%; the British con-
trolled 26.16%; and the Dutch had 11.37%. Only 3.02% of the invested
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capital was Mexican. From these investments, foreign companies had ob-
tained, by 1924. almost 2.000 million pesos, from the sale of a little
over one billion barrel s.^^
There was a clear drop in operations after 1926. By 1927, refin-
eries had cut down their activities by 40%. in relation to the year
1924. In 1927 the Royal Dutch Shell suspended its drilling and pumping
operations, and cut down to a third its refining operations .^^ The
companies stated several reasons for their declining operations, in-
cluding the arguments over the implementation of Article 27 of the Mexi-
can Constitution, the denial of new drilling permits, less productive
wells, and high taxation.
Even though by 1928 the legal controversy seemed to be solved, the
entrance of Venezuelan exports in the oil market, and the increase in
production in the United States proper, lessened the interest of the
foreign companies in Mexican oil. During the following years there was
a relative improvement in production, but never to the levels of the
early 1920's.
The Oil Expropriation of 1938
In 1934, when La'zaro Cardenas took over the Presidency of Mexico,
the Mexican economy was still very much under the control of foreign
corporations, this in spite of the fact that 18 years had elapsed since
the enactment of the Constitution of 1917. Total foreign investments
reached a value of 3,900 million pesos in 1935. The importance of this
figure is easily ascertained by the fact that in that same year the GNP
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of Mexico was barely 4,500 million pesos.
In many ways. Cardenas symbolized the climax of the Mexican Revo-
lution. He adopted a policy of profound structural changes. From the
beginning of his government. Cardenas accelerated agrarian reform. By
1936. this policy was affecting properties that belonged to important
American concerns, such as the Chihauhua Cattle Co. and the Cunningham
Investment Co. Additional lands that belonged to U.S. companies were
also taken over in Baja California and the Yaqui Valley of northwest
Mexico. Under the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S.
State Department recognized the right of Mexico to expropriate those
lands, but asked the Mexican government to offer a just compensation.
By 1938 Mexico had started paying these indemnities. This time the U.S.
government was showing patience in something that affected the inter-
ests of its business corporations; there were no notes with threats or
ultimatums, as had been the case before for much minor causes. In
June. 1937. the Cardenas government proceeded to expropriate the rail-
roads. The Mexican State assumed the direct obligations of the rail-
roads' debt, and reached an agreement with the International Committee
of Bankers; the final settlement for the compensation would be reached
under the following administration of Manuel Avila Camacho.^^
But the issue that brought to a head all the past conflicts be-
tween the United States and Mexico was the expropriation of the petro-
leum industry in 1938. Since 1917 the various Mexican administrations
had tried, unsuccessfully, to apply effectively Article 27 of the Mexi-
can Constitution and to carry out the nationalization of the subsoil.
In the end, foreign corporations, often backed by the U.S. government,
had held their ground; for example, the Mexican government had not
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been able to make foreign petroleum companies comply with Mexican tax
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laws. By 1938, however, Lazaro Cardenas had consolidated his politi-
cal position firmly enough so that he felt confident to challenge the
power of the foreign oil companies, natural targets of the resurgent
revolution.
At the outset of the disputes, it was the question of labor rela-
tions that brought matters to a standstill. What the issue finally
came down to was whether the foreign oil companies would conform to the
conditions and restrictions of Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution,
dealing with the rights of workers, and backed not only by Mexican la-
bor unions, but by the CaVdenas' government. Article 123 granted Mexi-
can workers guarantees such as the eight-hour day, equal pay for equal
work, control of wages, and the abolition of child labor, and estab-
lished the responsibility of employers in protecting the workers
against occupational accidents and diseases. On the other hand. Arti-
cle 123 guaranteed the right of the workers to organize and bargain for
the defense of their common interests through unions, and to strike.
Strikes were considered to be licit when their objective was to achieve
the equilibrium among the various factors of production.
In 1934, during his Presidential campaign, Cardenas had asked the
Mexican workers to organize themselves in order to pressure him to sat-
isfy the needs of the people. In his annual Presidential message of
1935, Cardenas criticized the oil legislation of 1925, because it did
not comply with the fundamental principles of Article 27 of the Consti-
tution. In that same message, Ca'rdenas pointed out that, while oil
taxes in Mexico were just 1.82 pesos per barrel, in the United States
they amounted to 4.1C pesos per barrel. Shortly afterwards. Cardenas
consolidated the twenty-one Mexican oil unions into the National Petro-
leum Workers' Union. In 1936. the Mexican Confederation of Workers
(CTM) was organized, which included the most important Mexican labor
unions; the National Petroleum Workers' Union merged into the CTM. The
CTM had in 1938 a total of 600.000 affiliated workers, of whom 15.000
worked for the foreign oil companies.
Later in 1936. the Petroleum Union struck for the adoption of a
new nationwide contract, based on the guarantees stipulated in Article
123 of the Constitution. All bargaining failed. After a six-month
cooling-off period of discussions between union and company leaders,
which ended with no results in sight, the union called for binding arbi
tration, reinforcing its demands with a strike in May, 1937. On Au-
gust 3, 1937, the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration delivered a re-
port in which it criticized the foreign oil companies for their respon-
sibility in the decline of production and for reselling oil back to
Mexico at a higher price. The Board found the workers' demands justi-
fiable, and ordered an increase in wages of 27%, as well as social ben-
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efits and better working conditions.
The foreign companies refused to comply, and appealed to the Mexi-
can Supreme Court. Their appeal was denied on March 1, 1938. but they
still refused to accept the ruling of the Board. The companies then
tried delaying tactics, which only helped Cardenas in rallying public
opinion against them. The impasse in the oil industry took the form of
an "economic conflict" which threatened Mexico's very viability; thus
the matter passed into Federal channels. The companies now faced the
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government, rather than the union. Bribery failed. As Cardenas took
steps towards expropriation, the stunned foreign corporations finally
agreed to pay the additional benefits for the workers on March 16. but
by then it was too late. On March 18. 1938. Cardenas issued the decree
of expropriation.^^
The conjunction of internal and external conditions in the late
1930's made possible the expropriation. Internally, by 1938 Mexico had
achieved a considerable degree of national unity, higher than ever be-
fore in its history. The central government under Cardenas had man-
aged, to a significant extent, to neutralize centrifugal forces deeply
embedded in Mexico's social fabric. The revolution seemed to have come
to fruition, through government actions such as the agrarian reform and
the nationalization of the railroads. Under these circumstances, the
protracted dealings between the foreign oil corporations and. in suc-
cession, the petroleum workers' union and then the Mexican government,
served to incense and rally public opinion behind the nationalization.
Externally. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy" (and its impact in
Mexico through the good offices of U.S. ambassador Josephus Daniels),
and his affirmation of the policy of nonintervention, as well as the
forebodings of the European conflict, made possible a healthy differ-
entiation between the interests of the United States as a nation, and
those of some of its private companies. President Roosevelt acknowl-
edged the principle of international law that underlines the right of a
sovereign nation to expropriate holdings with the objective of public
utility, as long as an immediate and fair indemnity takes place. Thus,
in spite of a strong worldwide campaign by the petroleum companies
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against Mexico, finally these had to settle their differences through
negotiations.
In the end. Mexico paid a sizeable indemnity. After long and dif-
ficult diplomatic negotiations, the two countries signed a pact on No-
vember 19, 1941. called the Mexican-American General Agreement, that
settled in a global way all U.S. claims against Mexico, agrarian as well
as those related to petroleum. On April 17. 1942, the Commission in
charge of the negotiations ended its mission and presented a report on
the value of the expropriated American holdings; these were estimated
to be worth 23.995,991 dollars, of which Standard Oil was assigned
18.300,000 dollars. Mexico paid a third of the debt by July of that
same year, and the rest in five equal yearly payments."^® The indemnity
to the British oil companies, which owned a greater share of the indus-
try, was much more substantial.
The oil expropriation was the apex of nationalistic fervor during
the Cardenas' years. Afterwards, extenuated by the struggle with the
foreign oil corporations, and their international campaign against Mexi-
can exports. Cardenas was not able, or willing, to proceed to national-
ize the mining industry. For his successors, as we will see, it was a
matter of attracting, not fending off, foreign investments.
Fluctuations of the Nationalized Oil Industry: 1938-1976
The nationalization of tie oil Industry did not start a series of
expropriations by the Mexican government. The expropriation of the
railroads had already taken place, and the cases in which the agrarian
reform affected U.S. interests were solved peacefully through the
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Mexican-American 3en?ra.l Agreement. It could be argued that Cardena
did not have a preconceived idea of nationalizing the oil industry.
According to this point of view, events themselves would have precipi-
tated the take-over in 1938. In any case, Cardenas' administration
pushed ahead with the reorganization of the Industry, and on June 7,
1938, "Mexican Petroleum" (PEMEX) was created as a public institution.
By August. 1940, Pemex had in effect centralized all the oil -related
activities in Mexico.
After the nationalization, Mexico's role as an oil exporter de-
clined sharply, mainly as a result of the international boycott imposed
by the expropriated oil companies. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Royal
Dutch Shell. Whereas in February, 1938, Mexico had exported 2 million
barrels of oil, this figure dropped dramatically to only 311,000 barrels
by April of that same year.^^ Thus, after 1938, and until the mid-
1970's, oil production was channeled almost entirely towards the domes-
tic market. Indeed, the nationalization of the oil industry was a cru-
cial factor in Mexico's impressive rate of economic growth beginning
with the late 1940's. It also contributed significantly to stabilize
the country politically, rallying substantial sectors of the population
around a revived nationalistic mystique.
The overall objectives of the expropriation and nationalization of
the oil industry could be placed in two categories: to provide suffi-
cient energy for the general progress of Mexico; and to turn the oil in-
dustry into the key element for achieving Mexico's independent economic
development.^^ It could be effectively argued that the first purpose
was adequately accomplished. The oil industry radically changed its
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structure: it shifted its orientation from the exports market to the
satisfaction of Mexico's internal needs. Petroleum and natural gas be-
came the overwhelming source of energy for Mexico's development.
However, there are indications that point to the fact that the sec-
ond objective of the nationalization of the oil industry, for Mexico's
state-owned oil company to become the key to the country's independent
economic development, was never attained. To present this argument, the
evolution of Mexico's oil industry since 1938 could be divided into
three periods: the "golden epoch" of Pemex, which lasted until around
1952; a transition period from 1952 to 1958; and a third period charac-
terized by the deterioration of the mystique of the petroleum industry,
as it had been nurtured by the nationalization.^^
The "golden epoch" (1938-1952) was a period of scarce financial re-
sources and strong international pressures. In spite of these obsta-
cles, the oil industry underwent a radical transformation. Through in-
genuity and a rational distribution of the available resources, the in-
dustry kept operations normally after the nationalization; workers and
administrators of Pemex were imbued with a sense of determination to
operate the company successfully. Its structure was geared to the in-
ternal market, parallel to the gradual increment in production and the
construction of new refineries and ducts. All this was made possible,
in part, because of a prevailing mystique, defined in terms of a spirit
of service to national goals, and in which group and personal interests
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were minimal. During the administrations of Presidents Avila Camacho
(1940-46) and Alema'n (1946-52), the Mexican government invested con-
siderable sums in Pemex. Nevertheless, to enhance production and the
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possibilities of financing and acquisition of capital equipment, from
1949 to 1951 Pemex signed five drilling contracts with private foreign
oil companies. These drilling contracts included guarantees to the for-
eign companies for expenses and investments, as well as a percentage of
the value of the oil production in the new wells. However, Pemex re-
served for itself all rights over any newly discovered deposits.
During the period from 1952 to 1958, Pemex increased its refining
capacity by 50%. However, after the 1954 devaluation of the Mexican
peso, the administration of President Ruiz Cortines followed a policy of
restraint with respect to public investment, and as a result the rate of
growth of Pemex diminished appreciably. Oil production increased by
28.7%, barely half the figure of 59.3% obtained during the previous six-
year period. By 1958 public investment in Pemex had increased again,
and in that year it represented 26% of the total public investment.
However, another factor, the relative poorness of the new oil fields,
kept increases in output at a low level. Although investments were
geared to modernization of equipment and installation of new ducts, the
increment in processed products could not keep up with demand, and sub-
stantial imports were necessary; meanwhile, exports increased only mod-
erately. As a result of the general situation, Pemex's finances were
seriously affected and, since overall government investments were not
sufficient, it had to resort to internal and external credits to defray
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expenses
.
In November, 1958, a clause was added to Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution, precluding contracts in the terms that had been agreed to
from 1949 to 1951 by Pemex and several foreign oil companies; with this
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new regulation, by 1965 all foreign participation in Pemex came to an
end. In any case, these drilling contracts had not significantly con-
tributed to increased production or technological improvement in Pemex.
Pemex paid the corresponding compensation to the foreign firms. The new
petroleum regulatory law reaffirmed that all oil-related resources and
activities belonged to the exclusive realm of action of the Mexican
State.
After 1958. Pemex seemed to lose momentum. Paradoxically, or per-
haps correspondingly, once international pressures ceased and Mexican
control over its petroleum resources was unquestionable, nationalistic
motivations were significantly discarded, and instead of the goal of
service to the nation, mercantil istic criteria prevailed. From 1959 to
the mid-1970's, the level of administrative corruption seemed to be
rising. Some of the conditions that characterized this period were:
improper financing, including the maintenance of excessively low prices
for derived products; lack of planning, which relegated the search for
new reserves; a significant increase in the debt of the oil industry,
brought about by credit-financing; interference by the political sphere
in the management of the oil industry. All these factors made impossi-
ble the attainment of the second main objective of the nationalization
of 1938: Mexico's independent economic development through its oil
industry. And they also brought about the oil crisis of 1973 in
Mexico.^^
In 1973, oil reserves in Mexico were at an all-time low. There
was a radical disequilibrium between reserves, on the one hand, and
production and growth in consumption, on the other. The apparent lack
on
r
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of a sustained and appropriate oil policy since 1959 meant that Mexico
had to import increasing amounts of oil. Thus, even the first objec-
tive of the nationalization, to provide enough oil and natural gas for
internal energy needs, was in danger of retrogression. If the situati
had continued much longer, it would have spelled financial disaster fo
Mexico, for towards the end of 1973 international oil prices quadrupled.
The discovery and exploitation of the new fields in the states of Ta-
basco and Chiapas ameliorated what could have been an economic crisis
of major proportions, with its corresponding political implications.
By the mid 1970's,as stepped-up exploration and exploitation of the
new oil fields in southeastern Mexico revealed an enormous potential, old
expectations came to the fore again. The question, once more, dealt
with a renewed opportunity for Pemex to become effectively the key to
Mexico's independent economic development. It remained to be seen
whether the new oil wealth might be just a much wider scenario for a
repetition of past pitfalls.
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CHAPTER III
MODERNIZATION AND DEPENDENCY IN MEXICO: 1940-1976
Tendencies in Mexico's Development
The nationalization of the oil industry has been a crucial factor
in Mexico's impressive rate of economic growth since the 1940 's. As
the nationalized industry achieved viability, it became the basis of
increased state intervention in the economy. However, this did not
mean a prolonged halt to foreign investments; it just set the stage for
its new manifestations: away from the extractive activities, and fully
and increasingly into manufacturing. Paradoxically, oil would come to
be the main source of energy for the expansion of a manufacturing sec-
tor controlled to a great extent by foreign capital."^
By the late 1940's, Mexico had adhered to the postwar U.S. policy
of fostering economic growth, mainly through industrialization, as a
primary means to achieve political stability and social progress. As
it was the case in the United States and other Western countries, this
model of development led to higher levels of concentration of wealth.
In Mexico these discrepancies would turn out to be far more acute,
since the less advanced economic base and fiscal mechanisms cause the
"trickle down" of wealth to be a much slower and less socially satis-
fying process. Moreover, some of the main beneficiaries of Mexico's
development policies were to be foreign multinational corporations.
The industrial sector gained the greatest advantages in Mexico's
process of development, and a key role was played by foreign capital.
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Starting in 1940, total foreign investments rose from the lowest levels
of the twentieth century, 449 million dollars, to 2,822 million by
1970.^ Foreign investments increasingly centered in the manufacturing
sector, from 147 million dollars in 1950 to 2,082 million in 1970. In
this latter year, the figure represented more than 70% of total foreign
investments. In addition, more than 80% of the foreign capital in-
vested in the manufacturing sector, the predominant share, was American,
The emphasis on industrialization came to mean, by the early 1970 's, a
growing Mexican public and private foreign debt of more than 24 billion
dollars; more than 50% of this impressive debt was contracted with to-
tally or predominantly U.S. financial institutions."^
It would appear that the oil expropriation of 1938, on a middle
and long-range terms, established the conditions for a displacement,
and not an eradication, of the economic axis of dependency, from agri-
culture and raw materials to the industrial sector. At the same time,
quantitatively, that dependency vis a vis the United States seems to
have recrudesced. In other words, beginning in 1938 oil was the pro-
pelling force of Mexico's economy, to higher levels of specialization
and complexity, albeit not along lines of self-sufficiency and economic
autonomy.
What were the reasons behind the new wave of foreign investments?
As one of the possible alternatives to develop a country economically,
foreign investments constitute, apparently, a way "to have your cake
and eat it, too." That is, foreign investments can result in signifi-
cant contributions to economic growth, without precluding present con-
sumption. Many governments are reluctant, for political as well as
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economic reasons, to deal with the complex and difficult issues in-
volved in reforming the fiscal structure (a measure that, to be effec-
tive, would imply progressive taxation), as a means of securing domes-
tic funds for development. Thus, foreign investments are sometimes
Viewed as a panacea for the ills of underdevelopment. It could be ar-
gued that, especially since the 195C's. Mexico has been a clear example
Of the previous assessment. In spite of still ongoing, though mostly
Ineffective, attempts to shift the tax burden to the more prosperous
sectors of the population, and to increase revenues. Mexico until the
early 1980's has consistently relied on foreign investments and credits
as a practically indispensable factor in its strategy for development.
The criticisms of this policy are obvious, such as the often voiced
radical indictments that foreign investments have been responsible for
the postponement of urgently needed, deep-seated changes in the social
and political spheres. On the other hand, an economic counterargument
would assert that, no matter how substantial domestic savings might
have been, they would not have been sufficient by themselves to sustain
the high indices of economic growth of the postwar era in Mexico. In
effect, foreign investments have filled this gap. Furthermore, and
mainly during the 1950's and 1960's. by concentrating on "hard" pro-
jects, foreign investments have resulted in a highly favorable "multi-
plying effect" for the Mexican economy. Other areas of reference, in
any comparative assessment of the benefits and/or liabilities of for-
eign investments in Mexico, would be their effects on unemployment, on
domestic savings, and on income distribution.
The study of foreign investments in Mexico seems to confirm the
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tendency of Latin American countries to e.bark upon quick-develop.ent
schemes that are but an extralogical imitation of the economic condi-
tions prevalent in developed, industrialized nations. Since the recip-
ient society. In this case Mexico, usually does not conform to the pre-
ordained formulas for development, the results are not too attractive,
from a global perspective: high unemployment; rising foreign debt; and
control Of the industrial sector by foreign companies, which have a com-
parative economic advantage over domestic concerns.
In any case, during the late 1940's and early 1950's, Mexico was
achieving significant economic goals (for example, sustained progress
in key Industries such as steel), mainly through national efforts, i.e.
those of private domestic Investors and of the government. However, as
the 1950's wore on. international conditions ceased to favor Mexican
exports, and the scarce buying power of the popular sectors of the pop-
ulation weakened the growth of basic consumer-oriented industries. As
a result of these factors, private domestic Investment declined. There
was a reticence on the part of Investors to expand the Industrial plant
at an adequate pace. Some observers detected, during the late 1950's
and early 1960's, a loss of momentum In the Mexican economy.^ The Im-
passe was related to the everpresent political question in Mexico of
the roles and domains of the private and public sectors of the economy.
The possibility of stagnation, then as well as now, might threaten the
fabric of Mexican society. Mexico's political leadership seemed to be
faced with a choice of risks. As Raymond Vernon posed the issues,
"Which risks will they prefer to accept: the
risks associated with inadequate economic
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performance or the risks associated with change
in the national decision-making machinery? "5
Mexico's leaders opted for the latter, albeit within the existing
institutional framework. The Mexican government returned to a more or-
thodox economic approach, that is. a willingness to deal on an equal
basis with Mexico's domestic private capital. Nevertheless, to a great
extent, the crisis was resolved by the substantial entrance of foreign
capital: starting during the mid-1950's. foreign investments mostly
from multinational corporations made possible the significant growth of
the industrial sector, on an average of more than 9% annually between
the mid-1950's and the late 1960's.^ For Mexico it was a Faustian bar-
gain: during this new economic stage the most dynamic sectors of its
economy fell under the control of foreign entrepreneurs.
However, it would be unfair to single out the multinational corpo-
rations as responsible for the alienation of the industrial sector of
the Mexican economy. The entrance and growing power of foreign invest-
ments in Mexico were not just the result of a fortuitous and favorable
economic juncture. On the contrary, the Mexican government and, seem-
ingly strange, the prevailing groups in the Mexican private sector,
propitiated and encouraged the entry of large amounts of foreign capi-
tal. The reasons behind this attitude are not hard to discern. For
the Mexican government, the economic crisis augured a social impasse;
it could not afford to contract public expenditures, for the price in
terms of political instability might have been too high. In other
words, the ruling political circles needed a growing economy, as well
as sources of external credit. As for the private sector, their
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sympathy towards foreign investors derived from their mutual economic,
political, and ideological ties. Of course, all these circumstances
coincided with a period when U.S. corporations were looking for prom-
ising foreign outlets.^
The decision of Mexico's governing elites to industrialize the
country no matter what the price was the key to the massive entrance of
foreign capital. This conscious encouragement of the industrialization
process by the Mexican government brought about painful implications,
among them: the promotion of capital-intensive industry and technol-
logy, which have had a detrimental effect on the unemployment level;
and a tremendous increase in the foreign debt.
A subtle and contrasting parallel could be traced between the atti-
tude of the Mexican government towards the oil and the manufacturing
industries. In the case of the petroleum industry, the negotiations
were directly held between governments, which allowed the Mexican gov-
ernment to charter the course for the industry, ultimately a national-
istic one. In contrast, in the case of the manufacturing sector, for-
eign investors dealt directly with Mexican entrepreneurs, the latter
concerned with private gains and profits, and the result was the alien-
o
ation of that economic sector.
Finally, another very important determining factor of Mexico's
postwar magnet-like qualities in regard to foreign investments, was the
so-called "clima de inversion," i.e. "investment climate." Since the
late 1940 's, Mexico had offered a combination of economic growth, an
expanding domestic market, and a stable political system, which proved
to be an irresistible target for the expansion of U.S. -based multi-
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national corporations.^
Thus, the stage was set for the period of "desarrollo estabiliza-
dor," i.e. "stabilizing development." in effect, roughly from the late
1950's until 1970. According to Mexican critic Olga Pellicer, there
were three basic objectives in the strategy of "stabilizing develop-
ment." The first was to keep price stability, i.e. an equal level of
investments and expenditures. This first goal was achieved basically
through external financing. The second objective, closely related to
the first, was to prevent a rise in prices of the goods and services
produced by State-related enterprises. However, since the need for
public investments was greater than the available funds, once again the
Mexican government had to resort to credit-financing. Finally, the
third objective was to promote capital accumulation and reinvestment of
profits, through a series of fiscal incentives. This encouragement of
the role of the private sector represented a weakening of the financial
capacity of the government which, together with a drop in export taxes,
again made inevitable an increase in the public debt. Thus, the objec-
tives of the model of "stabilizing development" were all contingent upon
the utilization of external credits. '^^
Within the general framework of the strategy of "stabilizing dev-
elopment," the recourse to external credit financing was a means to
avoid other more extreme measures which, if implemented at the time,
might have prevented a later reckoning during the 1970's. These
dreaded remedies were related to the need for a devaluation and a deep-
seated fiscal reform. The willingness of the Mexican government to
enter into new foreign debts was coupled at the time with the inordi-
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nate availability of funds in various international sources of capital.
In any case, Mexico's public foreign debt, which had stood at 1,327
million dollars during the early 1960's, reached the figure of 4.200
million in 1970. During this last year, 22.5% of the income of the
Public Sector was destined to cover the debt service, basically inter-
ests. External credit-financing was nothing new, but now its utiliza-
tion was increasing and deliberate. Some of the additional character-
istics of these credits were: a marked tendency towards "privatiza-
tion;" an increasing reliance of private Mexican borrowers on the giant
foreign banking enterprises; and a growing reliance of the Mexican Pub-
lic Sector on U.S. banks.
The development of the industrial sector was one of the key prior-
ities in the schemes of Mexico's "stabilizing development." But for-
eign capital retained a dominant position in much of the expanded manu-
facturing activities. In this context, it could be argued that the pro-
tectionist measures put into effect by the Mexican government have often
served to encourage the activities of foreign corporations, since these
are already located in the most dynamic sectors of the econorny, whose
further growth the government wants to foster. The internal dynamism
of the Mexican economy itself then contributes to enhance the role of
the foreign corporations.
At the same time, protectionism and fiscal incentives accounted for
a strengthening of the political position of native entrepreneurs. The
renewed assertiveness of Mexico's private sector would play a key role
later on, in the failure and demise of President Echeverria's model of
"shared development." Finally, to complete the vicious circle, public
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economic policy geared excessive funds as subsidies for urban substruc-
ture, accentuating tendencies towards centralization, whose momentum
brought about larger increases in public spending. Meanwhile, the
agricultural sector was neglected.
Mexico followed one policy for industry, and just the opposite for
the agricultural sector. Agriculture, which had previously been the
mainstay of Mexico's process of development, suffered from decreasing
public outlays: its share of total public investment dropped from 20%
in 1950 to barely 8% by 1960. In this latter year, the agricultural
sector registered a growth of 5%, which meant a participation of 15% in
Mexico's total domestic product; by the second half of the 1960's, these
figures had appreciably declined, to 1.2% and 11%, respectively. More-
over, a good portion of the growth in agricultural output took place in
products not destined to the domestic consumption but to the exports
market. In general termis, during the 1960 's the situation of the agri-
cultural sector deteriorated sharply, as it was totally subordinated to
the objective of industrialization.'^^ The neglect of the agricultural
sector, with its detrimental effects on rural employment, and the fail-
ure of production to keep up with increasing demand due to population
growth, would have severe consequences for Mexico by the late 1970's
and early 1980's.
Indiscriminate industrialization brought about grave structural
imbalances in Mexico, and it tended to polarize the social sectors along
sharply contrasting levels of income and consumption. In fact, it could
be argued that the overall model of "stabilizing development" actually
undermined the capacity of the State as the promoter par excellence of
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Mexico's development, and the acknowledged arbiter of social pressures.
As the import of the State in gearing Mexico's development declined.
dependency vis a vis the United States became more clear.
"By the early 1960's, a new pattern for Mexico's
foreign economic relations was clearly established,
wmch implied a new form of dependency, suffi-
ciently pronounced, but with distinct modalities
to those present during the first years of the
Mexican Revolution. This scheme is similar to
that which governs the foreign relations of other
Latin American countries
... (but) in the case of
Mexico, the proximity of the United States gives
a special character to its foreign relations;
because of geographical vicinity there are
between both countries particular ties which
have a very decisive influence in Mexico's
internal life and contribute significantly
to the complexity of its dependence vis a vis
the United States. "16
In appearance, the decade of the 1960's was one of uninterrupted
growth for Mexico. This was reflected in the literature on Mexican de-
velopment during those years. In retrospect, the administrations of
Presidents Lopez Mateos (1958-1964). and Dfaz Ordaz (1964-1970), espe-
cially the latter, favored relatively conservative economic policies
that enhanced the role of the private sector and the maintenance of a
high growth index. However, there were deep problems, such as: a high
and rising level of unemployment, due to increases in productivity,
rapid demographic growth, and urbanization; pressures for the distribu-
tion of land, related to the stagnation of the rural sector; a deterio-
ration in income distribution; labor pressures for wage increases; a
chronic and growing commercial deficit; and an insufficient basis of in-
come for the Public Sector.
In December, 1970, the new administration of President Luis
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Echeverrfa marked the beginning of an attempt to break with the priori-
ties of the model of "stabilizing development," and to address some of
Its Shortcomings, with respect to categories such as employment, income
distribution, and external financial dependency. The new strategy would
be called "shared development. "^^ The main objectives of Echevern'a's
economic policies were the following:^^
- Economic growth with income distribution;
- Strengthening of public finances;
- Reorganization of international transactions;
- Modernization of the agricultural sector;
- Rationalization of industrial development.
In the socio-political sphere, the policies of Echevern'a's admin-
istration attempted to face a dangerous legitimacy crisis, partly a re-
sult of the social costs implicit in the model of "stabilizing develop-
ment" and, more specifically, of the domestic unrest which had culmi-
nated in the bloody confrontation between soldiers and students in
21Tlatelolco in 1968. The process of political reform from 1970 to 1973
was meant to strengthen the institutional and legal opposition to the
ruling party, "Partido Revolucionario Institucional " (PRI), and to allow
new means of expression to the diverse ideological tendencies present
in Mexico. These reforms were introduced through constitutional amend-
ments and the promulgation of a new electoral law. Of course, it was
evident that these measures also purported to channel and control social
conflicts through legally recognized political parties.
The objectives of the model of "shared development" made necessary
a vigorous Public Sector, in order to recover the initiative that had
64
been partly lost to the private sector, and to give the economy a new
orientation. This gave rise to a conflict between the government and
the private sector, which became a permanent fixture of Echevern'a's
administration. President Echeverrfa adopted a policy that strongly
favored a greater intervention of the State in Mexico's process of de-
velopment, and changes in the patterns of distribution of income. On
the other hand, the private sector opposed this emphasis on State par-
ticipation; instead, it sought a continuation of the policies of the
1960's which, to a great extent, had placed the political and economic
resources of the State at its service.
President Echevern'a's administration considered "stabilizing de-
velopment" responsible for the relegation of the social aspects of de-
velopment. Therefore, public investments would now be channeled towards
the creation of new jobs, an increase in productivity and efficiency in
basic industries, and the reinvigoration of the agricultural sector.
And indeed, the Public Sector increased its participation in Mexico's
domestic product, from 11% in 1970 to 17.2% in 1975 and, respectively,
from 38% to 45% of the total gross domestic investments.^^
However, in the end, the model of "shared development" did not
bring about the expected results. The series of domestic measures un-
dertaken by Echeverria showed the critical interrelationship of social,
political, and economic factors. Echevern'a's attempts to tilt the
ideological orientation of the government to the left, and to side with
the poorer sectors of the population, brought about a break with the
private sector of the economy. As huge sums of capital left the coun-
try and investments collapsed. Echeverrfa resorted to foreign loans to
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finance his government's social programs. The growing debt, increased
public spending, and the diminishing production of basic articles of
consumption such as foodstuffs, generated a strong upwards inflationary
spiral. In the end, the sectors of the population worse-hit by infla-
tion were those that Echeverrfa had originally meant to help. And this,
finally, brought about renewed social unrest, manifest in the peasant
land invasions of 1976,25 and the general anxiety over the presidential
succession that same year.
During Echeverrfa's government, the attempts at administrative re-
form failed. The expansion of public spending stimulated economic
growth indices: 7.3% in 1972; 7.6% in 1973; 5.9% in 1974. However,
there were no perceptible changes in the distribution of income. And,
by 1976. inflation had reached a level of 16.5% annually. A new surge
in imports cancelled out the increments in exports: the deficit in the
balance of payments increased from 703 million dollars in 1971 to
3,643.4 million dollars in 1976. Tourism as a source of revenue was af-
fected by Mexico's vote in the United Nations on the "Zionist" resolu-
tion, which caused a Jewish travel boycott to Mexico.
During the period 1973-1976, Mexico's foreign debt grew by leaps
and bounds. By 1976, the total external public debt had reached the
figure of 15.845 billion dollars, which represented 32.8% of Mexico's
27
GNP. At the same time that private domestic investment contracted,
foreign investment increased its participation in the Mexican economy:
from 2.373 billion dollars in 1972 to close to 5 billion in 1975.
Obviously, foreign investors did not share the lack of confidence prev-
alent among Mexican private investors at the time. "Shared develop-
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ment," if for different reasons, had fallen into the same trap as "sta-
bilizing development:" an overwhelming reliance on foreign credits and
investments. According to Clark W. Reynolds, it would seem that the
years between 1971 and 1976 "...can be considered rather a period of
'destabilizing development' than of 'shared development. '"^^
Petroleum, although a crucial element in the Mexican developmental
equation, was only a part of the general scenario of economic imbalance
that persisted throughout the first half of the 1970's. The normaliza-
tion of the petroleum supply lessened what could have been radical po-
litical repercussions, but the economic crisis came anyhow, climaxing
in 1976. On August 30 of that year, the Mexican peso was devalued.
This marked the end of the transition period of "shared development."
The devaluation seemed to settle the internal conflict in Mexico in fa-
vor of the development schemes of the private sector.
"With the devaluation the last conditions were
given for the reproduction of the accumulation
process on the basis of industrial exports
controlled by dependent capital. "30
Apparently, except that petroleum would take the place of indus-
trial exports. By the time Mexico's new President, Jose Lopez Portillo,
took over in December, 1976, the situation of the country was darkened
by dreadful economic indicators, which included: a trade deficit of 3.2
billion dollars by February, 1977; inflation running at a rate of 30%;
high levels of unemployment and subemployment; a high rate of demographic
growth; uncontrolled urbanization; and a decline in tourism. To gener-
ate the resources necessary to grapple with this multi-faceted crisis,
and to restore confidence, the answer would be found in petroleum.
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Presence and Impact of U.S.
-based Multinatinn;^!
Corporations in Mexico
Multinational corporations could be broadly defined as "those eco-
nomic enterprises
-manufacturing, extractive, service and financial-
that are headquarted in one country and that pursue business activities
in one or more foreign countries ."^^ This basic definition could be
widened or restricted, in relation to the number of countries where a
corporation operates, or to the amount of their investments. In order
to better understand the role of multinational corporations in Mexico,
it would be useful to mention some fundamental characteristics of their
structure and behavior.
Global corporations are not only multinational, but multifunction-
al, that is, they are involved in the different stages of the productive
process through vertical integration. The distribution of different
productive capabilities throughout various countries gives the corpora-
tion headquarters an edge in determining volume and prices. Multi-
national corporations share a conception of the world as one big inte-
grated economic unit, in which they exert an increasing control through
the technology of production, finance capital, and marketing. '^'^ The
cosmopolitan vision of the multinationals constitutes, indeed, a chal-
lenge to nationalism. In a way, the upsurge of the global corporations
has been based on the beliefs in "progress" and "growth," i.e. the
"cult of bigness," and in the tendencies towards centralization.
Beginning after World War II, the development of multinational en-
terprises and their presence in the fields of investment, international
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commerce, and technology, have been steadily increasing. The sheer eco-
nomic weight of multinational corporations is impressive. In 1970. it
was estimated that the total value of all foreign investment was around
250 billion dollars, with a rate of expansion of between 10 and 20 per-
cent yearly. 36 By the beginning of the 1970's U.S.
-based multinational
corporations made up 5E.6% of the total; European firms. 37.5%; Japan.
2.6%; Canada. 3.9%; and Australia. 0.4%. In 1970. the annual produc-
tion by foreign enterprises in the world surpassed the volume of world
exports; from another perspective, the volume of international produc-
tion doubled that of exports by Western countries.
There are opposing views with respect to the activities of multi-
national corporations. Those who favor them point out the increasing
anachronism of the nation-state in an age of expanding and complex in-
terdependence, when efficiency and rationality are key objectives to
suit the needs of the world. Instead of the old-fashioned relative
gains of particular states, multinational corporations would open the
door for absolute gains for all.^^ The adherents of the "sovereignty-
at-bay" theory "...regard the multinational corporation as the embodi-
ment par excellence of the liberal ideal of an interdependent world
i40
economy." The global corporations consider themselves as vehicles for
peace and better understanding among nations, as a step beyond the nar-
row and confining allegiances of nationalism. In short, centralized and
integrated production is the best way to run the world economy.
The opposing view is equally emphatic. Some theorists point out
that in economic development there are two basic laws: the law of
increasing firm size, and the law of uneven development. Parallel to
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of
the concentration of economic wealth, there is a process of division
the world between regions of development, and regions of poverty. Thus,
underdevelopment and development are but two elements of the same phe-
^
nomenon: the inability to achieve balanced growth/^ To the argument
of efficiency proclaimed by the promoters of the international division
of labor, critics reply that top management continues to be recruited
from rich countries, while workers increasingly come from low-wage
areas.'^^ Furthermore, the activities of multinationals often result in
clashes between the corporations themselves and/or their parent-states,
and the host countries. Finally, all these considerations implicitly
question the ultimate compatibility of the profit motif with appeals to
the issues of morality and justice.
Other views on the subject emphasize that, even though the multi-
nationals have an international or transnational character, their matrix
and decision centers are located in the central metropolis, especially
the United States. Multinationals would appear to be controlled by
self-perpetuating elites that establish a symbiotic relationship with
the national state where they originate, in a process that conditions
and mutually reinforces the two actors. Even though their pursuits
and behavior may vary, both multinationals and the states where they are
headquartered share the same basis of sustenance: economic growth. As
such, their perception of the world is common more often than not.
The predominance of U.S. management in the big U.S. -based corpora-
tions would seem to substantiate the previous assessment. Richard J.
Barnet and Ronald E. Muller avoid the use of the term "multinational,"
because "...it suggests a degree of internationalization of management.
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to say nothing of stock ownership, which is not accurate." In their
analysis of global corporations, it was found that of 1.851 top managers
of leading U.S. companies with large foreign sales, only 1.6% were non-
American. Besides. non-Americans have but an insignificant amount of
the stock of these corporations.^^
What would have been the causes of the apparent confluence of in-
terests of U.S. foreign policy and U.S.
-based multinationals? Some re-
searchers have suggested that after World War II. U.S. foreign policy
was a reflection of the objectives of U.S. domestic policy: economic
growth and productivity, as a way of resolving political conflicts. The
idea behind this emphasis on economic development was that if scarcity
could be overcome, then political stability would follow. In this con-
text, new wealth would make it unnecessary to radically redistribute
economic benefits and power. As international tensions and ideological
rifts arose during the late 1940 's and 1950 's. the attempt to ensure the
primacy of economics over politics led into higher levels of concentra-
tion of economic power in multinational corporations as engines of
growth. In Germany and Japan, as mainstays against communism, but
mainly in the United States, large corporations eventually managed to
ascend to the fore of the production process, weakening the concern over
monopolistic power. However, the economic solution for political dis-
equilibriums would seem to work only under conditions of shared prosper-
ity. Present-day tensions over U.S. foreign policy and the role of the
multinationals arise from the fact that
"Hegemony remains successful, however, only
when it achieves advances for the whole
international structure within which it is
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exercised. Hegemony imposed in a zero-sum
cockpit, that is, at the expense of the
secondary members of the system, must finally
prove less durable. "46 ^
To a considerable degree, the phenomenon of the growth of the mul-
tinationals since World War II has been related to the dynamism of the
U.S. economy. Between 1950 and 1968, U.S. private investments in for-
eign countries increased from 19 billion dollars to more than 101 bil-
lion.'^'' The most important 187 U.S. corporations increased the number
of their foreign subsidiaries from 250 at the end of World War I to more
than 5,500 subsidiaries under their control in 1967.^^ Even though the
relative importance of U.S.
-based corporations with respect to total
world direct foreign investment tended to diminish somewhat during the
1970's, with the increasing participation of countries such as Japan and
West Germany, U.S. capital remained predominant among the leading multi-
nationals. By the 1970's it was estimated that close to 75% of world
commerce and industrial production was under the control of 300 multi-
national corporations, based mainly, although not exclusively, in the
United States.
The presence and impact of U.S. -based multinationals in Mexico must
be understood in light of these worldwide tendencies. Because of its
proximity to the United States, its political stability, and its grow-
ing domestic market, Mexico has been a much-favored target for the ex-
pansion of the multinational corporations. The increasing relevance of
the role of U.S. -based multinationals in Mexico coincides with the
worldwide enlargement of these corporations; geographical, economic, and
political reasons explain the degree of the phenomenon in Mexico.
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Mexico is among the top five recipients of foreign investments.
By 1970, multinational corporations were responsible for 23% of the to-
tal gross domestic product in manufacturing, a considerable increase
from the 18% they produced in 1962. Whereas in 1962 multinational cor-
porations had been responsible for 20% of all Mexican sales, in 1972
they accounted for 28% of the total. ^0 Foreign investments are concen-
trated in the largest firms and in certain key industries. For example,
in 1972, 50% of the largest 300 Mexican industrial firms, and 61% of the
overall largest firms, were controlled by foreign interests. The pre-
dominance of foreign capital is a fact in the most technologically ad-
vanced and capital-intensive industries in Mexico, including: in non-
electrical machinery, 95%; in transportation, 79%; and in chemicals.
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68%. Also, foreign investments find a favorite field for expansion in
the highly concentrated industries; in these, multinational corporations
accounted for 71% of all manufacturing sales.
In 1970, there were in Mexico 1,915 foreign-owned companies. Of
these, 242 were subsidiaries of 170 U.S. -based multinational corpora-
tions that have an undisputed importance in their home country, in terms
of their volumes of production and sales, and technological development.
These 242 subsidiaries represented more than a third of the total for-
eign investment in Mexico, and more than a third of the total sales in-
come; they were predominantly involved in manufacturing activities.^"^
Fully 166 of the 242 subsidiaries (or, 68.6%) were totally owned by some
of the 170 aforesaid multinationals. In 41 subsidiaries (17%), the
multinationals had a controlling share. Only in 14.4% of the 242 sub-
sidiaries was there a participation of less than 50% by the multi-
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national s.^^
In 1970, out of the total value of direct foreign investments in
Mexico. 80% came from U.S.-based corporations. In mining, U.S. invest-
ments represented 91% of the total, and in commerce, 77% of the total.
But the clearest case of predominance of U.S. firms was in the manufac-
turing activities: 90% of the activities of the U.S.-based multina-
tional corporations were concentrated in industry and manufacturing.^^
From the perspective of a Mexican observer:
"In conclusion, almost all foreign investment
in Mexico is Northamerican. and is located,
fundamentally, in the activities that are
cause and effect of a more dynamic develop-
ment: manufacturing and commerce. "56
In general terms, foreign-owned firms in Mexico are highly inte-
grated with their corresponding global corporations. Local subsidiar-
ies are owned directly by the parent corporation, rely on the corpora-
tion for financing, and do most of their trading with it.^^ In 1976.
foreign-owned corporations brought into Mexico 330 million dollars in
new investments; during that same year, they took out of the country
781 million dollars in profits. Thus, the negative balance for Mexico
on this account was -451 million dollars. The negative balance, i.e.
profits sent out of Mexico in excess of new investments, reached be-
tween 1971 and 1976 a total of -1,900 million dollars. This negative
balance for Mexico, the difference between new investments entering the
national economy, and profits from their operations that are sent to
the headquarters of the multinationals, would seem to indicate that it
is Mexico which is financing the development of the United States, and
not the opposite.
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It has been documented that multinationals tend to displace native
entrepreneurs, and make use of native capital, whenever that course of
action is possible, rather than to contribute new capital. In Mexico,
between 1965 and 1971, there was an increase of 74,542 million dollars
in the total active capital of foreign multinationals; of this sum,
62.6% was financed with national resources. By 1967, of the 412 sub-
sidiaries which belonged to the 162 U.S.-based multinational corpora-
tions operating in Mexico, only 143 subsidiaries had been established
as new companies; 112 subsidiaries were set up as acquisitions of al-
ready-existing firms, and 109 as a result of branching out of already-
established subsidiaries.^^
In regard to external credits to finance Mexico's development,
U.S.
-banking institutions have also been predominant. In 1976, the to-
tal public and private external debt of Mexico amounted to 24 billion
dollars. Of this figure, 15,830.000 million were contracted with pri-
vate foreign firms, and 11,540,000 million of this sum (72.9%) were
credits from U.S. private banking institutions. In 1976, the public
external debt of Mexico, 15,845,000 million dollars, amounted to 32.8%
of the country's GNP.^^
According to the market orientation of U.S.-based corporations op-
erating in Mexico, a general classification would show two main areas
of investments: the first, and by far most important, is constituted
by direct investments geared to produce for the Mexican market; the sec-
ond comprises the industrial plants established in Mexico within a short
distance of the U.S. border, geared to sales in the U.S. market.
The Mexican government, by the beginning of the 1970 's, offered tax
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concessions to foreign companies Interested In setting up Industrial
Plants Within 20 kilometers of the U.S. border, as long as all finished
products were exported to the United States. By 1972. there were 333
Of these plants operating along the border zone, employing 40.000 Mexi-
can workers, and producing electronic, textile, and other kinds of pro-
ducts with a value of 500 million dollars annually.^^
By m1d-l974 the number of companies had increased to more than
500. which employed more than 70.000 Mexican workers. In effect, these
were an exception to the predominantly capital-intensive activitJes of
U.S. corporations in Mexico. However, by 1975 the program began to
slow down, for a couple of important reasons. On the one hand, the
Mexican government had doubled the minimum wage level towards the end
of 1974. On the other hand, and most Important, under the U.S. Act of
Commerce of 1974, all cotton articles finished in Mexico and exported
to the United States would now be Included in the American export quo-
tas for Mexican cotton; fully 25% of the border plants were producing
textiles. These facts, coupled by the U.S. recession of 1974-75. had
brought about by mid-1975 a reduction in the number of plants down to
430 and in the number of Mexican workers, down to 60, 000.
The picture that emerges out of the presence and impact of the
U.S.
-based multinational corporations in Mexico is a complex and often
contradicting one. On the one hand, the beneficial effects of foreign
investments are considerable. They Include a steady Infusion of capi-
tal and techniques, the promotion of modernization and industrializa-
tion, a more efficient utilization of resources, employment creation,
and a rise In productivity. Perhaps the most visible and tangible
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effect of foreign investments is their contribution to fiscal revenues,
thus helping to cover the "gaps" between domestic savings and public
^
investments; that is, the taxation of foreign capital helps to elimi-
nate budgetary deficits. Foreign corporations are important tax con-
tributors: their participation in the federal budget until recently
has been around 20% of the total. These taxes represent almost a
fourth of the aggregate value of their production, and their fiscal
burden is higher than the average in Mexico. These facts are the re-
sult of their high rate of profits and the strict supervision of their
activities by Mexican fiscal authorities. Also, their usually large
Size makes them keep a more careful accountability than small and medi-
um-sized Mexican firms. Finally, some foreign corporations prefer not
to enjoy the fiscal exemptions allowed to mixed enterprises, as long as
they keep absolute control of the firms.^^
On the other hand, the detrimental effects for Mexico's develop-
ment of the activities of foreign corporations are also numerous. As
it has been stated, an overwhelming proportion of foreign investments
comes from the United States, a fact which underlines the dependence of
Mexico on its northern neighbor. Furthermore, foreign corporations pre-
fer to have total control of their firms in Mexico, their rate of profit
is considerably high, they take advantage primarily of the Mexican do-
mestic market, and do not constitute a significant source of exports.
In spite of their fiscal contributions, it is assumed that tax evasion
takes place at substantial levels, through "transfer-pricing" and other
means. Foreign investments are concentrated in the industrial sector,
and make use mainly of capital-intensive techniques, thus rendering its
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)e ex-
effect on employment creation to a much lower level than might b
Pected from the value of their Investments. The technological depen-
dence Of Mexico on foreign patents continues to Increase. Finally, the
activities Of foreign corporations take place primarily in or around the
metropolitan area of Mexico City and a few other major urban centers.
contributing to regional Imbalances.
In conclusion, the following could be said to be some of the main
characteristics of foreign corporations in Mexico:
-Preponderance of U.S.-based multinationals and U.S. banking in-
stitutions.
-Substantial control by these multinationals of some of the most
dynamic sectors of the Mexican economy.
-Subordination of operations in Mexico to external decision cen-
ters and foreign management.
-Displacement of native entrepreneurs.
-Decapitalization of the Mexican economy.
The previous analysis of foreign investments in Mexico leads into
the political arena. The economic and technological benefits implicit
in direct foreign investments must be contrasted with the possible loss
or reduction of national economic self-reliance. From this perspective,
the issue of the positive and negative effects of foreign investments
goes beyond the economic dimension to a scenario where economic opera-
tions, albeit important, are subordinated to a conjunction of political
factors. These factors are related both to Mexican domestic politics,
and to the maneuvering capacity of the Mexican government in the inter-
national milieu.
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The political implications of the effect of ii c:ui rr U.S. economic influ-
ence in Mexico ™st be viewed within the context of historical, politi-
cal, economic, geopolitical, and strategic evidence. In short, the po-
lUlcal impact of foreign investments in Mexico is directly related to
the concept of
..national interest... as a basis for analysis. But the
'national interest., of Mexico
.ust be weighed against the notion of the
"national security, of the United States. The perception of national
security on the part of different agencies of the U.S. government, and
the subsequent actions to enforce that perception, have often led to
conflict in the relations between the United States and Mexico, ^s a
general rule, the national security of the United States has determined
the need for a continuous reinforcement of U.S. hegemony in the Carib-
bean and Central American area, which comprises the so-called vital
geographic perimeter for the defense of the United States, and of which,
of course. Mexico is an Indispensable component. That need has often
clashed with Mexico.
s '.national interest... because of what the Mexican
government may or may not do. And. as a matter of fact, all political
outcomes in Mexico, are evaluated in Washington, primarily in strategic
terms.
National interest manifests itself in an acceptable degree of sov-
ereignty. Sovereignty means internal supremacy and external indepen-
dence; that is to say, a sovereign state must have complete legal and
factual authority over all the subjects (Individuals and groups) which
compose it, and must be legally and factually Independent from control
by another state. It is the degree of relativity of Mexico's sover-
eignty vis a vis the United States that especially concerns us here.
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The notion of sovereignty provides a useful parameter to assess
the impact of U.S. business in Mexico. Through their massive invest-
ments, U.S.-based corporations control to a considerable extent some of
the most dynamic areas of Mexico's economy. I.e. manufacturing and com-
nierce. as well as the most strategic factor of development, i.e. tech-
nology. It would follow that U.S. economic influence potentially re-
moves a large and vital part of the Mexican economy from national polit-
ical control. It could be argued that in many cases, economic deci-
sions have responded to the needs of U.S. corporations rather than to
the needs of Mexico. Therefore, the vulnerability of the Mexican gov-
ernment to actions taken by U.S. business corporations or by Washington
is increased significantly. The most important result of this situa-
tion is the limitation to the scope and reach of political action by the
Mexican government and, thus, to Mexico's national sovereignty.^''
Attempts to Regulate Foreign Investments
The real debate among Mexico's governing elites since the 1950 's
has not been whether or not to promote the entrance of new foreign in-
vestments. In this respect, up to now the issue is quite well decided
in favor of foreign investments. Rather, the critical point has been
how to have both foreign capital and domestic control. Parallel to the
impressive growth of investments by multinational corporations in
Mexico since the 1950's, two developments have underlined the contin-
uous concern of the Mexican government about the activities of the mul-
tinationals.
-The renewal of the process of nationalization of areas of the
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economy vital for national viability. In 1960. the State acquired the
last two foreign electrical companies through the State-owned Federal
Co^ission of Electricity, an action which gave it the monopoly of
electric energy. By the mid-1960's. all foreign mining compani
forced to sell 51% of their constitutive capital to Mexican i
tors. 68
es were
nves-
-As the model of "stabilizing development" gave way to the model
of "shared development" during the early 1970's, foreign investments
were seen by the Mexican government as unresponsive to the needs of in-
tegral development. Consequently, Echeverria's administration proceeded
to attempt to control more effectively the multinational corporations.
The Mexican government decided to face what it saw as a challenge
from the multinational corporations in a variety of ways: increasing
the pressures for "Mexicanization" to new areas of the manufacturing
sector; forcing the foreign-controlled industries to increase the use
of domestically-produced parts; tying concessions of import permits to
the levels of exports by the soliciting corporations; new coordinated
regulations to control the volume and activities of foreign invest-
ments.^^
There have been laws controlling foreign investments in Mexico
since 1944. However, because of the absence of a general law applica-
ble to all foreign investments, each presidential administration would
take a different approach. Also, the laws as they stood provided for
exceptions by administrative decree. By 1973, the need for comprehen-
sive legislation to control foreign investments had become apparent.
In March of that year the "Law to Promote Mexican Investments and
eman-
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Regulate Foreign Investment" was enacted, and it went into effect two
months afterwards. Among the fundamental points of the new legislation
were: in no case would foreign investments be greater than 49% of th
total in any given enterprise; this same limit would apply to local
agement of the companies; the creation of a "National Commission of For-
eign Investment," with the power to change established percentages, and
tending to greater national participation when it would deem it neces-
sary. ^0
While this law was being enacted in the Mexican Congress, an inci-
dent occurred which helps to illustrate the persistence of disagreement
between the official American and Mexican views in regards to foreign
investments. The U.S. ambassador in Mexico at the time, Robert H.
McBride. in a speech given before the U.S.
-Mexican Managerial Committee
in October, 1972, strongly criticized the imminent change by the Mexican
government of the "rules of the game" with respect to foreign invest-
ments, praising their beneficial effects on Mexican development. In
response to McBride, and expressing the dissatisfaction of the Mexican
government with his speech, the Mexican Secretary of Commerce, Jose'
Campillo Sains, declared that, indeed, the rules of the gam.e were being
changed, "to adjust them to the needs and aspirations of our day."^^
Significantly, ambassador McBride was recalled and dismissed from his
post within that same year.
Another legal means of control of foreign investments is the "Law
on the Registry of Technological Transfers and the Use and Exploitation
of Patents and Brands," which went into effect in January, 1973. This
law established the "National Registry of Technological Transfers,"
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whose main obierti\/oc +O j ctives are to avcd the Importation of technology al-
b. the ™uinat1onaU fo. concept of ro.aUles an. technical ass,.-
tance. which should not exceed 3% of net sales/^
In the context of these attempts to regulate the activities of the
«lt1nat1onal corporations, two related facts should be mentioned-
Mexico is one of the few Latin American countries that have refused to
sign With the united States an agreement of guarantee to investments-
and Mexico does not receive direct aid from the United States. Another
interesting related action too. place during the mid-igyo's. In regards
to the Mexican-sponsored United Nations
.'Chart of Economic Rights and
Duties Of the States." To this day. the United States has not signed
this international agreement, one of the few industrial powers still
not to do so. Thus, while the United States lacks certain legal and
economic means to pressure Mexico to be favorably disposed towards U.S.
policies regarding foreign Investments, it. too. has avoided entering
Into agreements that might hinder a U.S. response to actions against
foreign investments by other countries.
These Mexican laws that regulate foreign Investments and techno-
logical transfers are by no means flawless. It is doubtful whether the
Mexican government has the administrative capacity to carry on the reg-
ulatory supervision of foreign enterprises. On the other hand, various
devices to circumvent the laws are still extensively used in Mexico,
such as the subterfuge known as the "name lenders." which involves the
registry of shares of ownership under the name of a Mexican citizen.
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concealing the real owner or beneficiary. These facts add up to a sit-
uation where
"The preponderance and control of foreicninvestments in the Mexican economy will
continue to grow to the same extent that
the system does not come to grips with the
correction of these deficiencies, and to the
same extent of its failure in doing so 73
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CHAPTER IV
MEXICO'S ENERGY POLICY
Measure of the Petrol Pum Bonan za
cen-
Although most of the recent petroleum finds in Mexico have
tered in the southeastern region of the country, there are other areas
of substantial hydrocarbon accumulations. The main oil and gas produc-
ing areas are the following: the Northeastern Fields, located in the
Piedras Negras-Monol ova Province, which extends through the states of
Coahuila and Nuevo Leon; the Tampico-Nautla area, which includes the
Chicontepec Basin along the northern part of the state of Veracruz; the
Reforma Fields in the southeastern states of Chiapas and Tabasco; and
the Continental Shelf off the state of Campeche.^ There are also other
areas throughout Mexico that have been reported as promising sources for
new petroleum provinces. In regards to medium-term objectives, explor-
atory work is under way in the states of Baja California and Chihuahua,
as well as in the Continental Shelf of the Gulf of California and at sea
off the state of Sinaloa. Longer-term objectives include exploration in
the states of Michoacan, Guerrero. Nayarit, Oaxaca. and Jalisco. Addi-
tionally, preliminary exploration work suggests the existence of hydro-
carbons in various places along the Central Plateau. Sonora, and the
Chiapas mountain range.
The Northeastern Fields are mainly producers of natural gas, al-
though there are a few oil wells near the city of Reynosa. By 1978,
close to 15% of Mexico's estimated natural gas reserves, which amounted
90
91
along the centra, part of the state of Coahuila and the northwest sec-
tion Of the state of Nuevo Leon.3 The Sablnas fields, which extend
over an area of 50.000 appear to be so.e of the .ost Important In
the Western Hemisphere, and superior to all the other natural gas de-
posits in Mexico put together/
The Tampico-Nautla area, site of
.uch of Mexico's oil boo. of the
early 1920's, includes the old fields near Tuxpan and Poza Rica. Pres-
ent efforts in this area concentrate on the Chicontepec Basin, which
covers an area of more than 3,000 km^. These are generally shallower
deposits, found at an average depth of only 1,200 meters, and with a low
yield of between 50 and 100 barrels daily (b/d). By comparison, the
overall average production level of Mexican wells at present, including
of course the rich Southeastern area, is 500 b/d.^
According to Pemex, the Chicontepec Basin holds more than 100 bil-
lion barrels of oil, of which close to 18 billion are susceptible to
exploitation. However, this would require the drilling of more than
16.000 wells. By comparison, from 1938 to March, 1979, the total num-
ber of wells drilled in Mexico came to 15,895. Notwithstanding, Pemex
insists on the profitable exploitation of Chicontepec which, throughout
the first thirteen years of development, should yield 2,600 million
barrels of oil. As a start, by March, 1979, there were 433 wells in
production in the area.^ Initially, the news about Chicontepec were
received with awe in the United States. ^ which has subsequently turned
somewhat to skepticism regarding the technical feasibility of fully de-
veloping the area.^
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Mexico's present oil bonanza centers 1n the southeastern states of
Tabasco and Chiapas, and in the Continental Shelf off the state of
Campeche. An analysis of production figures for 1979 attests to this
fact. Pen,ex divided its oil production figures for that year In rela-
tion to three geographical zones, northern, central, and southern.
Which correspond roughly to the Northeastern Fields, the Tanplco-Nautla
area, and the Refor™ and Ca.peche Fields of the southeast, respective-
ly- In 1979. out of a total production of 590.6 million barrels, that
is. a daily average of 1.618 million barrels, the northern zone pro-
duced 27.812.635 barrels (5%). the central zone 53.403.515 barrels (9%).
and the southern zone 509,354.216 barrels (SSX) By 1980. the Reform
area was contributing 48.9% of the total production, and the fields In
the Continental Platform off Campeche accounted for 35.4%. For 1982
the relative importance of the fields in the Continental Platform is
expected to increase to 63% of the total, while the Refo™a area dimin-
ishes its share to 26%.!^ In any case, by mid-1981 it was possible to
conclude that both oil provinces were part of the same geological for-
mation.
The Reforma Fields in the states of Tabasco and Chiapas have un-
dergone a rapid development since 1972. when the first discoveries took
place. By 1975. five oil fields were being exploited in the area,
which represented 310,000 b/d. at the time nearly half of the total
national production. The average yield per well was over 4,200 b/d. in
contrast with the then national average of 110 b/d per well.^^ By
April. 1976. there were 80 wells in the Reforma area, which produced
442,000 b/d, that is. an average of 5.524 b/d per well. The combined
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production for both oil and associated gas was 950.000 b/d. which under-
lines the fact that natural gas accounts for a high proposition of the
total output in the Southeast. By 1976. the fact that wellhead pres-
sures had regained basically unchanged through
.ore than two years of
sustained production, confirmed the richness of the Reforma Fields.
By 1978. the picture that seemed to emerge from Pemex's data on the
Reforma oil region, was that of a huge deposit of approximately. 7.000
Km
.
The geological structures in Reforma are extremely rich, and most
drillings in the area have turned out to be commercially profitable.
The first discovery of a "supergiant" petroleum deposit during the
1970 's took place in Reforma: the "Antonio J. Be^udez" field, with
6.500 million barrels susceptible to exploitation, and an average pro-
duction of 8.000 b/d per well, as of 1978. Other "gianf fields in the
area, with more than 1.500 million barrels susceptible to exploitation.
Include the "Cactus." "Sitio Grande." and "Iris-Giraldas" fields. By
mid- 1981 the Reforma area was producing more than one million b/d.l''
It has been estimated by Pemex that, when fully developed, the Reforma
area could produce at least 3.5 million b/d.The total reserves of
Reforma should amount to over 25 billion barrels.'^
Closely related to the mainland finds, the most spectacular and
recent discoveries have taken place in the Continental Platform off the
state of Campeche. By mid-1978, Pemex had announced the existence of
a "sea" of oil offshore, comparable in size to the deposits of Tabasco
and Chiapas. In order to explore further, and commence the exploita-
tion of the area. Pemex rented several oil rigs and contracted the
services of U.S. engineers and geologists. The first drillings
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-suited 1n an encouraging rate of success.^^ By August. 1979. Pe.ex
had accelerated development of the Gulf of Ca.peche deposits at the
"ate of one drilling platform every two weeks.
By March, 1981. Pemex had explored some 50.000 km^ In the Contl-
nental Shelf, with detailed work being done in 8.000 kml Actual de-
velopment Of oil deposits was taking place within an area of 700 km^
at a depth of between 1.250 to 3.600 meters. There was a 6« rate of
successful drillings. With a production of 1.308.000 barrels per day.
the Gulf Of Campeche is at present the most Important oil province in
the world. The "Akal" field Is the world's first In capacity of pro-
duction, with an output of 42.000 b/d per welL^^
Many other areas in Mexico are susceptible of holding deposits of
petroleum and natural gas. Mexico's territorial extension is 1.967.183
km
:
including the Continental Platform, the total increases to approx-
imately 2.5 million kml According to Pemex officials. 72? of this
total area. i.e. 1.8 million km^, corresponds to sedimentary basins, of
which only 10% have been explored and exploited with relative Intensity.
The remainder. I.e. 1.6 million km^, is likely to contain hydrocarbon
deposi ts.'^^
In order to better understand the measure of Mexico's petroleum
reserves, the basic scale of reference should be mentioned here. There
are three categories used to estimate the magnitude of reserves:
proven, probable, and potential. These terms express the degree of
certainty of the deposits. Proven reserves are those whose location,
size, and susceptibility to exploitation have been determined beyond
any reasonable doubt. Probable reserves imply the likelihood of the
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existence of deposits. Potential reserves pertain to still preli.i
estimates, reached according to the characteristics of geological
strata usually associated with hydrocarbon deposits.
Since the early 1960's until the mid-1970's. estimates of Mexico's
proven hydrocarbon reserves remained stable, at 5 to 6 billion barrels
of crude oil and natural gas. Production steadily increased, albeit
not rapidly enough to compensate for growing domestic demand, and by
1972 Mexico's annual petroleum output of close to 194 million barrels
had reached the previous 1921 all-time high. By late 1976. the incor-
poration of the fields in southeastern Mexico had raised the level of
production considerably, as well as the estim.ates of proven, probable,
and potential reserves. On February 11, 1977, for the first time in
its history. Pemex produced more than a million b/d. By then, the new
fields in the southeast already represented 60% of the entire output.
During 1977. a year in which Pemex expanded its exploration to
cover twenty-five states across Mexico, petroleum deposits were being
discovered at a rate of one each twenty days. By December of that year.
Pemex estimated its reserves, which always include natural gas as well
as crude oil. to amount to 16 billion barrels in proven reserves. 31
billion probable, and 120 billion potential. In his second annual
report. President Lopez Portillo in 1978 officially announced estimates
of 20 billion barrels in proven reserves. 37 billion probable, and 200
22billion potential. By August, 1978, stepped-up explorations in the
Bay of Campeche were beginning to raise speculations that Mexico's hy-
drocarbon wealth could place it eventually alongside Saudi Arabia as
23
a producer. Early 1979 estimates expressed that Mexico conservatively
le en-
expected its offshore reserves and production to equal that of th.
tire North Sea by the n,1d-1980's. and that it had only begun to exploit
its Gulf of Mexico potential.
On the basis of these substantial increments in reserves, the pro-
duction of hydrocarbons doubled in just four years. From 1977 to 1980,
total output increased from 545.6 to 1,032.4 million barrels, i.e. an
average of 23.7% per year. In 1976, the average daily production was
0.9 million barrels of crude oil and 2,115 million cubic feet of gas;
by early 1980, these figures had increased to 2.1 million barrels of
crude oil and 3,672 million cubic feet of gas. In spite of the growth
in production, the ratio reserves/production improved from 19 years
in 1976 to 57 years in 1979.^^
The program of production drawn up by Pemex in 1976 had stated the
goal of 2.25 million barrels daily for 1982. By July, 1980, two and a
half years ahead of schedule, this objective had been surpassed, with
2.276 million b/d. At that time, Mexico became the first producer of
hydrocarbons in Latin America, ahead of Venezuela, and the fifth in the
world, behind the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and
26
Irak. In his fourth annual report of September, 1980, President
Lopez Portillo announced significant increases in estimates of reserves:
60.126 billion barrels in proven reserves, 38.042 billion probable, and
250 billion potential.
Thus, in terms of both reserves and production, the growth of the
Mexican petroleum industry has been spectacular. On March 18, 1981,
the Director of Pemex was able to announce that available reserves had
increased almost eleven times since 1976, to 67.830 billion barrels in
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proven reserves, 45 billion probable, and 250 billion potential. ^8 At
the time, the ratio reserves/production was up to 60 years.
There are two reservations that, to a certain degree, might qualify
reserves estimates as well as production goals. In its figures for re-
serves, Pemex includes natural gas as well as petroleum. Since the
ratio is usually estimated at 35:65 respectively, petroleum by itself
would correspond to only two-thirds of total reserves. Additionally,
partly as a result of the quick pace of development, in some cases
drilling data have not been forthcoming parallel to announcements of
increases in reserves. This point could raise some questions in regards
to reserve claims. However, in the light of achievements in both ex-
ploration and subsequent exploitation since the mid-1970's, these fac-
tors by no means appear to add up to a straitjacket for the Mexican pe-
troleum industry.
In his fifth annual report of September, 1981, President Lopez
Portillo announced that total production of hydrocarbons through 1981
had reached an average of 2.350 million b/d, an increase of 17.5% rel-
ative to the same period in the previous year. Whereas in 1976 Mexico
occupied the fifteenth place in the world with regard to production, at
present it is the fourth largest oil producer in the world, only after
the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Likewise, Mexi-
co's reserves are also the fourth largest in the world, on the order of
72 billion barrels in proven reserves, 58.650 billion probable, and 250
billion potential. By late 1981 it was a widely acknowledged fact
that Mexico had, indeed, sizable petroleum and natural gas deposits,
whose progressive exploitation was bound to have a lasting impact in
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its domestic affairs, as wpII ;ic -in i .. ell as in Us role in the international sce-
nario.
Energy Policy
Mnlnistra^ Until recently, the Mexican government had not consid-
ered the need for a comprehensive energy policy. Since the nationaliza-
tion of the petroleum industry, each energy field had been managed in-
dividually by state enterprises. These state organizations could be
classified in two groups: those involved in the production process;
and the institutions in charge of research and development. The most
important in the first group are: Mexican Petroleum (Pemex), created
in 1938; the Federal Electricity Commission, set up also in 1938; and
Mexican Uranium (Uramex). established in 1979. The research institu-
tions that operate in accordance with these organizations are: the
Mexican Petroleum Institute, established in 1965; the Electricity Re-
search Institute, created in 1937; and the National Nuclear Research
Institute which, together with the National Atomic Energy Commission,
were established in 1979.^^
Pemex is the most important Mexican company, second in Latin Amer-
ica, and thirty-eighth in the world, with sales for 7.290 billion dol-
lars by December. 1980.^2 ^^.^ ^.^^^^ ^^^^^ substantially higher
but for the fact that domestic price levels are far below those preva-
lent in the international market. To December. 1979. Pemex employed
103,271 workers in its various areas of activity. Whereas in 1976 pro-
duction was 14.9 b/d per employee, by 1980 this figure had risen to
26.1 b/d. This represented a 75% increase in productivity. By 1980,
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crude production was three ti.es that of 1976, while personnel had only
increased at an average of 5.06% annually. From another angle, oper-
ating expenses, which in 1976 accounted for 54% of total sales income,
represented only 31% of the total in 1980. Of course, it could be ar-
gued that the extraordinary wealth of the new wells, rather than spe-
cific increases in productivity per worker, has been the key to these
improvements. Indeed, the number of barrels of proven reserves for each
Pemex worker increased from 72,000 in 1976 to 560,000 by 1980.^3
According to U.S. sources. "Pemex can easily be compared to a major
American oil company." Pemex itself takes care of most of its own work:
exploration, drilling, production, refining, basic petrochemicals,
transportation and commercialization, technological development, and
construction. For operations such as offshore drilling and coring anal-
ysis, sometimes it contracts the services of comrr.ercial specialized
firms, just as major American companies occasionally do.^^
The Mexican Petroleum Institute includes five divisions: engineer-
ing, petrochemical and refining, training, exports, and exploration.
The Institute is Pemex's primary consulting firm and architect/engineer-
ing contractor. It appears to be an internationally competitive tech-
nical firm, holding more than 100 international patents. The Institute
is "an active, burgeoning petroleum technology firm" which, in addition,
provides Pemex with onsite technical supervision at its major construc-
tion projects. Thus, the Institute not only develops, but also imple-
ments and applies Pemex's technical base. This role as a fundamental
technological support includes training programs for most of Pemex's
personnel
.
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Plannini. The Secretariat of National Patrimony and Industrial Develop-
ment (Secretaria de Patrimonioy Fomento Industrial) is in charge of de-
fining and implementing national energy policy. Its jurisdiction in-
cludes the Energetics Corrmission. established in 1973 and termed by its
officials as a "modest equivalent" to the U.S. Department of Energy; its
role is rather diminished by the fact that it does not set any energy
36policy. However, the Energetics Commission formulates guidelines
about the administration and rational use of energy sources. In other
words, the Commission is a state instrument for developing strategies
to meet energy demands, according to available resources and the coun-
try's socioeconomic needs. "^^
With the creation of the Energetics Commission in 1973, the idea
of a comprehensive approach to energy policy began to take hold of
Mexican government officials. At first, the main themes referred to
self-sufficiency, an extension of energy supplies to the population, a
diversification of energy sources, planning mechanisms, financial sta-
bility, and the promotion of research and technology. There were obvi-
ous internal and external factors that blocked these measures, includ-
ing: a lack of coordination among the various organizations in charge
of the national supply of energy; a discontinuity in the development
plans of the sector, due to the administration changes every sexenio
(six-year presidential terms); after 1976, external pressures regarding
oil exports; domestic subsidies to the industrial sector; and a lack of
reliable data concerning reserves. However, the fact that national
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development is contingent, to a significant degree, on energy strat-
egies, reaffirmed the vital need for a comprehensive policy. It
double-edged proposition. Energy policy must be geared towards produc-
tion, mainly industrial growth, according to the basic tenets of
Mexico's postwar process of development; and the industrial sector
should cover, increasingly, the needs for capital goods in Pemex and
the Federal Electricity Comnission.
There were two basic domestic considerations in the promotion of
a comprehensive energy policy: the fact that Mexico's development and
growing energy demands have relied predominantly on petroleum and nat-
ural gas; and the state policy of maintaining a low domestic price for
these resources, in order to promote economic and industrial activities.
Conversely, an energy plan would have to address the question of dimin-
ishing the overwhelming reliance on a single non-renewable resources,
i.e. oil and natural gas, and of revising internal price policies.
By 1977, the main guidelines for a comprehensive energy policy dur-
ing Lopez Portillo's sexenio (1977-1982) already seemed clear: a) pe-
troleum should not become an end in itself in the process of develop-
ment; b) petroleum resources must be industrialized; c) for geograph-
ical as well as economic reasons, the United States would continue to
be Mexico's most important oil client; d) petroleum resources must be
given optimum utilization; e) hydrocarbons would constitute the axis
of the energy policy; f) the process of development must make use of
coal; g) nuclear energy should be used once reactors were available,
but it would not be the base of Mexico's development; h) solar and
geothermic energy must be incorporated to development, even before
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nuclear energy; i) hydraulic energy should also play a role.^^
By the late 1970's, it appeared that the Mexican government was
following a course of accelerated extraction of its petroleum resources,
with the objective of achieving a sizable level of exports. In the
past. Mexico had maintained a rather cautious energy policy, geared to
production for the domestic market, and conservation of its oil re-
sources. Now the new and sharply distinct goals revolved around three
incentives for development: to achieve self-sufficiency for Mexico in
refined products and basic petrochemicals; to increase the participation
of finished products in contrast with primary products in the exports
market; and to achieve a liberalization in the prices of petroleum pro-
ducts. This amounted to a recognition of the need to end with superflu-
ous subsidies and excessive protectionism.^^ However, these objectives
would be qualified, increasingly, by crude oil exports, a tendency which
in principle at least, would seem to undermine their intended effective-
ness .
In recent times, the Mexican government has shown an affinity with
planning, as a means to bring cohesiveness and a common purpose to the
process of development. According with this trend, on April 15, 1980,
President Lopez Portillo promulgated the "Global Plan for Development,
1980-1982," as a stage towards the creation of a "National System of
Planning." The Secretariat of the Budget and Planning (Secretaria de
Programacion y Presupuesto) is in charge of the implementation of the
Global Plan, whose basic objectives are:^^
1- "To reaffirm and strengthen Mexico's economic, political and
cultural independence as a democratic, just and free nation;
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2- To provide the population with employment and a minimum of wel-
fare, giving priority to the needs with respect to food, education,
health, and housing;
3- To promote a high, sustained, and efficient economic growth; and
4- To improve the distribution of income among the people, factors
of production, and geographical regions."
Energy policy is a crucial element of the Global Plan for Develop-
ment. In his presentation of the Plan, the Secretary of the Budget and
Planning, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, emphasized that "oil is inti-
mately tied to the viability of the planning strategy." However, "It
is not a matter of implementing an oil growth policy, but a policy of
development that makes use of oil." From this perspective, the exploi-
tation and export of oil would seem to be conditioned by the purposes
of the overall development strategy, and by the real absorption capac-
ity by the Mexican society, of oil resources and income. Indeed, this
question encompasses the critical dilemma that grows out of Mexido's
petroleum wealth: will Mexico's government and society be able to fos-
ter, shape, and channel development in a positive way for the nation as
a whole, or will oil distort development in an uncontrolled, and possi-
bly unsatisfying, fashion. In other words, oil income is likely to
further the third basic objective of the Global Plan, i.e. economic
growth; but its impact on the achievement of the other three objectives,
i.e. Mexico's economic and political independence, social progress, and
distribution of income, still remains a dubious proposition.
Energy policy, introduced in Chapter XI of the Global Plan, con-
stitutes a basic support for the objectives of the general strategy of
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development. Chapter XI enumerates the specific goals to be reached in
this field: to uphold the sole ownership by the nation of all hydro-
carbon resources in Mexico's territory, as well as in the 200-mile "ex-
clusive economic zone" in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean; to
generate sufficient electric energy for the country's needs; to diver-
sify and take advantage of alternate energy sources; to promote the man-
ufacture of capital goods for the oil industry; to diversify Mexico's
foreign trade; to protect the environment; and to propose to the inter-
national community the adoption of a "World Energy Plan," in order to
give an integral approach to the solution of the energy crisis. In
the Global Plan, a maximum level is set for production of petroleum,
defined as 2.5 million barrels of crude oil daily, with a margin of
flexibility of 10%, to guarantee domestic supply and exports. This
means that, according to the Plan, the level of 2.7 million barrels of
crude oil daily would be the maximum expected production up until
1982.^"^
The Global Plan for Development gave an additional boost to the
promulgation of an Energy Program. During September and October, 1980,
the Mexican Congress was busy analyzing the basic points of such a pro-
44
gram. Finally, on November 18, 1980, the Secretary of National Pat-
rimony and Industrial Development, Jose Andre's de Oteyza, set in motion
the National Energy Program. Among other points, he emphasized the fact
that not more than 50% of Mexican oil would be exported to any single
country, the need for appropriate technology, and the urgency of ratio-
nalization in the use of oil. Specifically with respect to the 50%
limit on exports, Oteyza declared: "Of the one million and a half oil
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barrels Mexico will export, the United States will receive 730.000 or
750,000 barrels of crude daily. "^^
The Energy Program sets goals to 1990. and projections to the year
2000. It places energy in the overall context of development, and de-
lineates its role. In other words, the main objective of the Energy
Program is to support national economic development, which implies:
"...in the first place, to expand the production ofhydrocarbons according to the needs of a balanced
economic growth. Secondly, to obtain the resourcesderived from o 1 exploitation, in order to assignthem to activities of the highest priority. "46
Specifically, the objectives of the Energy Program are as fol-
lows r^^
1- "To satisfy the national needs for primary and secondary energy;
2- To rationalize the production and use of energy;
3- To diversify the sources of primary energy, paying particular
attention to renewable resources;
4- To integrate the energy sector to the development of the rest of
the economy;
5- To know with greater precision the energy resources in the coun-
try; and
6- To strengthen the scientific and technical infrastructure cap-
able of developing Mexico's potential in this field and of benefiting
from new techniques."
The Energy Program stresses the fact that so far Mexico has used
its energy resources in an inefficient way. This is underlined by the
high intensity in energy consumption per unit of GDP, an index compara-
ble, and even superior to those in highly industrialized countries. In
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other words. Mexico appears to have an energy-intensive economy. Thus,
there is a need to modify consumption patterns and increase efficiency.
In this context, the diversification of energy sources is the only way
to diminish dependency on hydrocarbons.^^
The Energy Program establishes three levels of priorities:'^^
1- Energy and industrialization;
2- Energy and regional development; and
3- Energy and the external sector.
In regards to energy and industrialization, the Program underlines
the possibilities in refining, petrochemicals, and energy-intensive in-
dustries. The links with regional development are related to the need
for spatial planning of urban and industrial growth, for a strengthen-
ing and extension of infrastructure and services in the places where the
oil industry has a greater impact, and for a protection of the environ-
ment. The relation between energy and the external sector basically
deals with the limits of the economy to absorb income from oil exports,
and the role of these exports in the diversification of Mexico's foreign
trade.
There would seem to be a rather clear contradiction between the
promotion of energy- intensive industries, and the already-established
high-intensity levels in energy consumption in Mexico. It could be ar-
gued that the solution lies in more efficient operations, but the mode
through which this increased efficiency can be achieved is still unde-
termined. On the other hand, even though apparently sufficient consid-
eration is given to the regional impact, the Program goes on to empha-
size immediately afterwards that it is mainly at the national level
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where gains fro. the expansion of the energy sector will have an effect.
Here, again, the seeming Inevitability of centralization would seem to
override the preoccupation with regional imbalances. Finally, the ca-
pacity of the economy to absorb income from oil exports is not clearly
defined.
However, the Energy Program does set a limit to petroleum exports,
at a level of 1.5 million barrels daily, and of natural gas, at a level
of 300 million cubic feet daily. Furthermore, to avoid an excessi'
dependency on a single product, it is underlined that hydrocarbons
expected not to account for more than 50% of current foreign income.
Not more than 50% of Mexican oil exports should go to a single country.
Parallel to this, Mexican oil exports should not account for more than
20% of the hydrocarbon im.ports of any country, with the exception of the
Central American and Caribbean countries, whose needs up to 50% could
be supplied by Mexico.
The Energy Program emphasizes Mexico's unique international posi-
tion, due to the magnitude of its petroleum and gas reserves, and to the
comparatively low costs involved in their exploitation. Given the ex-
port projections of the Program, and the expected increases in domestic
demand, it is estimated that the production of crude oil and gas liquids
will be around 3.5 million b/d by 1985, and around 4.1 million b/d by
1990. The production of natural gas will increase, respectively, to
4,300 million and 6,900 million cubic feet daily. A margin of 10% in
additional production capacity should give the energy sector added flex-
ibility. The rate of exploitation of actual proven reserves, as estab-
lished by the Program, would guarantee by 1990 a ratio reserves/
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production of at least 23:1 for petroleum, and of at least 19:1 for nat
ural gas. which are deeded to be adequate margins of security, to be en-
hanced as exploration proceeds." Independently of the exploitation
policy that is followed, the Energy Program concludes that, because of
technical reasons, which Include safeguards against premature exhaus-
tion of the fields, the maxi^m level of production of oil and gas in
Mexico will not exceed during any period the equivalent of between 8 to
10 minion b/d of crude oil.^^
On February 5, 1981. the National Energy Program was published in
Mexico's Official Diary, approved and signed by President Ldpez Portillo
and nine Secretaries, and thus it became a law. This, in effect, seemed
to reassert the goal of the Mexican government in regards to the ratio-
nalization of the activities of the energy sector.
Infrastructure
.
According to the Global Plan for Development, "the in-
dustrialization of hydrocarbons is the fundamental part of energy infra-
structure. The priority given to infrastructure works is revealed
by some of Pemex's development objectives over a six-year period (1977-
1982). As stated in 1978. these included: in refining, to double ca-
pacity to 1.7 million b/d; to accelerate the construction of gas pro-
cessing plants, and of the gas pipeline system in Mexico, as well as of
oil and gas distribution and transportation equipment in general, such
as additional pipelines and tankers; in petrochemicals, to triple ca-
pacity to 18.6 million tons by 1982.^^
Mexico's energy policy has given priority to the multiple uses and
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transformations of crude hydrocarbons into processed products. During
the first three years of the Lopez Portillo government, from 1977 to
1979. there was a significant increase in infrastructure geared to that
end. In the area of industrial plants, there were the following works:
28 refining industrial plants. 18 plants for hydrocarbon treatment. 24
petrochemical industrial plants, and 50 auxiliary service installations.
During these three years, the area of transportation, storage, and dis-
tribution expanded in the following way: 128 gas, oil, and petrochemi-
cal ducts. 18 storage tanks. 17 storage and distribution plants, and 11
port works. With respect to offshore structures in the Gulf of
Campeche. again from 1977 to 1979, these included: 10 drilling plat-
forms, one linkage platform, four platforms for temporary production,
the setting of a 36" diameter oilduct 165 kilometers long, and 65 kilo-
meters long, and 65 kilometers of recollection lines.^^
Domestic demand for refined products derived from petroleum has
pushed Pemex to sustain annual rates of increment of 9.2% on the aver-
age. By December, 1979, refining of crude oil and liquids had reached
the level of 1.1 million b/d, an increase of 42% from the December,
1976, level. For the first time in its history, Pemex surpassed the
level of one million barrels of crude oil refined daily. The capacity
of crude processing was raised by 31% from December, 1976, to December,
1979; during this same period, processing of gas liquids increased by
58
78%. This was made possible by the incorporation to production of the
new refineries of Cadereyta, with an ultimate capacity of 235,000 b/d,
and Salina Cruz, with an ultimate capacity of 170,000 b/d. These refin-
eries, together with the expansion in the capacity of older ones, have
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allowed Mexico to become self-sufficient in processed products.^^
Towards the end of 1980, Mexico had reached the eleventh place as
a country in the refining of crude oil and gas liquids, by increasing
the processing capacity of its ten refineries to 1,476.000 b/d, i.e. an
average annual growth rate of 13% since 1977. As a refining company.
Pemex now occupies the fifth place in the world, surpassed only by four
multinational corporations. Expansion is under way in the refineries
at Tula. Hidalgo, Salina Cruz, and Ciudad Madero, and there are projects
for new refineries. The expected expansion of refining capacity dur-
ing the 1980's will make it necessary to build five plants equivalent
in size to the refinery at Minatitlan. the largest in the country.
The increases in refining capacity underline the fortunate coincidence
for Mexico of huge deposits of petroleum and gas, a rapidly expanding
domestic consumption, and a respectable level of industrial capacity.
In the primary petrochemical industry, during 1979 the production
in Pemex's 70 plants reached a volume of 6.34 million metric tons of 37
different products, such as ammonia, ethylene, polythylene, methanol and
ethanol. This represented an increment of 60% with respect to the 1976
level of production. In spite of this increase, the supply of several
important products still remained under the level of demand. This
situation was being addressed since mid-1978, with the construction of
76 additional petrochemical plants, which would help Pemex reach its
goal of tripling production to 18 million metric tons per year.^^ Ac-
cording to the rate of construction, by late 1981 Mexico was expected
to be self-sufficient, and even an incipient exporter, in most of the
basic petrochemical products.
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In 1980. the production of basic petrochemicals was 7.22 million
tons, an increment of 83% over the 1976 level. The Cosoleacaque petro-
chemical complex is at present the biggest a^nia-producing center in
the world, which guarantees Mexico sufficient nitrogen to .eet domestic
demand for fertilizer, as well as a substantial surplus for exports.^^
On April 29. 1981. the huge petrochemical complex at La Cangrejera
started operations. The 20 plants located in this complex represent an
initial incorporation of 3.5 million tons per year to total petrochemi-
cal production, and will make possible the fulfillment of the expansion
objectives.
One of the most important additions to Pemex's infrastructure has
been the Central Duct of the National Gas System, from Cactus to
Monterrey. Originally initiated with the main purpose of selling nat-
ural gas to the United States, at present it plays a crucial role in
meeting Mexico's domestic energy needs. The result of the rupture in
the negotiations for the sale of gas to the United States in 1978 was
a process of conversion of Mexican industry to gas. By March, 1978,
the Secretary of National Patrimony and Industrial Development, Jose
Andre's de Oteyza, stated the intention of supplying all the industrial
zones in the country with natural gas. and adding an extension to the
gasduct from Cactus to Reynosa-Monterrey all the way to Chihuahua and
Ciudad Juarez in the northwest. Gas was to become the key to an ambi-
tious project of industrial decentralization that would help to ratio-
nally distribute economic growth through the establishment of develop-
ment poles.
On March 18, 1979, President Lopez Portillo inaugurated the Central
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Duct. Its construction time was 17 months, the total length of the
main line is 1,247 kilometers, and the cost was over 16,00C million
pesos. This was the most ambitious distribution project ever undertaken
by Pemex, and investrr.ents ran at the rate of almost 1.000 million pesos
per month. The line includes 1,102 km of 48" diameter duct, and 145 km
of 42" diameter duct.^^
Towards the end of 1979, work was under way in 82 additional ducts,
in order to interconnect the Central Duct with various locations in the
country, such as the poliduct Cadereyta-Monterrey-Torreon-Jime'nez, and
also in other regions such as the poliducts Rosarito-Mexical i and
Topolobambo-Culiaca'n in the northwest. In October. 1980, the Secre-
tariat of Health and Welfare signed an agreement with Pemex through
which the latter is to supply natural gas to the central valley (where
Mexico City is located), by means of a direct gasduct from Cactus,
Chiapas. The main objective of this project would be to reduce the
level of environmental pollution in the capital through the use of
cleaner energy sources such as gas.^^ By November, 1980, the Director
of Pemex announced that the national duct network for the distribution
of hydrocarbons and gas would ultimately extend 35,100 km, of which
15,800 km were already in service. At the time, a new gasduct was un-
derway between Salamianca and Leon, Guanajuato, alongside which there
will be an industrial corridor through the central part of the coun-
try.''^ Early in 1981, construction of a line was started in order to
supply gas to the steel works at La'zaro Ca'rdenas-Las Truchas, on the
Pacific Coast. Likewise, an additional 48-inch gas line was being laid
7?
to double the volumes available in the central valley.
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During 1980. for the first ti.e, natural gas consumption exceeded
that of gasoline, fuel oil and coal, and its importance is expected to
be still greater in the coming years. In all. in that year 2.940 mil-
lion cubic feet of natural gas were processed. 97% more than in 1976.
In this operation. Mexico occupies the fifth place in the world.
The advances in infrastructure were dramatically underscored by the
Director of Pemex in his annual report of March 18. 1981:
"During the period 1977-1980 we have installed an
average of one high-capacity compressor every sixdays; we have laid 5.200 meters of pipelines perday; we have completed and put into operation oneindustrial plant every 14 days; we have installed
one offshore platform every 19 days; we have built
a storage tank every three days. "74
In spite of Pemex's impressive record of achievements, especially
since 1977. a number of drawbacks still persist. By September. 1980.
out of a total production of 3.300 million cubic feet of natural gas per
day. 300 million were being burned in the atmosphere.''^ However, most
flaring has been confined to offshore wells in the Bay of Campeche.
With the construction of gas delivery systems to the shore, specifically
a 336 km gasduct to Ciudad Pemex and a 165 km gasduct to Merida, it is
expected that Pemex will be able to use up to 97% of the total produc-
tion. By March. 1981. the Director of Pemex acknowledgedthat in total
550 million cubic feet of gas were still being flared at sea, but that
the installation of compression platforms as well as the additional
gas pipelines, would soon eliminate the waste.
There are indications that Mexico's industrial sector is not keep-
ing up with the capital goods needs of Pemex. In 1978. a year in which
the petroleum industry grew by 65%. Pemex had to import 50% of the
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capital goods in foreign
.arkets/^ In October. 1980. the Mexican
Petroleum Institute estimated that Pemex would spend a total of 33 bil-
lion pesos in foreign equipment during 1980. This figure represented
30% of the total imports by Mexico's Public Sector/^ The previous
facts imply a significant erosion of Pemex's financial basis. Two addi-
tional limiting factors to Pemex's expansion are its reduced tanker
fleet and the lack of adequate port facil ities .^^
Pemex is pushing ahead to cope with these obstacles, In March.
1979. it was announced that a plant for the production of machinery and
capital equipment would be built in the northern part of the country,
with French technology and financial support, which would eventually
supply the needs of Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission. Addi-
tionally, by mid-1981. Pemex owned 222 drilling rigs, thus becoming one
of the main drilling firms. But in general terms, the scientific-
technological panorama in Pemex. as well as in Mexico as a whole, is
rather somber. There is an urgent need to foster basic research and
research for development, in order to proceed from the stage of a user
to that of a producer of appropriate technologies.^^ Nonetheless, in
what would appear to be excessively optimistic projections, by October.
1980. Pemex announced that by the end of 1981 it would be using in its
operations 90% of national technology, and thus only 10% of imported
technology.
Action is being undertaken which shows a preoccupation with the
need to develop human resources. As part of the National Program for
Science and Technology. 1978-1982. 2.924 scholarships are being granted
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through the Mexican Petroleum Institute, for training in the fields of
petroleum and petrochemicals, as well as technical training in nuclear
and solar energy. The Mexican Petroleum Institute itself grew in size
from 1966 to 1977. from 316 employees to almost 3.000. 75% of whom were
Involved in research and development projects. On the other hand, there
have been increases in the budget of the Institute in the order of a
20% level .^^
With respect to tankers and port facilities, Pemex is also trying
to build up its capacity. Pemex's tanker fleet is expected to increase
its deadweight tonnage, from 650.000 tons in 1977. to close to one mil-
lion tons in 1982. On the other hand, some shipyards are being rehabil-
itated. Still, Mexican ports can only service ships in the order of
25,000-30,000 tons of dead weight, which excludes supertankers. This
constitutes an obstacle to Pemex's objective of exports diversification.
A temporary solution has been found in the Bay of Campeche, through the
use of a mooring buoy installed at Cayo Areas, with a captive tank tied
to it, capable of storing one million barrels. Crude oil is pumped
from the captive boat to the tanker ships that carry the loads for ex-
4. 85port.
At present, under the project "Ships. Pipelines and Ports." a new
pattern of transportation is taking shape, based on sea and river
routes, as well as the optional use of pipeline systems, instead of the
traditional land roads. By the end of 1980. 793.000 tons of freight
had been transferred from land to sea and river transportation. These
measures are aimed at complying with the proposed goal of relieving
congestion in overland routes. Whereas formerly 78% of Pemex freight
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was transported by railroad and highway, and only Zn by water, by 1980
land movements had decreased to 59% while sea transportation had in-
creased to 41%.^^
Finances. A key component of Mexico's energy policy is the financial
factor. The schemes for advancing rapidly and in unison in the various
stages of the petroleum production cycle obey a financial imperative.
For example, the development policies for the petrochemical and refining
phases are expected to eliminate imports of chemical products, which in
1976 still amounted to 700 million dollars, and of fertilizers, which
in that same year totalled 350 million.^''
Several fortunate circumstances would seem to contribute to a
bright financial outlook for Pemex. Even though the Reforma Fields are
relatively deep and the decline in the natural pressure of the wells de-
mands maintenance works, plus the additional expenses involved in ex-
ploiting the offshore deposits in the Gulf of Campeche, the total pro-
duction costs for the average barrel of Mexican oil are considerably
lower than the costs in other areas such as the North Sea fields. Ex-
traction costs for Mexican oil. which vary markedly, are not expected
to exceed an average of $2.50 per barrel, and might be as low as $1.60.
However, they are substantially higher than Saudi Arabia's $0.35 to
$0.50 per barrel.
Pemex 's development program, introduced in 1977, included a bud-
get of 926 billion pesos for the entire period 1977-1982. Investments
were expected to reach a total of 390 billion pesos. The magnitude of
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these figures is easily perceived when compared to those of the previ
sexenio. during which budget and investment totals amounted to 240,300
and 119,800 million, respectively.^^ Since 1977. moreover, expenditure
levels and investments have surpassed the original estimates by a con-
siderable margin. Just in 1979, Pemex received financial resources that
totalled 259,026 million pesos, an increment of 57% over the 1978 level.
Pemex 's own income from its operations came to 184,372 million pesos,
71% of the total and 275% higher than in 1976. Credit financing repre-
sented 74,654 million, or 29% of the total. Of Pemex's own income in
1979, 72,749 million corresponded to domestic sales, and 100,766 million
to exports of crude oil, refined products, and petrochemicals. Expenses
amounted in 1979 to 258,884 million.
During 1980, Pemex's total income amounted to 362 billion pesos,
a figure more than seven times higher than that of 1976. Current dis-
bursements came to 140,600 million pesos, more than five times those of
1976. Thus, current savings totalled 221 billion pesos, i.e. 12 times
as much as the 1976 figure. The destiny of these savings helps explain
Pemex's financial situation, as well as its impact in the Mexican econ-
omy. In 1976, 38% of internal savings were assigned to the payment of
taxes, i.e. revenues for the Public Sector. By contrast, in 1980 this
proportion had increased to 73% of internal savings. In 1980 Pemex
paid 162 billion pesos in taxes, or 20 times more than the 1976 level.
For 1981, taxes are estimated to increase to over 300 billion pesos.
On the other hand, the amount corresponding to investments during 1980
was 121,800 million pesos, or five times more than the figure for
1976.^^
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As of December 31. 1980, total liabilities of Pemex amounted to
369 billion pesos, of which 193,400 million corresponded to foreign
debt on a short and long term basis. That is, the debt increased five
times from 1976 to 1980. Pemex officials argue that the increment in
the debt does not have a detrimental impact on the financial stability
of the company, when compared with the substantial and growing value of
the vast and ever expanding petroleum reserves. In other words, the
growth in reserves has brought about the possibility of widening Pemex's
credit capacity. And Pemex has increased its foreign debt as a function
of its investment programs, and as a result of its supportive role as
a major source of revenues for Mexico's Public Sector.
On the other hand, Pemex is a major recipient of government expen-
ditures. Mexico's national budget for 1981 allocated 418 billion pesos
for the sectors given priority in the Global Plan for development.
Among these, 36%, or 150,480 million pesos, were destined to Pemex's in-
vestments. As a whole, Pemex received 35.6% of the total budget for
organizations and companies within the Public Sector, i.e. 376,818 mil-
lion pesos. This is 10% higher than the 1980 figure.^^ And there is
the precedent of "additional" allocations: during his fourth annual re-
port, in September, 1980, President Lopez Portillo announced an increase
in that year's budget by 206 billion pesos, most of which went to Pemex
to "balance costs and operations related to the new oil production
94level." Thus, it is likely that, given the industry's momentum, ex-
penses in 1981 will have exceeded estimates once again.
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Alternate ener^ ^^^ources
.
There are three important variables that de-
termine energy de.and: population growth, economic development, and
modes of utilization of energy sources. Energy consumption in Mexico
has also been influenced by government price policies. By keeping
prices low, on occasion even below production costs, the government has
tried to promote development. However, this artificial price structure
has also led to an irrational pattern of consumption. This is one of
the reasons that explain the fact that many Mexican public companies
operate at a loss and. subsequently, increase the public debt. In ad-
dition, there is the question of whether in recent times petroleum re-
sources have been exploited irrationally, i.e. at an excessively rapid
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pace. This general situation has hindered the incorporation of al-
ternate energy sources other than petroleum.
By 1978. the general rate of growth in energy consumption in Mexico
was 7.5% annually, and 7.7% for petroleum consumption. Between 1976 and
1979, per capita energy consumption expanded at a rate of 5% per year.^^
In the world context, Mexico has a relatively high level of energy con-
sumption, and one of the highest among developing nations. The consump-
tion of primary energy per unit of GDP in 1978, expressed in thermic
equivalent of crude oil. was of 0.8 in Mexico. This figure can be com-
pared with 1.1 for the United States. 0.9 for Great Britain. 0.9 for
Venezuela, and 0.6 for West Germany, during that same year.^^
The indices of growth cf energy consumption, and of the GNP, have
traditionally been intimately tied in post World War II Mexico.
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According to official sources, by 1979 the .ost important energy users
were the following sectors: industry. 25%; transportation. 24%; energy.
34%; domestic consumption. 6%; and other uses. 11%.,58
, ,,,,
and somewhat different chart of energy users would show the following
^
percentages: industry. 26.38%; transportation. 29.84%; residential.
8.09%; agriculture. 0.69; other uses. 1.00%; nonenergy uses. 3.39%;
Pemex's own needs. 14.01%; and the electricity sector, 16.61%.59
any case, it is clear that the industrial sector is a dynamic energy
user. The growth in energy use in the field of transportation is a re-
sult, to a considerable degree, of the rapid increase in the number of
motor vehicles, of 10.2% annually. The precarious level of energy use
by agriculture is a reflection of the travails of this sector in recent
years. And the rate of growth in the domestic sector, well above the
rate of population increase, denotes an increment in per capita consump-
tion, although not necessarily a more equitable spread among the various
groups of the population.
Petroleum and natural gas are by far the predominant sources of
energy in Mexico. In 1980. the production of primary energy came from
the following sources: petroleum, 64.40%; natural gas. 23.15%; coal.
5.25%; hydroelectric works, 6.94%; and geothermal, 0.26%}^^ Thus, out
of its total energy consumption, Mexico depends in a level of 87.55% on
hydrocarbon energy. The Global Plan for Development, in its section on
energy, proposes a strategy that would consistently widen the govern-
trient's knowledge about Mexico's energy resources, as a basis for diver-
sifying actual sources. It seeks to promote a greater use of hydraulic,
geothermal, solar, and coal sources, among others. This strategy
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acknowledges the effect that domestic price structures have had on the
exploitation of new sources, and the need to use energy more effi.
ciently. in his annual report of September. 1981, President Lopez
Portillo emphasized that the electricity sector, in which demand grows
at a rate of 11% annually, will be forced to double its electric energy
generating capacity of 17.1 MW every seven years. Thus, efforts will
have to be undertaken in order to diversify its energy sources; specif-
ically, geothermal. coal, and nuclear power, will progressively become
substitutes for hydrocarbons, which have other more productive uses.^^^
Mexico has sizeable sources of energy, other than petroleum and
natural gas, such as:
Coal. Reserves, which were 172 million tons in 1976, had increased
to 1,500 million tons by 1980.^^^ Traditionally, coal production in
Mexico has been associated with the steel industry. However, at present
the Federal Electricity Commission is trying to foster the development
of other sources for electricity, such as coal. Some Mexican sources
foresee that by the end of the century coal might supply 12% of the
country's electricity needs. As a start, the first great thermoelectric
plant based on coal. "Rio Escondido." Coahuila. is near completion.
This plant will have a capacity of 1,200 MW.'^^^
Hydraulic energy. At present, this is the source of almost 1% of
the overall energy generated in Mexico, and of close to 28% of electric
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energy. Even though Mexico is not relatively well-endowed with great
river systems close to its main population centers, the government is
pushing ahead with dam projects in the southern section of the country,
in order to supply an increasing share of the national demand for
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electricity. The great works at Chicoacen. Chiapas, constitute the
most recent example of this policy. In November. 1980, President Lopez
Portillo inaugurated the Chicoacen Hydroelectric Plant, which required
an investment of 21 billion pesos, and is expected to generate 8% of
Mexico's total electricity demand, i.e. 5,500 MW per hour.^°^
Nuclear energy. This is another possibility that is being given
growing attention by the Mexican government. During 1983 and 1984, the
nuclear reactors at Laguna Verde are expected to begin operations, with
a capacity of 1.308 MW. Together with another nuclear unit to be built
during the 1980's. by 1990 Mexico is expected to have a nuclear-electric
generating capacity of 2,500 MW. In this context, the objective of the
Energy Program is to build additional nuclear units throughout the
1990's. in order to have installed 20,000 MW of nuclear capacity by the
end of the century. -^^^
A drawback from the perspective of the goal of energy independence,
is the fact that Mexico must rely on the United States for delivery of
enriched uranium for these nuclear plants. Nevertheless, Uramex has
increased its exploratory activities, in order to guarantee the produc-
tion of 250 tons of uranium needed for the Laguna Verde plant. By
December, 1980, the prospects appeared to be good, with the discovery
of sizeable uranium deposits in the state of Oaxaca. With these finds,
the production of refined uranium might reach the level of 70 tons in
a two-year term. Apparently. Swedish. French, and Canadian companies
are actively trying to obtain the contracts for the construction of the
1 08
new Mexican nuclear plants.
Geothermal energy
. Mexico, a predominantly volcanic country, is
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located in a privileged area for generating geother^al energy. There
are estimates for a minimum geothermal potential of 20,000 MW. The
importance of this figure is well understood by comparing it with the
9,000 MW total electric capacity installed in Mexico at present.^^Q
According to the goals of the Energy Program, Mexico will have increased
its goethermal capacity from 150 MW in 1980 to 620 MW in 1990.^^0
^"^^^ ""^^qy
-
Additionally, the Energy Program also considers the
"solar option," although only as a long-term resource that will be the
basis for decentralized types of electricity systems.
The degree of success in promoting alternate energy sources is
bound to be a decisive factor, on a middle and long range basis, in
determining the flexibility of development strategies and of foreign
policy options. Rising domestic demand for energy, if dependent solely
on hydrocarbons, could eventually lead to dwindling reserves. And, to
the extent that domestic needs require a greater share of total output,
the potential will diminish for petroleum to be used by Mexico as a
generator of foreign revenues, as well as a leverage for its foreign
policy. Thus, the stabilization of the domestic energy market, in terms
of a rationalization of consumption patterns and a diversification of
energy sources, would appear to be a must for Mexico's overall objec-
tives of development.
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CHAPTER V
THE ENERGY SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The World Energy Crisis: Frnnnm^r_^nHD^,.,^^
P^^^ crum
It would be pertinent here to incorporate into the discussion the
general context of the world energy situation, and U.S. responses to it,
as the global scenario where Mexican petroleum must, by necessity, play
Its role. In order to better understand the meaning of the energy cri-
sis, it is necessary to underline the peculiar characteristics of petro-
leum, as a raw material of not only economic, but also political and
strategic importance. Petroleum is a critical factor in determining
the possibilities of any nation, in terms of both domestic viability
and international relevance. In this context, three categories should
be considered: 1) those countries which have oil; 2) those which do
not have oil, but control financial resources to acquire it; and 3)
those which have neither oil nor sufficient financial resources to buy
it from foreign producers.^ International politics and economics, to
a significant degree, are contingent upon the changes in price, supply,
and demand of petroleum. This is a fact of present times.
Much of the economic growth in the post-World War II era was based
on cheap energy. From 1967 to 1973, the demand for hydrocarbons in
the three main consuming regions. Western Europe, Japan, and the
United States, increased by more than 500 million barrels annually,
while production in these same areas expanded by less than a tenth of
this amount. Thus, imports by these regions grew by 95% during this
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entire period, fro. 4.9 to 9.5 billion barrels per year. Practically
all the increment in consumption was made possible through an increase
1n production by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). More specifically. 80% of the increase came from
Middle East countries. 2 This constitutes the background of the energy
crisis of the 1970's. and of the growth in power of OPEC countries.
Petroleum prices were kept at a low and stable level through the
worldwide control of the market by the fabled "Seven Sisters: - Exxon.
Shell. Mobil. Texaco. British Petroleum. Standard Oil of California,
and Gulf. These companies, in effect, operated as a cartel from 1945
until 1973. ccrcerting their transactions in the international oil
trade, in order to maintain prices low. One of the results of this
successful policy was that alternate sources of energy were gradually
driven out of the market. During the 1960's. oil prices diminished
progressively in real terms. This made possible the penetration of
petroleum as the predominant energy source in Western Europe and Japan.
In the United States, the effect of low oil prices was felt at various
levels, all of which would contribute later on to increase U.S. depen-
dence on foreign oil sources: the domestic market was protected by
means of import quotas, which made U.S. oil prices rise well above
those in the international market, and thus affected adversely U.S. in-
dustrial and trade competitiveness vis a vis Western European countries
and Japan; coal production declined; starting in the 1970's, natural
gas production also diminished; and the timetable for the construction
of nuclear plants was significantly delayed.^
The main oil companies were able to maintain a low-price structure
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by means of increases in production. In this way. even though the
price per barrel of crude declined, oil-producing countries registered
an absolute increase in tax revenues: from, 1.381 million dollars in
I960 to 4.886 million in 197o/ But the situation was to change soon,
as the oil-producing countries looked for ways to obtain nore substan-
tial profits.
The first initiative for the creation of OPEC belonged to
Venezuela. This country, in 1949, offered its cooperation to Iran in
the negotiations then underway between the latter and the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company.. rwards, Venezuela's information on its tax agreements
with the oil companies would be used by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other
oil-exporting countries in their demands for additional revenues. In
1953, a formal agreement was signed between Iran and Saudi Arabia for
the exchange of inform.ation regarding prices and oil policy. Finally,
in Baghdag, in September. 1960, as a reaction to the persistent trend
towards lower oil prices [8% less in 1959; 6% less in 1960), representa-
tives of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, announced the
creation of OPEC.^
There were three principal factors that contributed to the develop-
ment of OPEC: the need, from the point of view of the petroleum-produc-
ing countries, to check the capacity of the oil companies to lower
prices at will; the awareness on the part of the already-established
producers that the entrance in the market of new, lower-priced producers
could affect their operations; and a new confidence by the oil -export-
ing countries in their own technical achievements, enough so to com-
pensate for any possible reaction by the oil companies.^
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A few years later, in January. 1968. the Arab countries members
of OPEC signed an agreement that created the Organization of Arab Oil-
Exporting Countries (OAPEC). Even though the OAPEC agreement stipulated
that it would not affect the functions of OPEC, the fact that the Arab
countries felt the need to underscore their common economic and politi-
cal objectives was indeed significant.^ Arab militancy, reinforced by
political-military events in 1973. i.e. the "Yom Kippur" war. that gal-
vanized Arab countries into action, came to the fore in unprecedented
oil price increases: from 2.48 dollars per barrel in 1973 to 11.56
dollars in 1974. that is. an increment of 366%. ^ This action, in ef-
fect, signaled the end of the era of cheap energy.
The energy crisis, in plain terms, has meant a disruption in the
production and commercialization processes of the main energy source
in the contemporary world: from 40^0 to 50% of all the energy consump-
tion comes from crude oil or derived products. But its causes and out-
comes are not a matter easily agreed upon. According to various di-
verging perspectives, the roots of the energy crisis can be located in:
the actual or imminent scarcity of world energy reserves, especially
petroleum; the instability in the international oil supply, manifest
through price variations and insecurity in the supplies; and the envi-
ronmental and social degradation due to the growing dependence on oil
and coal to meet energy demands.^ Obviously, the relative weight of
these factors, especially the first two. is directly related to the
political context. Thus, it would be useful to analyze the energy
crisis in terms of its impact on, and reaction from, five basic groups
of actors: OPEC; the international oil companies; the Western
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industrialized countries; Third World countries; and the Soviet Bloc
countries
.
To a significant extent, what the OPEC countries have done is to
take over the petroleum market structure that had been created by the
main oil companies, and to continue fixing prices also according to a
political strategy, albeit a different one.^° But diverging ideologi-
cal perspectives within OPEC have threatened its very viability as an
international cartel. Specifically, the "hard-liners," such as Lybia
and Iraq, have frequently clashed with the "moderates," mainly Saudi
Arabia, over matters related to price and supply levels.
After the abrupt increases of 1973-74, oil prices began to fall in
real terms, i.e. in relation to inflation. Specifically, from January,
1974, to December, 1978, official OPEC prices declined 25% in constant
dollars, 40% in constant Marks, and 50% in constant Yens. Several fac-
tors contributed to this trend. First of all, the economic recession
in the Western industrial nations during the mid-1970 's, and the subse-
quent erosion in the value of the dollar, brought about a reduction in
the demand for OPEC oil, and declining revenues for the cartel mem-
bers. On the other hand, during the second half of the 1970's, new
sources of oil, such as Mexico, the North Sea, and Alaska, caused a
temporary relative glut in the oil market.
Another factor that permeated the oil price structure during the
1970 's was the continuing presence of the international oil companies
as kingpins of commercialization. The size and diversity of the main
oil companies, which limits their vulnerability, and their extensive
control of refineries, pipelines, tankers, and gas pumps, tend to
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explain their resilience. By 1978. the sales of the "Seven Sisters^,
had
.ore than doubled the level of 1973. Most of the companies were
successful in arranging deals with OPEC countries, through which they
received a fee for pumping the oil, and bought a guaranteed share of
the production for themselves, plus most of the remainder at a fixed
price.
According to a 1980 study for the National Office of Economic Re-
search, written by the forn^.er head of economists of Allied Chemical
Company. Avram Kisselgoff. the price increases by OPEC also brought
about higher earnings for the main U.S. oil companies, in the three
stages of operation: production, refining, and commercialization.
Even though the relative increases in their earnings tended to diminish
through 1981. it is estimated that total earnings for 1980 were still
30% above the 1979 level: from 8.350 billion dollars in 1979 to 11
billion in 1980. Earnings for 1981 were expected to amount to 11.7 bil-
lion dollars, and for 1984 a total of 14.960 billion dollars.
The role played by the oil companies is intimately tied to the
actions by the Western European and U.S. governments in regards to the
energy crisis. To begin with, the energy crisis is not by any means an
isolated phenomenon, in its causes and consequences. At a macro-level,
it is inscribed in the fram^ework of a linear vision of history, central
to contemporary Western civilization, and to much of the rest of the
world by the effect of demonstration, which assumes unending progress
and limitless expansion of the standard of living. Without entering
here into a revision of the various estimates of availability of natu-
ral resources, i.e. of the exploitation of the physical environment.
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such a Vision is ultimately a fallacy from either a material or a moral
perspective. But this topic is well beyond the objectives of this vol-
ume, and a brief mention will suffice. At a micro-level, the energy
crisis is related to the general economic situation in the countries
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), i.e. inflation, unemployment, and the deficits balance of pay-
ments. In regards to energy policies since 1973-74, there have been
instances of sharp disagreement among OECD nations.
Diverging political responses by oil-importing OECD nations to the
sharp increases in oil prices were, from the beginning, divided in two
currents. One, headed by the United States, tried to promote the for-
mation of F, r--nn front to counteract OPEC. This initiative culminated
in the International Energy Agency (lEA), established in Brussels in
September. 1974. The lEA has encouraged cooperation among its members^^
in order to "...promote a secure petroleum supply, according to reason-
able and equitable conditions ."-^^
The opposing tendency, led by France, maintained that such a front
would not be able to achieve the needed unity among its members, and
thus would not have the negotiating power to check OPEC's maneuvers .-^^
Indeed, to a certain degree. Western European countries, and to a lesser
extent Japan, nave frequently favored bilateral negotiations and inde-
pendent agreements. Such a course of action might appear to be contrary
to the interests of the lEA, the United States, and the big oil com-
panies. Parallel to this, since 1973, governmental control over the
energy sector in Western Europe has increased significantly.^^
On the other hand, U.S. initiatives provoked an uncomfortable
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political situation for OECD countries that were potential oil export-
ers, such as Canada. Great Britain, and Norway. Some of these nations,
as a matter of fact, concurred with OPEC measures. After all. it was
the increase in prices itself that made the exploitation of oil profit-
able in areas such as the North Sea. that had previously been economi-
cally unfeasible. Nevertheless, by early 1981. the European Economic
Community was considering a project to constitute a "petroleum bank."
as a common reserve to act as a safety value against supply deficits and
19pnce raises.
From a general perspective, some authors see the energy crisis as
a syndrome of a global crisis of the capitalist system, unable to main-
tain a rate of growth akin to raised expectations.^^ Within this con-
text, there is the view that the energy crisis has been to a certain
degree the result of price manipulation by the oil companies, with the
objective of increasing profits. Likewise, one of the positive results
for the United States would have been the partial reduction of the com-
parative trade disadvantage of recent years vis a vis Western Europe
21
and. mainly, Japan. However, this point of view misses facts such as
the growing deterioration of the U.S. balance of payments, and the ero-
sion of U.S. global political leadership, both direct results of the
energy crisis. At any rate, even though there might be reasons to think
that the U.S. government tended to stimulate actions by OPEC until
1973, as a means to bring about a raise in prices in the international
market to levels closer to U.S. domestic prices, after that year OPEC
policies were by far too forceful, unpredictable, and disruptive of the
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international monetary system, to serve U.S. interests. ^2
If the increases in oil prices have pushed inflation to perilous
levels in Western developed nations, among the Third World oil-i.porti
countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the impact has been cata-
strophic. In 1978, Third World countries, with 71% of the world popula-
tion, were consuming 10.5 million b/d of oil; by contrast, the United
States, with approximately 6% of the world population, in that same year
consumed 18.3 million b/d.23 i, 3p,,e of the fact that Third World
countries consum.e only about 16% of the total energy, their current pay-
ments deficit grew from 7 billion dollars in 1973 to more than 70 bil-
lion in 1980. The standing debt of almost 100 developing countries in-
creased six er during the 197C's. to a total of 376 billion
dollars by 1980.^^ Developing countries must pay oil bills that amount
to 50 billion dollars per year and that, on the average, absorb 26% of
their export earnings; in some cases, this last figure is considerably
higher, for example, in 1980, 60% for Turkey, 40% for Brazil, and 30%
for India. Oil expenditures are expected to increase to 110 billion by
1990."^^
In the United Nations, the danger of an economic paralysis of the
Third World has been given growing attention, as proof of the urgent
need for a "New Economic Order" that would be based on a monetary re-
form, a transfer of financial resources, and an equitable planning of
energy production and consumption.^^ Even though the possibilities of
an OPEC "Special Fund" for helping developing countries solve their
financial problems have been widely considered, no effective and quick
solution is to be expected from these quarters. In their price hikes.
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OPEC has given only marginal attention to their pledge of 1975, in
Argel, to assist developing countries.
At the October, 1981. summit of 22 leaders from industrialized and
developing nations, held at Cancun. Mexico, near consensus was reported
on the need for the creation of an energy affiliate of the World Bank.
The proposed agency would manage a 30 billion dollar fund to help fi-
nance exploration and development of energy resources in Third World
countries. In this context, the active participation of the United
States would be essential. However, the Reagan administration has op-
posed the idea, favoring instead the action of private enterprise.
In the context of the energy crisis, those nations which have oil
and the political
-military capability to act on a global scale, will try
to assert their presence and objectives. Specifically, the Soviet Union
would appear to gain from financial turmoil in Western countries, includ-
ing inflation, recession, and social malaisse, and from stagnation and
increasing political upheaval in Third World countries. Thus, the en-
ergy crisis must be placed in a proper framework, political as well as
economic, strategic as well as commercial, and as a danger signal that
points to the fact that the means and ends of development must be rede-
fined, in order for the Western world to stand up to the challenge of
an economically finite, and politically perilous environment.
There have been contradictory signals, since 1973, regarding the
future energy supply scenario. According to some observers, the rela-
tive oil glut since the second half of the 1970's, a result of Western
economic recession and growing oil production, means that scarcity was
just a passing phenomenon. The optimistic forecasts in regards to
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petroleum supplies have been partly based on the assumption that
technologies will make possible an increase in the recovery rate of de-
posits. But the discovery of new sources, by itself, is supposed to
augment petroleum supplies. According to some 1975 estimates, by 1985
potential production of oil will be twice as large as consumption: the
exporting capacity of oil-rich countries would amount to 65 million b/d,
while the import needs of industrialized nations would be covered with
32 million barrels. A study of OECD published in 1977 expected supply
by OPEC countries to reach the level of 45 million b/d by 1980, well
above the estimated world demiand of 33.5 million b/d. By 1985, there
would be an excess supply of between 13% to 37% of OPEC's production
capacity. By October, 1981, new and hopefully more accurate predic-
tions underlined that there could be surpluses for the next five to ten
years, as a result of continued slow growth in world economies and fur-
ther energy conservation.^^
On the other hand, new sources such as Mexico and the North Sea
have considerably increased total output. Additional possibilities are
found in China which, according to the China Business Review, published
by the National Ccunrll for U.S. -China trade, would be exporting 50
million tons of oil a >ear by 1990. Indeed, by August, 1980, China was
producing 106.15 million b/d. a level equivalent to that achieved by
Great Britain in its North Sea wells.^^ All in all. some estimates put
the amount of oil remaining to be discovered in the world at around 1
trillion barrels, with 30% to 40% of it expected to be found offshore.
TO
some in deep water areas that have yet to be explored.
In the midst of the maze of estimates regarding oil supplies and
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a
zons
.
prices, it is obvious that these depend on contingent situations of
triple nature: economic; political; and those related to time hori
In order for the price of crude oil to decline significantly, there
would have to be a sizable drop in world demand (especially U.S. de-
mand), a growing reliance on alternate energy sources, and a permanent
expansion in the oil production of non-OPEC countries .^"^ These condi-
tions are not likely to coincide on a sustained basis.
Many recent indications tend to confirm the previous argument. A
1977 analysis of future oil supplies concluded that, regardless of the
rate of economic growth and oil prices, up to a 50% increment above
then prevalent levels, before the end of the century there would be a
substantial ga^ between production and demand: demand would outstrip
supplies by a margin of 15 to 20 million b/d. that is, a 26% to 28% of
35total world demand. According to a report by the Office of Techno-
logical Studies of the U.S. Congress, oil production in the Western
industrialized nations, under the most favorable circumstances, will
remain stationary until the year 2000. In the United States, produc-
tion is expected to decline to 4 million b/d. Additionally, by the
early 1980 's the Soviet Union may be forced to interrupt its oil ex-
ports to Eastern Europe.
A 1977 CIA projection estimated that the Soviet Union and its
Comecon Bloc are likely to have a petroleum deficit of up to 4.5 mil-
lion b/d by the mid-1980's, with its subsequent impact on the World
37
Market. Indeed, in 1981 the Soviet Union, the biggest oil producer,
increased its oil output by only 0.7%. the lowest rate of increment in
recent times, in contrast with a 4% rate during the previous four
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38years. At present, the Soviet Union supplies only 75. of the petro-
leum demand of Eastern European countries, which
.eans that a higher
Share of the latter's financial resources will have to be spent on oil
from other sources.
Developing countries constitute the most dynamic force in overall
petroleum supply and price levels. Petroleum exporters, which number
more than 20 countries and represent one-fifth of the population of the
Third World, are industrializing at an accelerated pace, and increasing
their energy use at a rate of 6.1%; oil-importing developing countries
also share the oo.l of industrialization. As an aggregate, these coun-
tries will pu,
.cial role in the 65% Worldwide increase in energy
consumption expected by the end of the century. Energy use in less
developed countries is rising at a rate at least 3C% higher than the
GDP. In all, the demand for crude oil in the Third World, including
the 13 OPEC members, will grow from 11 million b/d at present, to
close to 24 million b/d by the year 2000. Import needs of developing
countries may not be satisfied unless there is a drastic reduction in
sales to OECD nations, or a substantial increase in overall production.
But oil demand elsewhere is expected to decline only slightly, by about
2 million b/d. to somewhere around 64 million b/d by the end of the
40
century.
If the previous situation appears to impede any sustained trend
towards stability in petroleum supplies and prices, the political
milieu is even more unpredictable. By 1978, sagging demand for petro-
leum was instrumental in making Saudi Arabia lead and implement an
OPEC price-freeze through the last two-thirds of that year.^^ However.
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the Iranian upheaval and the Iraq-Iran War were soon to show again the
intimate relationship between political and economic events. In partic-
ular, the war between the two Persian Gulf oil-exporting countries has
raised the possibility of a cut-off in the transit of oil tankers
through the Strait of Ormuz. which would economically strangle Western
Europe and Japan. By October, 1980, most of the Iranian oil exports,
and more thu:,
.hirds of Iraq's exports had been suspended. This
amounted to a loss of 3.15 to 3.35 million b/d for exports market.'^^
These factors contributed to a new round of price hikes. By June.
1980, OPEC members had agreed to raise their base price from $28 to $32
per barrel of crude oil. with a maximum $5 premium. By mid-November
of that same year, the price had gone up to $40 per barrel for cash
transactions, and up to $50 for 30-day sales, the highest levels in
44history. The precipitate price increases would put to test OPEC
unity, and bring about an abrupt reversal of the upward price spiral.
Even before the price increases of November. 1980, a drop in the
demand of industrialized nations due to recession, and to burgeoning
existences that by the beginning of that year had reached the level of
5 to 5.5 billion barrels, were already eroding the basis for OPEC's
45
price structures. Saudi Arabia, by far the main OPEC exporter, in
order to prevent excessive raises in prices, by October 1980 had in-
creased its production from 9.5 to 10.5 million b/d.^^ For their part,
the 21 nations members of lEA responded to the price raises by announce-
ing in December, 1980, that they would reduce their oil imports and
47
start to use their reserves instead. These factors, in addition to
the bitter pricing battle that ensued through 1981, had by mid-year
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effectively undermined the unity among OPEC members and forced a down-
ward revision of prices. Skyrocketing prices and diminishing demand
had, in effect, resulted in a mini-glut.
The key to a price compromise has been the high level of produc-
tion of Saua. nr^oia's less expensive crude oil. nearly half of OPEC's
total production of 21.5 million b/d by October, 1981. Apparently,
Saudi Arabia's policy has been to maintain the price of oil at a level
low enough to prevent conservation measures and alternate sources of
energy from substartially eroding the demand the petroleum. At the
same time, the Saudi 's benchmark price for their oil during 1981. at
$32 a barrel, effectively undercut competition from other oil-produc-
ing counter
^.^to reaching a price agreement."^^
On October 29, 1981, at Geneva. OPEC again established a common
price structure. Saudi Arabia agreed to increase its price $2 per
barrel, in return for a $2 reduction by other members of their $36 base
price. Thus, the new common benchmark price is at present $34 per
barrel, frozen at that level until the end of 1982. OPEC members are
allowed to attach surcharges to this base price, to account for trans-
portation and crude quality differences, although there will be a maxi-
mum of $4 surcharge per barrel. This means that under no circumstances
will the price per barrel of oil be above $38.^^ After 1982, OPEC
policy conceivably could seek pricing formulas that would link the
price of oil to the rate of inflation in the main oil-importing nations,
and to the value in real terms of certain key world currencies. Such
an arrangement would strengthen a long-term tendency towards moderate,
progressive raises in petroleum prices.
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The end to the OPEC pricing feud. i.e. to the dual pricing struc-
ture that plagued the organization during most of 1981, could mean a
reassessment of the energy picture in Western industrialized nations.
By November, 1981, demand in the United States was again edging upwards,
while supplies were going down. The new. stable OPEC prices might re-
sult in decreasing efforts to develop alternate energy sources. No end
was in sight for the Iraq-Iran War. which continued to limit output
from these countries. Total OPEC production had, by October 1981,
fallen to 20.5 million b/d from a high of 31 million b/d in 1979. In
this context, if Saudi Arabia were to cut back on its production, cur-
rently at about 9.5 million b/d, as an additional measure to ensure
more bargaining power for OPEC, this could mean a new period of tight
petroleum supplies.
In regards to time horizons for changes in oil price and supply
levels, the picture is not any rosier. On a short-range basis, it is
widely acknowledged by now that fuel supply difficulties will be an
almost universal phenomenon during the 1980 's, though taking different
forms in different parts of the world. According to a 1980 CIA study,
world oil supplies are likely to last only between 60 to 90 years.
There is a "precipitate decline" of "giant" oil fields (those of 500
million barrels or more), and of "supergiant" fields (at least 5 bil-
lion barrels), which are being found only at a fraction of the rate of
previous years. These huge fields are at present the source of more
CO
than 75% of the recoverable oil. According to a global projection
of the energy sector to the year 2030, the period of "confusion" up to
the year 2000. during which the world will face a progressive scarcity
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of "clean" fuels, must be overcome by a period of "transition." imme-
diately afterwards, during which energy needs will have to be increas-
ingly supplied by alternate sources.
The energy crisis, with its economic and political variables, con-
tributes to shape an international scenario according to the degrees of
vulnerability of the actors. In this respect, Helio Jaguaribe has
noted several overlapping categories: countries or regions without
resources to face the crises; those that are being forced to revise
their economic and social policies to adapt to the new conditions;
democratic nations whose consensus mechanisms are being sorely tested
by the economic impasse; and those countries whose legitimacy is based
on an apparently all-encompassing ideology, albeit under diverging
methods of political control.
In an unstable international milieu, qualified by these groups of
actors, disorientation as to the mutually acknowledged and accepted
boundaries of political interplay could lead, according to Jaguaribe,
to three possible outcomes: 1) a Third World War; 2) the consolida-
tion of a "world regime" under "shared direction" by the superpowers;
or 3) the emergence of a new international system, based on widely
agreed-upon economic transactions.^^ The definition of, and agreement
on the meaning, causes, and effects of the energy crisis, will be a
crucial factor in determining which path will be followed in the end.
Impact of the Energy Crisis in the United States
It is necessary to analyze the energy crises in the United States
in relation to general patterns of consumption, for if the goal of
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sooner or
development is limitless expansion of demand, ours being a finite
world, there is no possible way of avoiding a turning point s(
later. In this context, is it a crisis indeed, or rather a shortcoming
of a particular mode of civilization, i.e. industrialism, based on an
excessive rate of energy consumption? Of course, it could be argued
that the United States also produces a disproportionate share of the
world's industrial and agricultural goods. But this fact by no means
would dispose of the innate faults of life style and a system of pro-
duction based on the irrational exploitation of non-renewable resources,
After World War II, exploitation of petroleum in the United States
accelerated sharpiy. The United States, in fact, was a net oil ex-
porter, mainly to Western Europe, until 1947. As early as during the
1950's, some U.S. geologists were disputing the excessively optimistic
estimates of hydrocarbon reserves, among them L. G. Weeks and M. K.
Hubert. By 1956, based on a revision of available data, Hubert pre-
dicted that U.S. petroleum production would reach a peak from 10 to 15
years afterwards. A few years later, in reply to greater supply expec-
tations raised by the main oil companies, Hubert reaffirmed that new
discoveries had already reached a maximum level in 1957, and that
proved reserves were at their highest in 1962. Hubert was saying, in
effect, that during the 1960's, U.S. oil production would enter a phase
of decreasing yields.
Grim reality would confirm Hubert's assertions. What the 1973-74
oil price hikes did was to question the up-until-then assumed abundance
of cheap energy. But the signs of an impending crisis were at hand
well before that time. After 1961, proven oil reserves in the United
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States entered into a steady decline. The U.S. petroleum industry
could not keep up with the staggering increases in demand of the 1960's
and early 1970's. Nevertheless, some of the most important markets and
industries in the United States, such as the automobile industry, the
transportation system, and the home-heating market, were developed on
the premises of cheap, abundant energy.
Between 1955 and 1976. U.S. petroleum demand almost doubled, from
8.5 million b/d to 17.4 million b/d. Production of oil and natural gas
increased at a slower pace. In 1970. petroleum production reached its
peak. 9.64 million b/d. By 1965, the United States had ceased to be
self-sufficient in petroleum and, after 1970, imports grew at a rapid
pace. By 1976, the United States was importing 7.3 million b/d, that
is, 42% of national demand. Whereas in 1973 the United States im,-
ported 35% of its oil, by 1977 the figure had risen to 48%.^^
The sources of oil imports on which the United States relied be-
came increasingly less secure and more politically explosive. During
1976, Canada reduced its oil exports to the United States. Parallel
to this, Saudi Arabia replaced Venezuela in the position the latter had
occupied since World War II, as the main U.S. external source of crude
oil and derived products. Imports from OPEC countries grew from 47%
of the total before 1973 to close to 67% in 1976. This included a tri-
pling of purchases from Arab OPEC nations, a disturbing strategic pros-
pect. The cost of oil imports increased rapidly, from 4 billion dol-
lars in 1971, to 8 billion in 1973, 45 billion in 1977, and 42 billion
in 1978. By 1979, the petroleum bill had exceeded the 50 billion
mark.^^ In his "Energy Address" to the nation of April 5, 1979,
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President Carter presented a gloomy picture:
"Just ten years ago, we imported hardly any oilToday, we buy about half the oil we use from
*
foreign countries. We are by far the largest
customer for OPEC oil, buying one-fourth of thatforeign cartel's total production. This year
we will pay out 50 billion dollars for imported
dollars for every household inthe United States. "61
Domestic oil production has failed to meet increasing demand. In
1978, oil imports diminished somewhat as oil from Alaska's North Slope
added 1.2 million b/d to domestic supply. However, this proved to be
only a temporary respite, since it was rot reinforced by stringent re-
straint measures, and it was partly erased shortly afterwards by the
effects of the Iranian upheaval on world oil supply and prices.
As a result of government measures, but mostly because of economic
reasons, during the first two-thirds of 1980 crude oil imports by the
United States dropped from 8.3 million to 5 million b/d. This repre-
sented a contraction of 19.3%.^^ However, price increases nullified
any possible gains from this decline in demand. In April, 1980, govern-
ment officials were announcing that:
"With the doubling of oil prices in the last 12
months, we are spending 90 billion dollars per
year for imported oil — and the price is rising
all the time. Our 1980 oil im.port bill is equal
to the net assets of General Motors, Ford, IBM,
and General Electric combined. If we continue to
spend for imported oil at this rate, in 12 years
we will have exported cash equal to the trading
value of all stocks listed on the New York
exchange -- well over a trillion dollars. "64
There is no way to overestimate the impact of the energy crisis
on the American economy. Since the first oil price increase round of
1973-74, the U.S. economy has been painfully vulnerable to trade
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innbalances and Inflation. The unhappy combination of inflation and
recession so prevalent In the mid and late 1970's was directly related
to OPEC's price increases.
Specifically, foreign oil price hikes have meant that substantial
income has been shifted to OPEC which otherwise would have been spent
on goods and services within the U.S. market. The fact that energy
demand is relatively fixed in the short run, i.e. it cannot be reduced
significantly by conserving fuel or by using substitutes for oil, made
it unavoidable for consumers to pay higher energy bills. Indirectly,
higher energy prices have had repercussions on everything that uses oil
or substitutes, even for several years after the initial impact. In-
ternally, this has implied additional inflation; externally, growing
trade deficits. The depreciation of the dollar in foreign markets dur-
ing the late 1970's completed the vicious circle, by further raising
oil imports and inflation. In short, the net effect of the energy cri-
sis has been a decline, or at least a stagnation, of the American stan-
dard of living, this in spite of the 12% reduction of oil prices in
real terms from mid- 1974 to 1978.^^
A comparison of the average economic growth rates in the main
Western industrialized nations during the periods 1950-1973, and 1973-
1978, clearly presents a picture of a fall in the rates of growth and
productivity. In the United States specifically, the growth rate fell
from an average of 2.6% during the first period to 0.4% during the
second. One of the main reasons for the decline was the sudden in-
crease in energy prices.^^
By April, 1979. one of the primary immediate impacts of the
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curtailment of foreign oil supplies on the U.S. economy, in spite of
constantly higher prices, was the reduction of industry stocks to dan-
gerously low levels. This augured a crucial need to dispense partially
with gasoline production in order to rebuild distillate fuel oil stocks
for industry.67 But the energy problems referred to a much wider frame-
work than the simple reduction of oil consumption:
"The task ahead is clear. We have to bring the
sJo^ thl"l.?fr"''^ Si?' °^ '"''9y under control,t p the outflow of dollars, and wean ourselves
away from the excessive dependence on Middle Easton. which has grown to the point where it threat-
ens our national security. "68
The energy crisis represents a danger to the United States from
two sources: domestic malaise, and foreign strategic dependence. In-
ternally, unless policy measures to prevent them are effective, pro-
gressive increases in the cost of fuel and rationing, a breakdown of
the -
-nsportation system, unemployment, and inflation, could wreak
havoc with America's social structure and even its political system.
Externally, the security threat from vulnerable sources of supply,
which are concentrated in the politically volatile area of the Middle
East, underline the need to find appropriate solutions.^^
United States Energy Policy
If the voice of alarm had been given since the 1950 's by some
scientists worried about the growing gap between U.S. energy production
and reserves, on the one hand, and demand on the other, it was not until
the early 1970 's that political circles began to show their concern
about the situation. During 1971, President Nixon expressed his
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awareness of a possible energy scarcity, and proceeded to promote
search and development of new sources. By April
, 1973. these programs
had not given the expected results, and Nixon proceeded to eliminate
government restrictions on petroleum imports. When the crisis of late
1973 arose, the response of the Nixon administration centered on pro-
duction: oil companies were given incentives, such as the authoriza-
tion to raise prices, as a means to increase the domestic supply of
petroleum. Other signs of government action were the adoption of a
general 55 m.p.h. speed limit all over the nation. Nixon's "Project
Independence," geared as its name implied to achieve energy self-suffi-
ciency and sever external links of dependence, fell short of its goal.
Some of the reasons for its failure were an excessive optimism regard-
ing the production and price levels of alternate sources of energy, and
envi ronmental cons i dera ti ons
.
The failure to increase domestic supplies led to conservation mea-
sures. A 1974 policy project by the Ford Foundation stressed the need
to cut in half the annual rate of increment in energy demand through
conservation. This reduction, according to the project, would not af-
fect the growth of the economy, but it would effectively contribute to
reduce petroleum needs through the end of the century. The project was
the first integral policy approach designed to face energy shortcom-
ings. However, because of strong opposition from the private sector,
it was never implemented.
During the 1976 elections, the energy question was not a central
theme of the Ford-Carter campaign debates. Both men coincided in the
triple need to cut petroleum imports, to free the prices of natural
gas, and to support a strategic petroleum reserve. While Ford empha-
sized strong Federal budgetary support for creating a 90-day reserve.
Carter went further and proposed an energy plan that would deal with^
the various dimensions of the problem.^^
After his election. Carter placed James R. Schlesinger in charge
of the energy sector. The bitter winter of 1976 reinforced the objec-
tive of a comprehensive energy plan, but political problems related to
Carter's inability to deal with Congress were to plague its enactment.
The energy plan that finally emerged in November. 1978. after pro-
tracted negotiations in Congress, was a modified version of the orig-
inal. Nevertheless, it was a recognition to a new awareness in the
government regarding energy problems. Energy questions had gained a
position of priority. An indication of this fact was the creation in
1977 of the Department of Energy at the level of a Secretary, headed
by Schlesinger.
Carter's Energy Plan. i.e. the National Energy Act, was in real-
ity a package of energy-related measures
, centered on two basic objec-
tives: conservation and utilization of alternate energy sources. In
regards to conservation, the National Energy Conservation Act of 1978
required Governors to submit plans to the Secretary of Energy on the
procedure through which oil and gas dealers would advise customers
about conservation measures in each state. Furthermore, it encouraged
conservation by putting into effect a series of grants, loans, and
federal programs to assist public and federal facilities in installing
energy-saving devices and switching to solar heating and cooling.^^
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 reinforced these measures by granting
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tax credits to homeowners who installed energy-saving equipment, and
by imposing a tax starting with 1980 automobile models, on those which
did not meet a minimum standard of economy. The Public Utilities Regu-
latory Policy Act was based on the principle that electric rates should
encourage the conservation of energy and the efficient use of re-
sources. In regards to the promotion of alternate energy sources, the
Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 tried to reduce the
nation's dependence on imported oil by expanding domestic coal produc-
tion; this would be achieved by limiting the use of oil or natural gas
in certain facilities, which would then turn to coal for their energy
needs.
Another section of the energy package, the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978. created for the first time a single national market for natu-
ral gas. Through this Act, all states now gained access to m of the
natural gas production, which had previously been out of the inter-
state market, due in part to the higher prices available in the produc-
ing states. Since this situation had caused gluts inside the producing
states, it was expected that the nation as a whole would benefit from
more abundant supplies. Initial price increases would be smaller for
homes, schools, and hospitals than for large industries. In regards
to new natural gas, price controls would end by 1985. The Natural Gas
Policy Act purported to help reduce dependence on imported oil by stim-
ulating home production through increased prices, and accelerating the
switch from gas to more abundant energy sources.
The National Energy Act acknowledged that growth in world oil
production could not keep pace indefinitely with demand. While new
oil findings might postpone the day when oil production started its in-
exorable downward trend, the Act underlined the fact that new finds
were not replenishing existing reserves. Thus, there was a crucial
need for conservation and use of alternate energy sources.
During 1979, energy questions remained one of the priority policy
areas in the Carter administration. The central preoccupation was now
to set forth a phased decontrol of oil prices, to begin on June 1, of
that year throughout 28 months, until September, 1981, when Federal
government controls on oil were to cease anyway. The objective of
phased decontrol would be to encourage production of oil and gas. Thus,
it appeared that conservation and alternate sources of energy by them-
selves were not enough to face the energy crisis. However, since de-
control could further augment what the Carter administration deemed to
be already large profits by the oil companies, there would also be a
"windfall profits tax" on the oil companies, in order to retain part
of the extra earnings and channel them into an "Energy Security Fund."
This Fund would be geared to "protect low income families from energy
price increases, to build a more efficient mass transportation system,
and to put American genius to work solving our long-range energy prob-
78lems." Congress would later approve these mieasures.
In addition to the previous announcements. Carter proposed other
steps to encourage production. One of these would be the resumption
of previously stalled talks with Mexican officials, in order to reach
an agreement on sales of Mexican natural gas to the United States, "at
a price that is fair for both countries. These talks would eventu-
ally clear the way for an agreement.
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conser-
The details of Carter's new offensive on the energy field were
spelled out in what was called a "Response Plan," that included
vation as well as production measures, such as: crude oil price decon-
trol mechanisms; increased production from sources such as the Naval
Petroleum Reserve at Elk Hills; State, local, and private initiatives
to reduce petroleum use; natural gas projects; electric energy trans-
fers; a lead phasedown for gasoline; emergency building temperature re-
strictions; immediate reductions in Federal energy consumption; emer-
gency weekend sales restrictions; and allocation and price control
rules in case of emergencies.^^
To present a coir^prehensive view of the new initiatives or, as
President Carter put it, "to build on the foundation of the National
Energy Act." by May, 1979. the Department of Energy designed the Second
National Energy Plan. This plan addressed three fundamental themes:
U.S. dependence on potentially unstable supply sources, which implies a
vulnerability to interruptions and sudden price increases; the possi-
bility that supply and demand forces might cause world and domestic oil
prices to rise well above the rate of inflation, depressing the long-
term economic growth index; and the need to develop an energy strategy
that holds down economic and political costs to the United States.
The National Energy Plan II introduced a near term (1979-1985). a
mid- term (1985-2000). and a long-term (2000 and beyond), strategies.
The challenge of the near term would be to insure appropriate energy
producing and consuming equipment in degree and kind, so as to start
reducing dependence on foreign oil. During the mid-term, the United
States would continue to hold down energy consumption and oil imports.
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and to develop the capability to shift from reliance on oil and gas to
new and higher-cost forms of energy technologies. Finally, the chal-
lenge for the long-term would be to go beyond the "transitional" energy
supplies of the mid-term, such as some renewable technologies, enhanced
oil recovery, oil shale, and coal-derived products, towards a set of
"ultimate" technologies, such as renewable and advanced nuclear tech-
nologies. "The Nation's long-term objective is to have renewable and
essentially inexhaustible sources of energy to sustain a healthy econ-
omy. "^^
The Agenda for Action of the National Energy Plan II included a
number of Federal policies and programs. Grants and tax incentives
would continue to be instrumental in increasing energy efficiency, thus
enhancing conservation. Financial incentives and the reduction of in-
stitutional barriers would be major tools to raise domestic oil and gas
production. The use of coal, as the Nation's most abundant fossil en-
ergy resource, would be encouraged in place of oil and gas wherever
economically and environmentally feasible. Nuclear reactors were ex-
pected to continue to meet a growing share of the electrical energy
needs. And, finally, an effort was to be made to enhance the capacity
to use renewable resources such as solar and geothermal energy.
By mid-1979, the Carter administration again underlined its com-
mitment to deal with the energy crisis. The 1977 oil import level was
set as the maximum allowed, leaving conservation and domestic produc-
tion as the only avenues for higher energy consumption. To insure these
targets, import quotas were set. A commitment of funds and resources
was made to develop alternative sources of fuel. Carter asked Congress
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to require by law that U.S. utility companies cut their massive use of
oil by 50% within the following decade, and switch to other fuels, es-
pecially coal. He also urged Congress to create an Energy Mobilization
Board, in charge of completing key energy projects. Finally. Carter
reemphasized a conservation program, at the State, county, and city
levels.
Carter's energy proposals faced numerous obstacles from pressure
groups, within Congress itself, and from lobbies, which favored above
everything else the liberalization of prices as incentives to produc-
tion. Carter's proposals, which originally had underlined the need for
conservation and the use of alternate sources of energy, progressively
incorporated measures such as phased decontrol, whether by own convic-
tion, or perhaps in order to lessen the opposition to his programs.
Some observers have also pointed out that the energy proposals were
designed in too much of a hurry and secrecy, which harmed Carter's al-
ready-strained relations with Congress. On the other hand, the barrage
of legislative initiatives received by Congress may have weakened their
85passage.
There has been a continuing debate over the role of the American
oil companies in the energy crisis since 1973. Obviously, there is a
wide, and hard to discern, margin of negotiation between the U.S. gov-
ernment and the oil companies. There are both coincidences and diver-
gencies between the perspectives of the two in regards to national se-
curity, the standard of living, economic stability, and the proper rate
of profits. There are questions regarding the degree of compatibil-
ity between the interests of the U.S. government and those of the oil
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companies. The issue remains undefined and open to debate. During
1979 the Carter administration became worried over the role of the oil
companies in the gasoline supplies shortages of 1978-79. However, in
a mid-1979 report by the Department of Energy, it was stated that'no
evidence had been found of hoarding of oil by refiners, and that the
refiners had kept their stocks within normal levels.
Perspectives. What are the perspectives of U.S. energy policies at
present? In regards to exploration and production, intensive efforts
are being carried on. By 1979. world instability in the petroleum mar-
ket was spurring domestic drilling.SS By late 1980. oil companies were
drilling at deeper levels than ever. 15.000 feet or more. During
1980. a record 60,000 new oil and natural gas wells were estimated to
have been drilled in the United States; by comparison, only 27.602 wells
were dug in 1973. At the same time, an attempt was being made to de-
velop new techniques to recover some of the 75% of oil that remains in
the subsoil after using conventional pumping methods. According to
official sources, these efforts are expected to succeed in keeping oil
production in the United States near current levels of approximately 9
million b/d. through the year 2000. In addition, by 1985. petroleum
consumption is expected to be lower than current levels: up to an 8%
reduction that would allow a savings of as much as 1.5 million b/d.^°
In 1980, the Department of Energy had projected conservation mea-
sures that by the year 2000 could bring about savings on the order of
approximately 20% in energy use.^^ Among alternate sources, coal
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constitutes by far the brightest hope. Under the authority of the Fuel
use Act, during 1980 the Department of Energy was ordering industry and
utilities to convert fro. oil to coal, with the goal of displacement of
the equivalent of a million b/d of oil by 1990. However, many environ-
mental problems related to the burning of coal remain to be solved.^^
In August, 1980, it was announced that the biggest con^ercial plant for
the production of oil from coal would be built in West Virginia, at a
cost of 1.400 million dollars; the investment would be partly guaran-
teed by West Germany and Japan, which would benefit from the technol-
ogy.
Crucial to the achievement of the previous objectives would be the
rational distribution of energy throughout the United States. This
will involve the construction of much additional infrastructure, in-
cluding pipeline systems. For example, the size and development of
additional Alaskan reserves and California production will determine
the size and desirability of a west to east pipeline. By late 1980
the U.S. pipeline network continued to grow steadily, despite infla-
tionary costs for construction.^^
A key part of U.S. energy policy, in regards to lessening the po-
litical vulnerability of the United States vis a vis foreign oil
sources, is the strategic petroleum reserve. In 1977, President Carter
proposed the creation of such a reserve, in the order of 500 to 1,000
million barrels of oil.^^ By March, 1978, 150 million barrels were
already in reserve, and the 1 billion objective was expected to be
reached by 1983.^^ However, by 1979, the U.S. Department of State
opposed the Strategic Reserve, arguing that it would destabilize the
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world market; leaders of the oil industry, as well as Saudi Arabia,
supported the view of the State Depart.ent.58
.^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^
92 million barrels were in reserve, sufficient for only 86 days of nor-
mal consumption. At that time, the Department of Energy suggested that
the initial objectives fell short of actual strategic needs, and should
be increased four times over.^^
These discrepancies in official U.S. policy objectives seemed to
subside with the election of President Reagan. Since early in 1981,
the Reagan administration announced that the United States would buy
crude oil for the strategic reserve, at an accelerated pace and directly
in the international market. By mid-1981 the new Energy Secretary,
James Edwards, declared that the United States was taking advantage of
more flexible market conditions, to increase its strategic petroleum
reserves at a rate of 200,000 b/d. The ultimate objective has been
expanded to 120 days of supply. In this context, a significant de-
velopment by September, 1981, was the incorporation of Mexico as a
direct supplier to the strategic reserve.
If a lesson must be learned from a decade of various approaches
to face the energy crisis, it is the extreme difficulty of putting into
effect an efficient program of energy conservation in a society and an
economic system such as those of the United States. According to some
observers, factors such as the American political process itself, and
the coexistence of multiple pressure groups, do not bode well for the
1 n?
prospects of success.
It would appear that energy policies should be flexible and multi-
faceted: the goals of conservation and production must be carefully
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balanced. However, the Reagan administration is bound to direct its
efforts mainly towards production and away from conservation. This is
likely to imply a number of things, such as: a lessening of environ-
mental standards, in order to facilitate the use of coal; the encourage-
ment of the nuclear industry; and the opening up of more federal lands
for oil and gas exploration.
Indeed, early in 1981 the Reagan administration moved to eliminate
the last oil price controls, well ahead of schedule, in order to spur
domestic exploration and production. Likewise, federal subsidies
in the industry were abolished, an action which has resulted in serious
economic difficulties for sm.all exploring and refining companies. De-
control was bringing about the closing down of various retail gas sales
operations, which had been maintained due to government regulations
Furthermore, the Reagan administration has proposed dismantling the
Department of Energy. By October, 1981. U.S. imports were at their
lowest level since 1975, oscillating between 3.3 and 4.4 million b/d.
However, domestic demand was beginning to increase again, while inven-
tories are 19 million barrels lower than a year before, down to 200
million barrels. This was taking place at a time when the mini-glut
in the international market seemed to be coming to an end.-^^^
Whether under an approach that gives priority to conservation or
to production, some of the main worries that have underlined the urgency
of U.S. energy policy, such as the need for stable, nonvulnerable
sources of foreign petroleum, remain very much in effect. And it is in
this context that the position of Mexico as a U.S. supplier finds its
relevance.
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Effects of Hexir.n nil Fvnorts on II. s n......--
.^^i-rt
In the light of special geopolitical circumstances, i.e. geographic
proximity, trade, strategic considerations. Mexico's oil-exporting po-
tential is bound to have a growing impact on the U.S. energy situation
and policies. In this respect, Edward J. Williams points out that
"Mexican oil will take on added importance as the drama of U.S. energy
dependence unfolds." This importance is manifest as a crucial source
of petroleum in case of an external threat to U.S. national survival.
Mexico's basic political stability and continuity, in contrast with the
political unpredictability of Persian Gulf and African sources, enhances
Its prospects as a reliable supplier.l°« In short, according to
Williams:
"The United States certainly sees more Mexican
oil as desirable under any circumstances, andU IS not too difficult to project a scenario
in which petroleum exports from Mexico would
be absolutely crucial. "107
The point of view of Mexican analysts often reaffirms the previous
assessment, albeit qualifying it with a dose of skepticism regarding
Mexico's prospective gains from the exchange. In many cases, it is
claimed that the United States has incorporated Mexican hydrocarbon
wealth to its global energy plan, as a means to maintain American hege-
mony. In this context, the main objectives of the United States behind
its massive purchases of Mexican oil would be: to increment its crude
oil reserves; to insure the external supply of petroleum and natural
gas necessary to cover the U.S. domestic deficit; to sustain a "loyal
exporter" as a precaution against future conflicts with Arab countries
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or adverse OPEC policies; and to solve the need for secure energy
sources while U.S. energy policy and consumption patterns undergo nec-
essary adjustments and new alternate energy sources become available.
Richard B. Mancke has summarized from the U.S. perspective, the
role of Mexico as a U.S. petroleum supplier:
"Expanded imports of Mexican petroleum will helpthe United States to achieve three importantdomestic goals...: reducing U.S. vulnerability
^h.t"?hriin?^TcE^!°"'
^'^ supplies, assuringt at the United States satisfies its basic energy
damage^" 109'^
and reducing environmental
In terms of U.S. national security, the view is widely shared by
American analysts that it is in the interest of the United States that
Mexico develops its hydrocarbon resources "as rapidly and completely as
possible. The reason for this derives from the divergence in po-
litical, economic, and ideological perspectives between the United
States and the group of countries that control a large share of the
world's oil exports, and from the growth in military and navel strength
by the v.niet Union. Obviously, the full insertion of Mexico in the
present framework of U.S. petroleum suppliers would support the U.S. po-
sition in regards to actual and potential threats to its energy, and
thus to its national security. Indirectly, in reference to Mexican ex-
ports to countries other than the United States, the existence of alter-
nate oil sources would also alleviate pressures on world supply and
prices."^^^
In a context of economic efficiency, Mancke sees three main areas
of economic benefits for the United States, arising from growing im-
ports of Mexican oil:
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0 Ih ?p''n'^'^"''''^"^ Sas or oil .ade from o ,oil shale, uclear power, and solar energy) in orderto ensure an adequate level of energy sec^rily;
?Lni?^''P reduction in capital demands and as acorollary less rigid capital stock requirements and
3 strengthened exports, which will improve the U Sbalance of trade. "112
Mancke is suggesting, in fact, that Mexico's oil exports to the
United States might add a third option, at least in terms of time-
margin, to the two basic alternatives faced by U.S. energy policy, i.e.
conservation, or increased domestic production. In short. Mexican oil
exports might solve, albeit temporarily, the dilemma of spending bil-
lions in alternate energy sources, or continuing to rely on high levels
of imports from unstable foreign sources. And. in what appears at
first to be an adequate suggestion. Mancke states that "it would be in
the best interests of both nations to negotiate firm guarantees calling
for a large and steadily growing minimum amount of petroleum to be sold
by Mexico to U.S. firms each year." In this way. Mexico would have no
financial or marketing problems for expanding its production, and the
United States would have secure sources of petroleum. -^^"^
However, there are some basic weaknesses to Mancke 's arguments.
To begin with, the postponement of the critical U.S. energy dilemma,
i.e. conservation vs. increased domestic production, is by no means a
solution to the energy problem, and might even retard such a solution
by giving rise to a new spurt in domestic consumption, on the basis
that new. secure supplies have been assured. And, whichever the path,
between conservation and increased production, proves to be the
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appropriate one. 1t
.ust undoubtedly be qualified by restraint In de-
mand increases. Moreover, the negotiation of sale guarantees of Mexi-
can oil to the United States on a long-ter. basis are conditioned by
MexIco^s domestic politics. Finally. Mexico's soc1o-econo.ic situation
would not necessarily Improve according to growing oil exports.
The purchase of large amounts of Mexican oil might reduce the need
for capital demands In the United States, but at the price of postpon-
ing a definite solution to the energy problems. And. in any discussion
In regards to the development of domestic oil and alternate energy
sources. U.S. pressure groups and domestic politics must be taken into
account. Mexican exports are bound to have a large impact on U.S. do-
mestic production. It has been estimated that Mexican oil could dis-
place petroleum from Alaska's North Slope (ANS) producers, v,ho have at
present no export option. Thus, there Is an urgent need to reconcile
the Increased Imports of Mexican oil with present policies that encour-
age sales of ANS crude in the Gulf Coast refining market. As a matter
of fact. Mexican exports might undermine ANS sales both in the Gulf
Coast and in the West Coast refineries. By August, 1978. Mexico was
discounting^!" its oil to the extent required to gain a share in the
U.S. market. As a result. Arabian light crude oil was being displaced,
as Mexican oil became available. Furthermore, at that time "Mexican oil
(was) also displacing ANS crude oil. causing ANS to be discounted on the
Gulf Coast as well.''^'^
This phenomenon might be beneficial tc U.S. consumers, since ANS
producers "would be forced to discount Alaskan oil to the extent nec-
essary to undersell Mexican oil and to maintain their market shares.
les
Slightly lower crude oil costs for domestic U.S. refiners could be the
result.""^ However, if Mexican exports were to increase substantially,
at reduced price levels, the situation might deter production and explo-
ration in Alaska's North Slope. The competitive position of the pro-
ducers of ANS could improve by the construction of the PACTEX Pipe-
117line. because of the savings in transportation costs over the present
transit costs of the Panama Canal route. If this were to materialize.
Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO). the largest ANS producer, which also has
a sizable investment in PACTEX, would likely discount its oil to the
extent needed to outsell Mexican oil in the Gulf Coast refining market.
Since it has alternative markets, in the end "Mexico will probably price
its oil just low enough to back out Arabian light but not low enough to
displace ANS crude on a large scale. ""^^^
However, there are contrasting views regarding the extend of the
impact of Mexico's oil exports on U.S. Gulf Coast refineries and
Alaskan North Slope crude Oil. According to U.S. official sources, the
importation of sizable amounts of Mexican crude oil to Gulf Coast re-
fineries "could render ANS crude oil unmarketable anywhere in the United
States except the West Coast, even with the PACTEX pipeline, unless ANS
prices are heavily discounted." And, needless to say, there are criti-
cal discounting margins beyond which ANS production and exploration
might be discouraged.
The effect of oil imports from Mexico on the U.S. domestic market
could be further underlined by reference to two additional indicators:
the "marker" standard in oil transactions, and transportation costs.
There are two important factors that help to establish the price of
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crude 011 and determine the ".arker" refining values and transportation
costs. Towards the end of 1979:
"...Arabian light crude oil (was) the 'marker' crudeoil against which other crude oil is measured Due
for i^'h-'"?^
differences between transportaiion costs
0?^ to u's" cltfYnl'i' Mexican-Reforma crufe0 I U.S. Gulf Coast refineries, however, the poten-tial exists for significant discounting of Mexican-Reforma crude oil, and this discounting could ead tothe Mexican-Reforma crude replacing the Arabian liqh?crude oil as the 'marker. ' "120 ^
Specifically in regards to transportation costs, these are deter-
mined by factors such as the size of tankers, distances, and prevalent
world scale rates. Due to the fact that freight rates are expected to
increase through the 1980's, "the transportation differential between
Mexican and Arabian light crudes will probably widen over the next de-
cade," As the transportation differential increases, "this discounting
in conjunction with West Coast surpluses could create downward pressure
on the price of ANS crude. "^^^
In short, the import of significant quantities of Mexican crude
oil would: bring about pressures to discount U.S. Gulf Coast price for
ANS oil, which would reduce the netback to the wellhead; in the absence
of a West Coast pipeline (PACTEX), hinder ANS production and explora-
tion; progressively push both Arabian and ANS oil out of U.S. Gulf
Coast refineries. These possibilities raise potential Federal policy
issues in regards to the need for incentives and compensations to
Alaskan North Slope producers in order to sustain exploration and de-
velopment of oil fields there. Other areas of concern would be the
potential levels of discounting by the various actors, estimates on
quantities and geographic penetration in the United States of Mexican
170
011. and availability of oil for the Strategic Reserve Progra.
On the other hand, in all likelihood the U.S. balance of trade
would benefit fro. the growing imports of Mexican petroleu.. Factors
such as geography, population density, and economic growth objectives
underline the fact that Mexico will purchase increasing amounts of U.^.
goods. According to Mancke:
^li/ u T^oreign exchange earnings for ll sgoods and services, a policy that encourages a risen Mexico's share of the total world oil trade w 1lead to a net increase in the demand for U S exoortsTherefore the net effect.
. .would be to reduce Se 5 ^balance of trade deficit. "123 ^ a the U.S.
However, it would be an altogether different proposition for the
United States to openly encourage, or pressure. Mexico to raise its
level of petroleum production and exports, even though it might benefit
the U.S. balance of trade, without due consideration to the domestic
socio-economic impact in Mexico. Any significant increases in Mexico's
hydrocarbon exports must be carefully weighed against the overall effect
in Mexico's internal milieu. And, obviously, domestic conditions in
Mexico are of utmost importance for the United States. Mancke seems to
assume that the more oil Mexico produces and exports, the better off it
will be. in terms of stability and "rapidly rising living standards . "^^4
But this is not necessarily so. As a matter of fact, unrestricted de-
velopment of Mexico's oil industry, with a corresponding increase in
exports and earnings, might well have the opposite effect, in social,
economic, political, and ecological terms.
By 1979, Mexico had already displaced, in order of importance, two
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traditional U.S. petroleum suppliers. Venezuela and Canada. u is
by now clear that Mexican hydrocarbon exports can indeed contribute to
alleviate the energy problems in the United States. However, as it has
been seen, their impact is complex and intimately tied to U.S. domestic
energy policy. Regardless of the extent of Mexico's petroleum export
potential, its ultimate significance is contingent upon the future pat-
terns of U.S. energy consumption and production. In a context of ex-
panding oil consumption, in time all of Mexico's exports might turn out
to be just a transient palliative. On the basis of a 1978 conjecture,
of 100 billion barrels in proven reserves, it was estimated that Mexico
would not be able to supply the equivalent of more than 3 or 4 years of
petroleum consumption by the noncommunist world, in terms of expected
1990 levels of petroleum needs. -^^^
Mexico as an oil exporter represents for the United States, on the
one hand, valuable time to reach an adequate equilibrium between con-
servation and production, and on the other, a unique opportunity to lay
the foundation for a better mutual understanding. In effect, this is
a two-sided proposition that goes beyond a mere commercial exchange, to
encompass the complex social, economic, and political amalgam of rela-
tions between the two nations.
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CHAPTER VI
MEXICO: THE DOMESTIC CAULDRON
Socioeconomi c Environment: 1976 to thp Present
A^la^nosis. The goals of Mexico's process of socioeconomic develop-
ment could be measured in terms of the following criteria:
-A more equitable distribution in income, through greater efficacy
and honesty in the fiscal mechanisms and a structure of progressive
taxation.
-An increase in productivity levels in all the sectors of the econ-
omy. This goal is parallel to the first one since, as the possibilities
of consumption of the population become greater, there must be an incre-
ment in the availability of goods. Productivity is also a key factor
in slowing the inflationary spiral.
-A rate of employment creation above that of the increment of the
economically active population. This is a vital objective in promoting
the self-satisfaction of basic needs by an increasing percentage of the
population, and thus freeing state resources for other critical areas
of development.
-An improvement of educational levels, congruent with the modalities
of development.
-An improvement and extension of social programs, tending towards
an ever- increasing coverage of the population, indispensable for their
full incorporation to the productive and creative activities of national
development.
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-An improvement in basic infrastructure, in order to achieve an
effective national integration.
-An extension of birth control programs, in order to bring demo-
graphic growth down to an acceptable level.
-The promotion of political-administrative decentralization, and
the establishment of fiscal incentives for industry in the interior of
the country (outside the cities of Mexico, Guadalajara, and Monterrey).
The objective of these measures would be to slow down the excessive in-
crease of population in a few, overcrowded, and unbalanced urban cen-
ters, with their subsequent negative impact in terms of maladministra-
tion of public resources.
These previous objectives implicit in Mexico's process of develop-
ment must be inscribed within a framework of complex social and economic
problems, intimately related to each other.
Official policy: 1976 to the present
. During the postwar era, a series
of factors effectively contributed to strengthen Mexico's process of
development, among them:
-Domestic political stability.
-A sustained rate of economic growth.
-Alternate sources of foreign currency (besides exports and inter-
national financial organizations), i.e. tourism.
-Self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs and petroleum.
-A low rate of inflation.
-Solvency in the world's financial markets.
-An "escape value" for unemployment and underemployment, through
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migration to the United States.^
However, by the late 1960-s these factors had ceased to have, to
various degrees, their former positive influence. From 1970 to 1976,
matters took a turn for the worse. Domestic political stability was^
threatened by a flagging economic performance, and by the acrid con-
flicts between public officials and the private sector. Income from
tourism was increasingly canceled out by the growing expenditures of
^^exican tourists in other countries, especially the United States. In
this way. Mexico lost an important compensating element for its chronic
trade deficit. Agricultural production continued its long and steady
decline, both for domestic consumption and exports. During a brief
period Mexico lost its self-sufficiency in petroleum. The rate of in-
flation soared. As a result of the previous situation, Mexico's posi-
tion in the international financial markets was progressively eroded.
Finally, a precarious economic situation in the United States made
Washington redouble, to be sure more in intent than in effectiveness,
its efforts to stop illegal Mexican migration.^
When the Lopez Portillo adirinistration took over in 1976, the
stage was set for decisive political action in order to overcome the
crisis, and embark upon new schemes of development. In his first an-
nual report, in September, 1977, the Mexican president defined the then
prevalent situation:
"Mexico... is living a severe crisis. The development
of the country was sustained for a long time by politi-
cal stability, moderation in price increases
.. .and a
fixed monetary parity with the dollar Of these three
supports we lost several years ago the proportionality
of prices, which unleashed inflation.
. .Later, our
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was
fen'?n^."f ""employment Increased, well i to a recession, the financial system proved
According to Lopez Portillo. inflation, massive movements of capi-
tal, and radical changes in the relative values of currencies and raw
materials, had created an essentially different scenario. Thus, there
could not be a return to previously acceptable rules for socioeconomic
development. The old pattern of growth, according to the President,
finished, and new approaches would be needed.^
A key element characteristic of Lopez Portillo's regime has been
the reliance on planning mechanisms, as a means to consolidate the
guiding function of the state in the process of development. During his
campaign for the Presidency. Lopez Portillo had coined the slogan "Al-
liance for Production." i.e. between the public and private sectors, as
a response to the economic crisis. In his acceptance speech of Decem-
ber 1. 1976, he defined the context of operation of the Alliance, in
effect a new framework or organization in order to produce, distribute,
and consume according to Mexico's own intrinsic needs. The Alliance
for Production would offer "to everyone viable alternatives geared to
reconcile the national objectives of development and social justice,
with the specific demands of the various factors in the economy."^
The Alliance for Production set the pattern for a series of pro-
grams, such as: the Plan for Urban Development, the Plan for Industrial
Development, the Plan for Agriculture and Cattle Development, the
Mexican Food System, and various political, economic, and administrative
reforms. By early 1980, all of these plans had been integrated into the
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Global Plan for Development, 1980-1982.
The Global Plan for Development has defined the model Mexico is to
follow as a nation, based on
"A productive system capable of offering the nationalgoods necessary for the consolidation of deve^opme tand national autonomy, and the social goods to coverthe normal needs of food, health, education, social
security, and housing... "6
Within the framework of the National System of Economic and Social
Planning, the strategy of the Mexican government would be geared to ful
fill four basic objectives of development policy:
-"To reaffirm and strengthen Mexico's independence as a democratic
just, and free nation, in the economic, political, and cultural spheres
-"To provide the population with employment and a minimum of wel-
fare, giving priority to food, education, health, and housing needs.
-"To promote high, sustained and efficient economic growth.
-"To improve the distribution of income among persons, factors of
production, and geographic regions."^
At present, two elements determine the priority of Mexico's devel-
opment efforts: petroleum, and food production. By March, 1980, with
the creation of The Mexican Food System (known by its Spanish acronym
of SAM), the setting of limits to oil exports, and the postponement of
Mexico's entrance to GATT, the model of development promoted by the
Mexican government appeared to emphasize the goal of national autonomy.
The Mexican Food System has tried to overcome the lack of response
by private enterprise in regards to the agricultural sector, namely in
the area of basic foodstuffs for domestic consumption. The official
encouragement of and preoccupation with food production would be
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summarized by K^pez Portillo in crude terms:
"...The objective is national self-sufficiencv Itwou d be painful for us that, having so ved the'e erqyproblem we were to fall into the trap of losing (the
An additional indication of the importance the Mexican government places
on food production is the Law for Increasing Production in the agri-
cultural and cattle industries. Enacted in early 1981, this law con-
stitutes a further attempt to encourage productivity in this sector.^
But the petroleum industry is the key factor that has brought re-
newed confidence and high expectations in regards to socioeconomic de-
velopment. The petroleum bonanza means for Mexico the possibility of
a new model of development, able to compensate for domestic disequilib-
riums. Official Mexican government assessments of the significance of
the oil wealth have shown clear optimism. By March, 1978, President
Lo'pez Portillo could already declare confidently that "petroleum will
erase the ancestral misery of the Mexicans
. In his second annual
report, on September 1, 1978, the Mexican President underlined the re-
covery of the nation's economy and predicted accelerated economic growth
for the next few years. By early 1979, in the words of Lopez
Portillo, petroleum had become the "axis of progress. "^^ In other
words, the exploitation of oil means the opportunity for Mexico to
"liberate itself economically and socially. "^"^ More than that, on its
petroleum wealth lies the future of Mexico:
"That a country without petroleum fails, cancels its
possibilities of development, is lamentable but ex-
plainable; but that in these moments, in this last
third of the XX Century, a country with oil should
become disorganized, to the extreme of not solving
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its economic and social problems, would be graveSuch a country would definitely cancel its hislori-
h?ltory''u'
^"'"'^
' Pl^^^ in
The expectations arising from Mexico's petroleum wealth were under-
lined in a mid-1978 study by Mexico's National Bank. Petroleum could
be. according to this analysis, the key to national development. It
would generate funds for various industries, provide the necessary en-
ergy for an increase in the production of goods and services, create de-
mand and employment through Pemex's purchases, strengthen Mexico's fi-
nancial stability in foreign markets, and promote the industrial capac-
ity to achieve new projects. Indeed, according to a prestigious in-
ternational analysis firm based in Mexico. 1981 was expected to be the
first of two years of accelerated growth, with a goal of upwards of an
8% increase in the GNP. A "powerful petroleum sector" would be the
basis for a year in which "the Mexican economy will be one of the most
dynamic in the world."^^
Mexican government officials have frequently expressed their as-
surances that the country's development will not come to rely exces-
sively on oil. Since mid-1977. President Lo'pez Portillo has often re-
iterated that Mexico's diversified economy will allow it to place the
exploitation of petroleum within a rational context and that petroleum
will not be the axis of national development.'^''
By early 1979, Mexico's Secretary of the Treasury, David Ibarra
Muffoz, and the General Director of the Bank of Mexico, Gustavo Romero
Kolbeck, had announced a new strategy to generate foreign funds, in
which petroleum would pass to occupy a second place in importance.
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while the exports of manufactured and semi.iaborated products would be-
come the pivot of economic development. In August. 1980. Pemex
Former Director. Jorge Dfaz Serrano, emphasized that Mexico's economy
was not becoming
"petroleum-bound." but that, on the other hand, the
financial inputs from hydrocarbon resources constituted a fundamental
element to attain social justice. Mexico, said Di'az Serrano, "is not
an oil country, but a country with oil
.. .hydrocarbons are not an end
in themselves, nor the final objective of the efforts underway. "^^
The self-assurance and ebullience of Mexico's public officials
since 1977 has been positively reflected in U.S. and international gov-
ernment and financial circles. Late in that year, France's Le Figaro
was predicting that "Mexico was destined to become a new Saudi Arabia."
a favorable assessment of the situation, apparently .^^ By April. 1979,
The Petroleum Economist considered Mexico's rapid ascent as an important
oil producing and exporting country as "the most stimulating event since
the 1973 oil embargo." According to that London-based publication, the
revision of Mexico's financial and monetary policies by the Ldpez
Portillo administration had placed the country again on sound basis,
and attracted a new wave of foreign investments.^^ By mid-1978, the
U.S. press was giving increasing attention to Mexico's oil wealth, em-
phasizing the promising perspectives for sustained economic growth un-
der new pragmatic policies.
An assessment. How does the socioeconomic situation in Mexico stand in
the context of governmental policies, rhetoric, and forecasts? To begin
with, there must be a distinction between two often interchangeably
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used terms. Eccno.lc growth is not the equivalent of development. The
latter Involves a conjunction of economic and social progress. The re-
lationship between these two factors is critical. A balanced process
Of development would tend to spread among the various sectors of the
population the gains achieved through economic growth. Social progress,
for its part, enhances the possibilities of economic growth by expanding
the domestic market.
Following this appreciation, it could be effectively argued that
Mexico's postwar "stabilizing development." while stimulating industri-
alization and economic growth, resulted in a deterioration of the dis-
tribution of income and unemployment rates, and the stagnation of the
agricultural sector. Likewise, "shared development" failed in its ob-
jective of improving income distribution, because it lacked a compre-
hensive fiscal reform and resorted instead to external financing.
Redvers Opie has underlined six main problems related to Mexico's
development: inflation; demographic growth; lagging agricultural pro-
ductivity; low levels of industrial efficiency and international com-
petitiveness; the problem of the "mix" between public and private enter-
prise; and the need for direct foreign investment capital. The tradi-
tional avenues of solution to these various problems involve definite
views concerning the direction Mexican development should follow. For
example, an improvement in agricultural productivity would be the means
to both expand the domestic market and create a surplus for exports.
Increased industrial efficiency would go hand in hand with a shift in
the structure of manufacturing into capital accumulation and the ex-
ports market. Mexico's "mixed system" would orient itself towards
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greater participation by private enterprise. And foreign direct invest-
ment capital, mainly through the action of multinational corporations,
would contribute to job-creation and general economic development.
Mexican sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen challenges the previous
perspective of the situation, through a number of "myths" which should
not be confused with reality. One of these myths is that growing ex-
ports are a solution to r^exico's problems. If exports consist mainly
of raw materials and semi-manufactured products, this would underline
the lack of autonomous internal development. On the other hand, exports
can indeed contribute to improve the balance of trade, but only if im-
ports diminish, too. A deterioration in the terns of exchange can also
spur inflation.^^
According to Stavenhagen, another myth would be that an increase
in production contributes automatically to the general welfare of the
population. Deficits in the production of basic articles such as food-
stuffs are often related not to a low level of output but to an unbal-
anced structure of production and an unequal system of distribution. A
third myth would be that measures such as a devaluation and/or a liber-
alization of prices can improve economic health without substantial
structural changes. Finally, there would be the myth that only large
entrepreneurs can increase production in the agricultural sector. This
production is usually geared to exports, which is detrimental for the
domestic market, and takes away financial and technical resources from
the poorest regions and populations.^^
It is fashionable in Mexico these days to mention that the post-
war model of development is no longer valid. It would be pertinent to
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analyze the shortcomings of the process of development during the
1950's and 1960-s. which tended to worsen domestic economic disequilib-
riums and social inequalities.27
..^^^^^ .^^ ^^^^.^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
now under the aegis of petroleum.
In many academic as well as financial circles. Mexico's economic
performance following World War II was widely described as a "miracle."
Specifically, high indices of economic growth, related mainly to the
development of the industrial sector, an impressive infrastructure,
improvements in the social services, and political stability, were^some
of the signs of the miracle. A critic of the "miracle" during the
early 1970's, Fernando Carmona et. al
. , questioned these assumptions
by referring to certain fallacies such as: the official manipulation
of statistical data; the lack of equilibrium in the economy, in secto-
rial as well as social terms; the "bureaucratic-political labyrinth,"
that enhanced nepotism and favoritism; the failure to improve signifi-
cantly nutritional, health, and educational standards among great sec-
tors of the population; and the monopoly of political power.
However, the authors of the Mexican Miracle failed to suggest al-
ternatives to the situation they explored. Furthermore, whatever social
and economic progress Mexico has experienced during the last few de-
cades should not be dismissed lightly, especially when the enormous
increase in population, and therefore in demands, is taken into consid-
eration. Faced with internal diversity and external limitations, the
job for Mexico's political leadership has not been easy, and its
achievements would seem to be substantial.
Nevertheless, there are some clearly identifiable drawbacks.
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Writing in 1979. Enrique Padilla Aragon. argues that Mexican develop-
ment tends to be dependent, fluctuating, unbalanced, and unequal. 29
To a great extend Mexico relies on foreign investments and loans. But
the determining factor is its strong dependence on a single market, i.e.
the United States. Says Padilla: "...our economic development accel-
erates or is set back according to the economic policy of the United
States in relation to the world and to us.-^O Mexican development also
fluctuates, i.e. it is a cyclic type of development. It suffers from
various types of disequilibriums, i.e. between occupation and income,
productivity in agriculture and industry, regional imbalances, and a
breach between exports and imports. Finally, the main problem, ac-
cording to Padilla. is "redistribution of income and the internal mar-
ket." In the early 1970's, 50% of Mexico's population perceived only
3 315% of the total income. To a varying degree, since 1976 these four
characteristics have continued to define Mexico's process of develop-
ment.
Mexican development until the early 1970's had enjoyed both growth
and stability. This was possible, according to Roger D. Hansen, be-
cause financing schemes followed the "monetarist" admonition of avoid-
ing governmental deficits, as well as the structuralist dictum that in-
vestments in infrastructure must be kept at a proper level. Foreign
credit financing was available at moderate interest rates. However,
something has obviously gone wrong since then. By early 1981, official
Mexican estimates put the rate of inflation at close to 28%. and the
IMF expects inflation to reach the figure of 32.5% by the end of the
year. Washington sources have stated that, in spite of an average 8%
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rate of increase of the GNP in 1979 and 1980, inflation is limiting
Mexico's progress.35 Po, his part. President Lopez Portillo has re-
ferred to inflation as the "cost of the consolidation of progress,"
i.e. industrialization and modernization.^^
Nevertheless, inflation remains a serious threat to the Mexican
economy. Part of it is undoubtedly related to the external sector, i.e.
a result of turmoil in international financial markets, and the high
costs of imported capital goods for the petroleum industry. But there
are significant domestic components, three of which could be identified:
a growing domestic demand which exceeds the supply of goods and results
in bottlenecks in the economy; the fact that imports which might satisfy
domestic demand and lower prices are constrained by trade barriers; and
wage compensations demanded by Mexican organized labor to offset in-
flation, which have often resulted in actual wage increases, and a sub-
sequent spur in demand for limited products. However, any actions by
the Mexican government to counter this situation would run contrary to
developmental and nationalistic objectives and, thus, would be politi-
cally unfeasible.
Inflation has also been spurred by the critical situation in the
agricultural sector. Starting in the 1940's, Mexico's economic growth
was based on the primary sector. The government invested heavily in
irrigation, and agricultural production began to increase by 4.4% a
year. According to Richard D. Hansen, the agricultural sector had to
provide: increasing amounts of foodstuffs to the rapidly expanding
urban population; raw materials; export earnings to finance the import
of capital goods; labor for the secondary and tertiary sectors; savings
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for industrial and infrastructure inves^ents; a market for the goods
from the industrial sector. Mexico became virtually self-sufficient
in food production, and its output of raw materials for the industrial
sector increased rapidly. Agricultural exports since 1940 grew at a
rate of 6% annually, and represented from 25% to 50% of total exports
income. A sizeable proportion of the rural population became available
for urban occupations. Savings from agriculture were transferred to
other economic sectors. And. finally, rural Mexico seemed to represent
a growing domestic market for Mexican industry.
But agriculture, the hen that laid the golden eggs for Mexico's
process of development, increasingly faltered. From 1965 to 1976, out-
put grew only by an annual average of 1.6%. In the words of Redvers
Opie:
"At some point in the process of industrializing
the country, the contribution of Mexican agriculture
to GDP could be expected to decline. But total
agricultural production would seem to have declined
too early and too rapidly. "39
The participation of agriculture in the total goods and services
produced in Mexico, which was 20.2% in 1950, diminished to 9.4% in
1965, 5.6% in 1975, and 5.2% in 1979.^° From 1970 to 1979. the agri-
cultural sector's contribution to Mexico's foreign trade declined by
23%.^^
The reasons for the crisis in the agricultural sector are varied.
At the beginning of 1980, the surface under cultivation and the grain
AO
tonnage obtained were basically the same as 15 years earlier. During
the 1970 's, agriculture suffered from a scarcity of investments.^"^
Cultivation of basic grains for domestic consumption, such as wheat.
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corn, and beans, has dropped, while crops for export or cattle- feeding,
such as sesame and sorghum, have increased their volumes/^ This has
been propitiated by speculation in the basic foodstuffs market by
Mexican as well as multinational corporations. The situation of scar-
city in basic agricultural products contrasts with the expansion of the
cattle industry, geared towards beef exports/^
Due to a combination of drought and frost, between 1979 and 1980
Mexico's grain harvest collapsed catastrophically. Through the entire
decade of 1970's, grain imports by Mexico amounted to 16.637 million
tons. By contrast, during 1980 alone the figure would reach a total of
12 million tons, the largest quantity of grains ever purchased in its
Mstory. The huge purchases brought havoc to Mexico's railroad sys-
tem, in charge of transporting the grain imports from the U.S. border,
and apparently unable to cope with the task.'^^ The traditional surplus
in the agricultural trading balance had, by 1980, turned into a deficit
of 180 million dollars, due to low production and massive imports.
Continued sizeable purchases were predicted for 1981, in the order of
10 million tons of grain.
The "easy" solution to the agricultural problem, i.e. to import
foodstuffs with funds from petroleum exports, would seem to hinder the
implementation of structural changes in the countryside, needed in order
to achieve a more rational and effective production. Nevertheless, the
Mexican government appears to be aware of these problems. Since late
in 1978, President Lopez Portillo had emphasized that "oil (was) not
enough; without foodstuffs, there can be only a half-way development."^^
The Mexican President, by late 1980, was counting on the Mexican Food
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System (SAM) to achieve a sufficient minimum level of foods consumption
for all Mexicans.51 m December. 1980, the Secretary of Patrimony and
Industrial Development. Jose Andres de Oteyza. was underlining that the
best utilization of earnings from petroleum would be in the agricultural
sector, to encourage food production.
In his fifth annual report of September, 1981, the Mexican Presi-
dent announced the recovery of the agricultural sector. During 1980,
harvests were the highest in history, i.e. 23.489 million tons of basic
foodstuffs, an 11% increment over the previous record figure of 1978.
and 29.5% in excess of the 1976 level. Likewise, new record figures
are forecast for 1981. The production of fertilizers more than doubled
during 1980, from 2.2 to 5 million tons. The Mexican government seems
to have made the decision to reach self-sufficiency in food as a means
to neutralize dependence on the United States. By 1982, present trends
point to self-sufficiency in corn and beans.
The Lopez Portillo administration has taken strong measures which
involve extensive subsidies to producers and consumers of agricultural
products. Besides the rise in production itself, the surface under
cultivation is expanding rapidly, a 17.9% increase in 1980 in relation
to 1979 levels, to a total of 12.7 million hectares. The strategy is
proving to be very costly. During 1980 credits to the agricultural
sector increased by 61%. and for 1981 it is estimated they will amount
to 290 billion pesos. Basic price guarantees to producers increased by
40% during 1980. and 1981 will represent an apportionment of 38 billion
pesos. Still. Mexican officials point to the fact that oil income is
being spent at home.
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According to a Mexican critic. Raul Olmedo. even if self-suffi-
ciency in basic foodstuffs were to be reached, it would mean nothing to
income and employment levels in the rural sector are not raised.
Olmedo thinks that insufficient food production is a result of a low
level of demand, which springs from the weak consumption possibilities
of great sectors of the population. Whereas potential demand is enor-
mous, as precarious indices of nourishment attest, real demand, based
on earnings, has not grown accordingly.^^
Some Mexican officials are apparently well aware of the social
implications from this agrarian dilemma. By late 1980. former Mexican
Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Javier Garcfa Paniagua, declared that the
social inequalities in the countryside were "brutal. "^^ Income distri-
bution problems are deep-seated, and they are likely to plague Mexico
through the remainder of the century. However, the level and intensity
of these inequalities, and the success or failure of the government to
improve them, might well determine social peace in Mexico. By mid- 1980,
a group of Mexican analysts were warning that the Global Plan for De-
velopment would not reach its goals, since it was addressed to problems
pertaining to a certain economic juncture, i.e. the so-called exhaustion
of the model of import-substitutions, and not to deep structural pro-
blems, such as the maldistribution of income.^®
Income distribution continues to be extremely unbalanced. While
certain small groups receive a disproportionate share of the total in-
come, the bottom 40% of the people subsist on barely 12% of the income.
This unequal concentration of economic wealth means that the living
conditions of the majority of the population are well below what they
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could be. were there a .ore equitable distribution of the national
come. By September. 1981. the Mexican President was addressing the
issue of income distribution. According to Lopez Portillo. the impres-
sive economic growth rates of 9.2% in 1979. and 8.3. in 1980. are having
a clear i.pact on the increment of family income, of 4.7X between 1977
and 1980. From another perspective, the various social security insti-
tutions cover 48 million people, i.e. more than 65% of the population.
20 million of whom have been incorporated since 1977.^5 But conclusive
proof of improvements in the distribution of income remains elusive,
and the quality of benefits under social programs varies sharply.
Socioeconomic pressures are directly related to demographic growth.
Mexico practically doubled its population between 1960 and 1980, from
36.881.000 to 69.752.000 people. During this period, life expectancy
increased from 59.2 to 64.4 years. In spite of partially effective
official efforts at birth control, Mexico still has one of the highest
rates of demographic growth in the world. around 3% annually. This
means that its population of 70 million will double in 24 years. One
of the most formidable problems derived from these facts is the age
structure of the population: more than 45% of the people are 15 years
old or under. There are simply not enough resources to achieve an ade-
quate level of nutrition, health, education, and housing for such an
overwhelming proportion of minors.
This phenomenon of rapid demographic growth in Mexico could be
better understood in the following terms:
-The estimated demographic growth for relatively short time spans,
of 20 to 30 years, leads to levels of population density similar to
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those of developed, industrialized nations, without a nearly comparable
urban, industrial, or agricultural infrastructure.
-Mexico's economic policies, and efforts at developmental planning,
cannot by any means underestimate the impact of the demographic factor,
not only in terms of total population increases, but also of its struc-
ture, i.e. the fact that the economically active portion of the popula-
tion continues to decrease relative to the dependent sectors.
-Demographic growth, and population structure, generate an ever-
greater need of investments on equipment and social services than is
the case in countries with smaller demographic increases and a more
balanced age structure. In particular, the educational and formative
process, together with the sanitary, assistance, and housing capabili-
ties, are under constant pressure from growing demands.
Closely related to demographic growth, the high rate of urbaniza-
tion causes multiple and sharp problems, among them the incapability to
create urban-industrial jobs in sufficient numbers, and to supply ade-
quate social services, equal to the prevailing needs. Almost two-thirds
of the Mexican population live in urban centers, and peasants continue
to migrate to the cities, most of them to jcin the ranks of the poor,
marginal population of the urban slums. Accelerated urbanization frus-
trates the efforts to provide adequate public services to an ever-in-
creasing population, and depletes resources that, otherwise, would be
channeled towards the agrarian sector. Industrial and bureaucratic
centralization in a few, large cities emphasize the negative effects
of urbanization.
Unemployment and underemployment represent one of the fundamental
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obstacles to achieving better distribution of income. Although data is
not altogether reliable, it is estimated that both of these phenomena
affect close to 50% of Mexico's population. The main causes of unem-
ployment are demographic growth and the situation in the agricultural
sector. The age structure of the population determines that the
country has an adult labor force of only 18 million. This means that
barely 28% of the population support the remaining 72%. Still, less
than half the workers have permanent jobs. The task of bringing down
the level of unemployment is staggering: the Mexican economy would
have to create more than a million jobs per year.^^ In other words,
the indices of employment creation. 2.5% a year between 1950 and 1970,
and 2% from 1970 to 1979. must be brought up to a goal of 4.2%. in
order to safely surpass the annual increment of job demand, of 3.4%.^^
President Lopez PortiUo is placing the hopes for employment creation
on vast industrial investments.^^' P.y September. 1981. the Mexican
President was reporting that during the period 1977-80 industrial pro-
duction registered a growth of 8.1% per year. This contributed to the
creation of 3.250.000 new jobs.^^ But. in the past, because of tenden-
cies towards capital-intensive industrialization, this scheme has been
only partly successful
.
Here, again, hopes are also placed on the oil industry to create
66jobs. But the petroleum industry is basically a capital-intensive
industry, employing relatively few workers per plant. Thus, the success
of a liaison between the oil industry and the employir,ent market would
depend, rather, on the ability to transfer funds from the first into
a wide arrangement of productive activities.
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In this respect, there are a number of critics who maintain that,
far from representing a contribution to Mexico's economic standing,
petroleum exploitation has increased its economic vulnerability. In
other words. Pemex has borrowed and spent more than it has received
from its exports.^7 ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^
to confirm this assertion. By the beginning of 1981. the Secretary of
Patrimony and Industrial Development announced that, in 1980. income
from petroleum exports amounted to 10.4 billion dollars (more than
twice the level of 1979). but the cornr.ercial and payrr.ents deficit grew
because imports totalled 18 billion, 7 billion more than expected.
On the other hand, during the second three-month period in 1980, Mexico
paid 2.88 billion dollars in foreign debt services, while petroleum ex-
ports income only reached the amount of 2.565 billion.
In the midst of economic turmoil in 1976. the Mexican government
had approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan, which
was granted under certain conditions, i.e. an austerity program which
would have set limits to Public Sector deficits as a percentage of GDP.
Petroleum changed this situation, and relieved Mexican economic policy
from IMF pressures. At present, international financial institutions
and banking consortia are more than willing to lend to Mexico. As a
result, Mexico has incurred a steadily growing foreign debt.
Towards the end of 1980, the public foreign debt was officially
estimated to be 34 billion dollars. If the private foreign debt is
added, the total rises to approximately 53 billion dollars. During
1981, the debt service grew by 36%. But official sources in Mexico
point out that the proportions of the public foreign debt in relation
to GDP has been reduced to close to half of what it was in 197?/°
And the government does not plan to utilize oil income to defray the
debt^^
As a result of the mid.1981 worldwide oil glut, Mexico's reserves
are expected to be cut during the year from a projected 20 billion
dollars to approximately 15 billion. This has affected adversely the
projected public budget for 1981. which had originally amounted to
2.333 billion pesos. 31% higher than the 1980 budget. In spite of
domestic measures to reduce public spending by 4%.^^ Mexico will have
to borrow about 8.5 billion dollars during 1981.^^
It is true that Mexico's total international reserves are at a
record high of 1C.397 billion dollars, 66% over the 1980 level and the
highest in history. However, in this respect it should be noticed
that the central bank's reserves, as a percentage of the bank's total
assets, have fallen from between 30% to 50% during the 1950 's and
1960's. down to 14% by July. 1981. These facts, together with a rise
in consumer prices of 106% between 1977 and 1980, point to the possi-
bility of a sharp devaluation of the Mexican currency. The peso has
been allowed to "float" since the 1976 devaluation, and it has slipped
from a parity of 22.74 pesos to the dollar in late 1977, to 25.62 by
November, 1981. But, as a matter of fact, the central bank has sup-
ported it by holding pesos in Mexico's financial markets. In any
case, it Is likely that the peso will continue to slip steadily, rather
than undergo a sharp devaluation, albeit at a rate as yet difficult to
anticipate.
The liquidity of Mexico's financial system suffers from a heavy
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imbalance in its foreign commercial transactions. This is not a new
Situation: Mexico's balance of trade, with the exception of the year
1949. has been unfavorable for the last 49 years. But the present
characteristics and volume of the deficit are indeed different. Spe-
cifically, two key factors that determine the performance of the ex-
ternal sector since 1978 are the steady growth in imports, and the de-
cline in manufacturing exports. Imports have increased partly as a
result of growing domestic demand, derived substantially from the ex-
pansion of the petroleum industry. And the balance of trade in the
manufacturing sector has worsened, in spite of continuing domestic
energy subsidies. The total commercial deficit for 1980 was 3.265
billion dollars. By 1981 the Mexican government was trying to reduce
imports by the Public Sector, with mildly encouraging results, but non-
petroleum exports continued to be sluggish. On the other hand tourism,
a traditional compensating factor as a source of reserves, is declining
due to rising domestic prices.^^
According to the Mexican government's Foreign Trade Cabinet, Mexico
has a substantial deficit in its commerce with the United States. From
1975 to 1978, petroleum exports brought about a reduction of this def-
icit, from 26.390 billion pesos in 1974 to 12.387 billion in 1978. How-
ever, the dynamism of the Mexican economy resulted in renewed sharp in-
creases in imports, which soon neutralized income from sales of petro-
leum. By 1979, the commercial deficit with the United States surged to
38.712 billion pesos, and tendency continued during 1980. when a level
of 64.512 billion pesos was reached. In 1977. petroleum started to
play a preponderant role in Mexican sales to the United States. In
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1978. oil accounted for 39.5% of sales, and this figure had risen to
61.2% by 1980. During this latter year. Mexico became the third com-
mercial client of the United States in order of importance. In general
terms, there would seem to be a correspondence between the sharp in-
creases in Mexico's trade deficits, and the consolidation of petroleum
as its main export to the United States.
'^^
During 1980. foreign investments in Mexico increased by 1.661
billion dollars, and were expected to go up by 3 billion in 1981. In-
vestments by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations registered an increase
of 347 million dollars in 1978. and 1.3 billion in 1980, channeled
mostly to the manufacturing sector of the Mexican economy. Parallel to
this, between 1979 and 198C the current account deficit of Mexico in its
balance of payments with the United States grew by 230%: from outflows
of 797 billion dollars in "hard" currency for 1979. to 2.631 billion by
70
1980.'"
The high indices of economic growth in Mexico during 1979 (9.2%)
and 1980 (8.3%) would seem to be related to a few basic detonating fac-
tors: petroleum exports, purchases of capital goods for Mexican in-
dustry (especially that related to the oil industry), and the entrance
of new flows of investments. Mexico continues to depend on the U.S.
market for these key components of its trading relationships.
The Political Pivot
An overview: the State and the Private Sector. According to Anderson
and Cockcroft, the Mexican government is primarily concerned with pro-
moting four national goals: political stability, economic growth.
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public welfare, and Mexicanization. Political stability involves the
perception of basic political institutions, decision-makers, and .odes
of transferring power as legitimate by most of the people. Economic
growth relates, as usual, to increases in categories such as industrial
productivity and per capita income. Public welfare implies the improve-
ment of living standards for the bulk of the population. And Mexican-
ization refers to the policy of achieving national control, public or
private, of the process of development.
In Mexico, these goals are closely linked with the mystique of the
Mexican Revolution, and the concepts of "mixed economy" and "state capi-
talism." i.e. the State viewed as leading the country to higher levels
of economic growth, social progress, and national consciousness. State
action takes place within a political space in which the main actors
are, in order of importance, the Mexican President, the "official"
Pantido Revolucionariolnsti tucional (PRI, i.e. Revolutionary Institu-
tionalized Party), and pressure groups of varying nature and political
persuasion.
The Global Plan for Development, 1980-1982, reaffirms the "pre-
dominance of the State and the Public Sector" in Mexico's economy.
In his Annual Report of September, 1981, President Lo^z Portillo
underscored that "planning for development supposes the leading function
of the State in its various processes. "^^ This preponderant role of
the State does not spring from direct control of most of the Mexican
econorny. The Private Sector still contributes about half of the coun-
try's total investment, to 45% for the Public Sector and 5% for foreign
capital. Rather, the State controls some key factors in the process of
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development. Raymond Vernon has pointed out the overwhelming role of
the Mexican State in regulating the supply of credits, imports, and
public facilities.^^
The Public Sector comprises a complex of powerful economic insti-
tutions. Three of these, the Banco de Mexico (Central Bank), the Na-
tional Banking and Insurance Com.mission. and the Secretariat of Finance
and Public Credit, regulate the financial operations of the Private
Sector. Traditionally, the government has maintained a degree of con-
trol over prices in the Private Sector, usually to protect domestic in-
dustry. Several public financial institutions such as Nacional
Financiera, are active in the promotion of agricultural and industrial
activities. State enterprises and decentralized organizations, of which
Pemex is by far the most important, have in recent years accounted for
10% to 15% of Mexico's GNP.^^
Since 1977, the growth index of State decentralized enterprises
has been more than double that of the total for the entire manufacturing
sector. Even excluding Pemex. this accounts for 11% of GNP. According
to official estimates, the 350 State decentralized enterprises employ
470,000 persons and contribute with more than 75% of total exports,
although most of this latter figure is made up by foreign oil and gas
^ 85
sales.
At first sight, Mexico's petroleum bonanza would seem not only to
restore to the State the influence it had lost during the crisis-ridden
mid-1970's, but to reinforce its role as the controlling force of the
economy. In the words of E.V.K. Fitzgerald,
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wil ave for the first ti.e. resour es of t ow
'
to allocate to economic and social infrastructurethis should permit the public sector to omp ete Ihe
vesLnt''86 ''''''' ''^^'^
In other words, the growing financial capacity of the State is
likely to have a substantial impact on Mexico's "mixed economy."
Indeed, by mid-1980 the Mexican Institute of Foreign Trade reported
that the Public Sector had attained a surplus in its commercial bal
during the first five months of that year, amounting to 2.032 billion
dollars, which compensated in 79.4% the commercial deficit of the pri-
vate sector, of 2.559 billion dollars. Hydrocarbon exports were the
decisive factor in the 199% increment in exports income during this
period, relative to a similar period during 1979. However, the Public
Sector had deficits in both agricultural and manufactured products
transactions.
Thus, petroleum income would seem to alter the previous political
equilibrium between the Public and Private Sectors. The increase in
petrodollars for the government could diminish the leverage of the
Private Sector to advance its goals. Capital flight constitutes the
main element of pressure available to the Private Sector to impinge
upon the orientation of national economic policy. This possibility
would tend to weaken as the State increases its disposable funds
88through oil exports. This seems to be the general situation in oil
exporting countries. According to Marcos Kaplan,
"The multiple impact of petroleum in producing-
exporting countries is manifest and focuses on
the strengthening of the State and its functions,
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?r.Icm.-?''-r%*/;^ ""l'^^ ^^^^t^'ve autonomy, to re-t ans it nself to all the aspects and leve s of
national society. "89
' ib r
However, the plain fact of the Increase in the financial weight of
the Public Sector, does not necessarily mean that there should be a
conscious attempt to swamp the sphere of action of the Private Sector.
From 194C to 1970, the role of the state in Mexico was to support do-
mestic private enterprise through means such as tax exemptions in
order to achieve an accelerated and sustained process of industrial-
90ization. And there is at present no real indication that the Mexican
government intends to do otherwise. The recent Mexican refusal to
enter into GATT seems to confirm this assessment. Some Mexican ana-
lysts see schemes such as the Alliance for Production, as basic incen-
tives to foster the activities of the Private Sector. In this context,
the larger enterprises would be the ones with the most to gain out of
price liberalization policies at a domestic level, and government mea-
sures to support industrial recovery.
Indeed, President Lopez Portillo has emphasized the need to protect
domestic industry against foreign competition, and from limitations
implicit in Mexico's present stage of development.^^ Specifically, in
October, 1981, the government's Public Works Bank (BANOBRAS), extended
a credit for 680 million dollars to the Alfa Industrial Group, Mexico's
largest and fastest-growing private conglomerate, which was suffering
a financial squeeze due to overextension of operations and the rise in
no
worldwide interest rates.
Pressure groups and political parties. Mexican critic Roger Bartra
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stresses the manifestations of Mexico's "heavy centralis, and authori-
tarian presidentialism.- According to Bartra. the Mexican federal sys-
tem is merely a legal formulism. As the traditional power of the re-
gional cacisues has eroded, the sway of the central government over the
provinces has increased. Most of the governors are imposed by the
Executive, says Bantra. With the exception of four state governments
that constitute a "crystallization of regional power," i.e. the states
of Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, and Veracruz, all the rest would be
either in a situation of extreme dependence v^:s a vis the central power,
or as mere administrators for it.^^
On the other hand, the PRI has been able to maintain an overall
control over political processes through its three sectors: the
National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP), which represents
the interests of Mexico's middle class; the Mexican Confederation of
Workers (CTM); and the National Peasants' Confederation (CNC).
A number of elements explain PRI control over Mexico's middle sec-
tors, such as the heterogeneity of CNOP's component groups, which make
it difficult for them to act in unison, and the expansion of the na-
tional bureaucracy, whose members depend on the government for their
jobs. Government employees constitute a sizable part of the sector and
are, thus, a powerful force contributing to close identification with
the official PRI line. Centralized control of Mexico's organized labor
through the CTM and its durable leader, Fidel Velazquez, gives the PRI
the capacity to mobilize workers in the urban sectors. The hold of the
CNC throughout the countryside, based on its possibilities for patron-
age of peasants, remains practically unchallenged.
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But political power in Mexico is by no .eans monolithic. There
are new patterns of authority, as well as new political actors.^^ one
of the key elements that must be Incorporated into an analysis of
Mexico's changing political environment is the growing role of pressure
groups.
Taken as a whole, the Private Sector Is perhaps the most formidable
source of pressure on the central government. As Richard B. Mancke
asserts:
"Ironically, it has been the 'nonrevolutionary
'
private sector that, historically, has had the
most influence on the PRI. Though officially
excluded from the PRI's formal structure, there
are at least three structural reasons why indus-try interacts closely with government. First
railways, communications, utilities, and severalkey industries, such as petroleum, are all in thepublic sector. Second, government pricing, credit,tarirt, and investment policies have a directimpact on private business. Third, and probably
most important, the PRI is able to control labor
and thereby wins the gratitude of the private
sector. "96
On the other hand, the activities of private business help to mo-
bilize employment and capital, vitally important elements in Mexico's
process of development.^'' In this respect, some conservative Mexican
critics argue in favor of a full return to private capital of its tra-
ditional activities in the Mexican economy, especially in the manufac-
turing sector.
At the other end of the political spectrum, the leftist leaning
Mexican magazine Proceso has given particular attention to what it sees
as a political environment, under President Lopez Portillo, extremely
receptive to the activities of the private sector. The initial action
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by the government in this sense would have been the formation, in
December, 1976, of the
-Alliance for Production,- an agreement reached
between the government and leaders of industry and organized labor.
With the objectives of promoting investments and economic growth. Ac-
cording to Prgcesp, since 1977 there has been an expansion of the fusion
between private industrial and banking capital which is bound to
tighten its hold on the Mexican economy.
Some Mexican critics go even further in their analysis and see the
appearance of a bureaucratic-entrepreneurial complex as part of a pro-
ject of privatization of political power. This would amount, in effect,
to an alliance between the government and private enterprise, in order
to maintain the present model of development, based on capital accumu-
lation, rapid economic growth, and renewed industrialization. How-
ever, present political processes in Mexico cannot be viewed from such
a narrow perspective, as the strengthening of any particular group, no
matter how relevant it may be.
Nevertheless, the resources available to Mexico's Private Sector
are formidable. In a mid-1980 list of the 500 most important enter-
prises in the world, published by the magazine Fortune, there were 16
Latin American state and private firms, of which 3 were Mexican. The
most important Mexican company was Pemex, third in Latin America and
39th in the world, with sales for 7.290 billion dollars. The other
two were private firms. The Alfa Group, with headquarters in the city
of Monterrey, ranked 8th in Latin America and 299th in the world. Alfa
is the most important private enterprise in Latin America, with sales
for 2 billion dollars and total assets at a level close to 5 billion.
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Alfa has diversified its activi' ties beyond its initial nucleus as a
steel company, into petrochemicals, touris.. electric appliances, food
processing, and capital goods. The VISA Group (Industrial Securities.
S.A.), also located in Monterrey, ranked 15th in Latin America and
453rd in the world, with sales for 781 million dollars.
The political demands by Mexico's Private Sector have traditionally
been channeled through a representation of their interests in Mexico's
bureaucratic-political apparatus. For example, the Secretariat of In-
dustry and Trade has generally tended to represent Mexico's manufactur-
ing interests. Likewise, the Secretariat of the Treasury has over time
worked towards the maintenance of a "good investment climate," and
sound financial management. ^^2 ^^^^^ ^^.^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
have direct institutional means to present its views in governmental
circles.
The Private Sector has a direct stake in the expansion of petroleum
exploitation, and present laws mandate the extensive use of Mexican
subcontractors in the development of the industry. By the same token,
oil income would seem to strengthen the Mexican economy and pave the
way for larger investments and operations by private companies ."^^^
However, an overheated economy has also brought about rising interest
rates, a sign of strain in the capacity of the Mexican banking system
to finance purchases on credit. In any case, in spite of the willing-
ness of the Private Sector to expand its activities in the petroleum
industry, the State is unlikely to relinquish to any degree its direct
control of the industry . "^^^
The harmony of interests between Mexican and American business
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groups derives from their multifaceted association. Mexican private
firms in Monterrey and Mexico City, as well as banking groups such as
Bancomer and Banamex, share joint ventures with U.S., Western European,
and Japanese Multinational corporations. Likewise, the Mexican private
sector relies on credit financing from U.S. conglomerates such as the
Bank of America and the Chase Manhattan Bank.^^^
After the January, 1981, meeting between President Lopez Portillo,
and then President-elect Reagan, the leaders of three of Mexico's most
powerful private sector organizations, Ernesto Rubio del Cueto,
President of CONCAMIN (Confederation of Industrial Chambers), Jose'
Porrero, President of CaNACINTRA (National Chamber of the Transforma-
tion Industry), and Jorge Chapa, President of CONCANACO (Confederation
of National Chambers of Commerce), stated their hopes for a better com-
mercial relationship and a relaxation of bilateral tensions. High on
their agenda is the need for lesser trading barriers in the United
States to Mexican manufactured exports.
It would be safe to assert that the American Chamber of Commerce
in Mexico represents the views of U.S. investors quite closely, since
in its membership of approximately 2,200 corporate members "is repre-
sented the major part of U.S. direct private investment in Mexico.
Al R. Wichtrich, former President of that association, has stated that
its "main objective (is) to promote trade between the host country and
the United States There is no question in my mind that U.S. private
foreign investment is one of the best ways to stimulate the economic
development of Mexico."
Wichtrich praised the measures put into effect by Lopez Portillo
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early in his regime, which gave Veassurance of a ™ore understanding
and conciliatory attitude toward the private sector.
a good working relationship has developed between the Mexican President
and the Officers of the American Chamber of Co^erce in Mexico. These
Officers, according to Wichtrich:
"...dialogue with the Mexican Government we dn t;,u
take
"^""^ Pr^'P' t^^y f^^king a mis-and try to prove... how they shouldadopt ce-ta n
welcome "11^
''''''' investment would be more
One of the objectives of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Mexico is to underline "this mutuality of interests between the U.S.
transnationals and the Mexican government. "Ill Jorge Dom<nguez has
noted in the behavior of this pressure group an attempt to widen and
influence the information available to the Mexican government and to
mold a more favorable political climate for foreign investments. At
the same time, "specific foreign firms have also lobbied to defend
their particular interests against adverse governmental policies," such
as the case of automobile and pharmaceutical firms in the 1960's and
John Pluntket. President of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Mexico at present, views the relationship between Lopez Portillo and
Reagan as instrumental in strengthening friendly relations between the
"leading Latin American country" and the United States. Pluntket mini-
mizes the import of recent differences between the two nations, as "a
problem of concepts and disagreements in the definition of some terms."
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The United States is ready, says Pluntket. to reestablish a dialogue
for the benefit of both countries.-^^"^
Likewise. Jos^ Carral
.
General Vice-President and representative
in Mexico of the Bank of America, has been encouraged by signs of de-
creasing political and economic tensions between the United States and
Mexico, due to Reagan's personal diplomacy, parallel to an increment in
foreign investments in Mexico and general conmercial relations between
both countries. ^^^
The American newspaper New Times has underlined the divergencies
in Mexican public opinion referent to ties with the United States in
the following terms: "The government, bankers, and industrialists are
pressuring in favor of closer links with the United States, while sev-
eral opposition groups demand economic independence for the country. "^^^
While this distinction may be too sharply drawn, it does reflect some
of the realities of the response by politically aware forces in Mexico,
especially in light of the oil bonanza.
The increasing diversity and conflicting demands of various politi-
cal groups point to the fact that the Mexican political system is be-
coming more open in terms of political competition. The process of
Reforma Politica (Political Reform), consolidated from 1976 to 1979
under former Secretary of the Interior Jesus Reyes Heroles, has allowed
for an expansion in the number of registered political parties, their
assured (if minimal) representation in the Chamber of Deputies, and
greater access to mass media, which the government strongly influ-
ences.
At present there are, in addition to the PRI, eight registered
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political parties which will present candidates in the 1982 elections.
These include three groups that had enjoyed legal status previously to
the Reforma Politica: the National Action Party (PAN); the Popular
Socialist Party (PPS); and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution
(PARM). The five new parties include three that had participated
in the 1979 congressional elections: the Corrjnunist Party (PCM); the
Workers' Socialist Party (PST); and the Mexican Democratic Party (PDM).
Two other parties have been legally recognized for the 1982 elections:
the Trotskyte Revolutionary Party (PRTT); and the Social Democrat Party
(PDS). Additionally, there is the Mexican Workers' Party (PMT). led
by one of Mexico's best-known opposition leaders. Heberto Castello,
which the government has refused to register, as well as other minor
groups. ^^^
The National Action Party (PAN), created in 1939, is the largest
and oldest political party in Mexico next to the PRI. To the right
along the country's political spectrum, the PAN constitutes a pro-
business force, ideologically ccmmittedto free enterprise and Catholic
values. In spite of a continuous division among its upper echelon
leadership, the PAN seems to have a unified policy thrust, which in-
cludes support for more domestic private involvement in the petroleum
industry. PAN's candidate for President in the 1982 elections, Pablo
Emilio Madero, is likely to be the runner-up after the PRI's candidate,
present Secretary of the Budget and Planning, Miguel de la Madrid
Hurtado. Another alternative to the right of the PRI and, as a matter
of fact, the most conservative Mexican political party, is the Mexican
Democratic Party (PDM), which wants to promote the collaboration
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between church and State and traditional family values.
The Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the Authentic Party of the
Mexican Revolution (PARM), have traditionally been allies of the PRI.
The PPS has attempted to rally supporters around the issues of land and
income redistribution, while the PARM's views remain indistinguishable.
Both parties have accepted, with token opposition, government policies
for the petroleum industry. The role of both PPS and PARM is likely
to be preempted by the entrance into the political arena of the new
leftist parties.
Mexican leftist opposition parties have repeatedly argued against
present Mexican government policies regarding petroleum production and
exports. Since early 1978. leaders of four Mexican parties of the left,
the Communist Party (PCM), the Mexican Workers' Party (PMT), the So-
cialist Revolutionary Party (PSR), and the Mexican People's Party (PPM),
coincided in expressing the need to draw and implement an energy policy
that would truly respond to the national interests, and warned against
the danger of continuing Pemex's "handout policy." Present oil policy,
according to this view, is totally opposed to that put into action by
Cardenas in 1938.-^^^
Herberto Castillo, head of the Mexican Workers' Party (PMT), has
stood out in recent years with his acerbic criticism of the government's
oil policy, both from an external and a domestic perspective. Exter-
nally, according to Castillo, present policies are bound to increase
drastically Mexico's dependence on the United States. Internally, he
says, petroleum exploitation is resulting in a dichotomous society,
with two contrasting sectors: "one employed and benefiting from
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economic growth, and the other underdeveloped and relying on government
handouts for survival . "^^^
The announcement by the Mexican government early in 1977 of the
construction of the gasduct to the United States, served as a catalyst
for the various leftist opposition leaders to unite against it.
Edward C. Williams has pointed out that even though the Mexican left
failed to thwart the project, it did succeed in making the government
effect a "strategic withdrawal." Under fire from critics, who advanced
a scenario of increased economic dependence, pressures, and even U.S.
occupation of Mexican oil fields, the government changed the emphasis
regarding the objectives of the gasduct. The project, according to
the revised official version, would improve Mexico's internal distribu-
tion system. -^^^
More recently, Castillo has presented his view of the logic of in-
creased petroleum exploitation in terms of greater dependence of Mexico
vis a vis the United States: "The U.S. needs our oil and Mexico is
economically bound to that nation." Speaking early in 1981, Castillo
pointed out that massive exports of petroleum have brought about the
abandonment of various industries, and have aggravated unemployment
problems in Mexico. The Communist Party sees the issue in terms of
"systematic pressures from imperialistic capital" to force Mexico to
raise its oil exports level, enter GATT, and change its stand against
intervention in Central Am.erica. "'^^^
By August, 1981, six leftist parties announced plans to unite for
the 1982 elections. These included the Communist Party (PCM) and the
Mexican Workers' Party (PMT). plus four other minor groups. The project
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attempted to form a new leftist alliance, to be called the Unified
Socialist Party of Mexico, which could have become Mexico's second larg-
est political force. However, by November. 1981. the alliance had col-
lapsed. The reasons for the quick end to the leftist challenge were
not too different from other cases, mainly a personality conflict be-
tween Heberto Castillo, head of PMT. and Arnoldo Mantinez Verdugo.
head of PCM. More specifically, the issue referred to the preference
by individual leaders to control their own groups rather than relinquish
authority to a bigger organization, but also to the reluctance by
Castillo to join forces with the Moscow-oriented PCM.-^^^
Leftist groups in Mexico have usually relied on intellectuals and
university students to strengthen their political demands. The student
movement of mid-1968, which ended in a bloody confrontation with police
and military forces on October 2 of that year, remains as a rallying
point for leftist forces. At present the National University in Mexico
City (UNAM), as well as other provincial universities, are footholds for
Marxist ideology. However, leftist student groups have not recovered
from the internal divisions that ensued following the 1968 debacle. On
the other hand, the government provides most of the financial support
for the public university system, and is directly involved in electing
high administrators. Furthermore, it could be argued that the govern-
ment perceives universities as providing an "escape value" for pressures
from young urban sectors of the population. Nevertheless, the intel-
ligentsia continues to be a strong source of criticism, some would say
the "conscience" of Mexico's political establishment which, in turn,
listens to its arguments.
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Independent unionism represents another pressure group of particu-
lar importance, since It would seen, to threaten official control of
labor through organizations such as the Mexican Confederation of
Workers (CTM). one of the three sectors of the PRI. and the Congreso
del Trabajo (Labor Congress). Domlnguez has mentioned Mexican automo-
bile Industry unions as examples of these changes In labor's political
role. Independent unionism would tend to affect managerial practices,
through a higher resource to strikes, and a more active attempt at par-
ticipation in policy-making processes affecting production.
Local peasant organizations In Mexico's southeastern states of
Tabasco and Chiapas have attempted to retaliate against Pemex. pressing
i'or demands regarding indemnizations for their ruined or expropriated
126lands. The take-over of some of Pemex's installations has brought
attention to the plight of the Mexican peasantry and, occasionally, the
intervention of the army.^^'' However, it is unlikely that these re-
gional actions by the peasants, lacking real organizational strength,
or a nationally established power base, can effectively challenge the
control that the PRI exerts over that sector through the National
Peasants' Confederation (CNC).
The various political uncertainties since 1968, which reached a
high point in the mid-1970's with increasing urban guerrilla activity
and terrorism, might be having a detrimental effect on one of the foun-
dations of the Mexican political system: the nonpolitical role of the
military. The limitation of the military's role in politics should not
be automatically thought of as a permanently settled question for all
time. As Martin Needier advanced in the early 1970 's, "...rather than
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regarding the achievement of civilian control In Mexico as a definitive
accomplishment. It Is probably wiser to think of 1t as provisional "^^^
If the government were to show steady signs of weakness and Instability
or ,f n had to resort too often to the military to put down civilian
discontent, such as It happened during the early 1970's with the guer-
rillas in the state of Guerrero when close to 20.000 troops were mobi-
lized there, the Importance of the military In the political equation
would be bound to increase.
The Mexican military are quite a susceptible subject in Mexico's
public life. Proof of this surfaced in November. 1980. when the Mexi-
can writer Juan Rulfo. in a discreet pronouncement put forth in a
National University act to protest against the most recent coup d'etat
by the Bolivian military, remembered that, historically, one of the re-
sources of the Mexican political system used to appease the aspirations
of the military was to offer financial rewards and business partnerships
to the generals, who then abstained from directly attempting to take
power. The indignant reaction from various military circles was swift.
But there was also a direct intervention in the suddenly burning issue
by President Lopez Portillo himself. The President publicly denounced
Rulfo's opinion as a calumny and vindicated the military. In any case,
the degree of the reaction to Rulfo's remarks cannot but raise certain
questions about the vulnerability of Mexico's civilian political ma-
chinery to potential military pressures. -^^^
In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the bud-
get for the military and police. According to a United Nations report
on disarmament, Mexico's growing petroleum wealth has turned it into a
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coveted prey for weapons manufacturers. Mexico's
.llUary purchases
had by 1979 risen to 780 million dollars, the highest in the Caribbean
and Central American area, with the exception of Cuba (which spent
1.065 billion approximately). Mexico's a™ed forces total 125.000 men.
and the army is by far the most important branch, with 95.000 men.
Still, in relation to its size. Mexico's military is one of the smallest
in Latin America. ^"^^
The traditional low profile the Mexican military have kept in re-
cent times may be giving way to a more assertive presence, m.ostly as a
result of Mexico's new status as an increasingly important oil producer
and exporter. In particular, the potential for difficulties arising
from the political situation in the Central American area seems to be
changing som.ewhat the priorities of the Mexican armed forces, to the
southern Mexican states in terms of location and. in terms of functions,
from basically social tasks to a truly self-defense force. The army's
training centers increasingly on "regional tactical and counterinsur-
gency operations," and its arms purchases, mostly light armed vehicles
and individual weapons, are geared to those objectives ."^"^^
In December, 1980, as he directed the biggest military maneuvers
ever staged by the Mexican military, in which 43.705 men from the var-
ious branches swept the southern state of Chiapas, the Secretary of
National Defense, General Felix Gal van Lopez, declared that the army
has the obligation to prevent any groups from any political tendency
to enter Mexican territory and to violate its sovereignty. -^^^ Some
sources saw the maneuvers as a proof that Mexico's southern region was
not being used as a refuge by Guatemalan guerrillas and, most important.
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go's
to quiet down rumors about violent confrontations between Mexican
forces, perhaps Pemex's "security" units, and groups of rural rebels.
For 1981, the Secretariat of Defense has a budget of 25,855 million
pesos. The main objectives are the modernization of military equipment
and an adequate level of training and preparedness for the armed forces.
Likewise, there are plans to accelerate the production of war material,
such as light weapons, mortars, and rockets. "^^^
Changes in the Mexi can po lit ica l establishment. The implications from
petroleum exploitation are permeating Mexican politics at all levels.
Signs of impending political change have come from the ranks of Mexi
ruling political establishment. There has been a displacement of the
center of gravity of political power, from traditional posts such as
the Secretariat of the Interior (Secretaria de Gobernacitfn)
, the Secre-
tariat of Agrarian Reform, and the Secretariat of Agriculture, towards
more professional and technocratic elites, located in the Secretariat
of the Budget and Planning, the Secretariat of Patrimony and Industrial
Development, the Secretariat of the Treasury (Secretariat de Hacienda),
and Pemex. As petroleum continues to be the lever of development, and
the government tries to consolidate its reliance on planning schemes,
these latter agencies would indeed seem to be headed for growing po-
litical relevance.
The increase in political power of the Secretariats associated
with finances, planning, and energy, within the context of the petro-
leum boom, leads to the issue of the apparent process of technocratiza-
tion of the Mexican state. While in the extremely dynamic Mexican
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development milieu, political approaches to problems will certainly re-
gain a .ust for the future ahead, a growing reliance on economic growth
and management, fueled by the petroleum industry, is likely to manifest
itself in the rise of technicians and planners to the top levels of
national decision-making. Writing in the mid-1970's. Rafael Segovia
noted a progressive loss of power by the traditional "caciques," i.e.
"the men who use their local implant and force to accede to national
power." Parallel to this.
"The new tendency seems to be that of a different
cursus honorum to accede either to the Presidency
of the Republic, or to the Cabinet.
... If this
technostructure is the most visible and perhaps
most important, the progressive and inevitable
techmfi cation and bureaucratization of the state
eads to the displacement of the traditional po-
litical class, limited more and more to functions
that keep it away from the authentic centers of
decision. "135
This tendency seemed to be confirmed on September 25, 1981. when
the PRI announced its candidate for the July, 1982, presidential elec-
tions. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Secretary of the Budget and Plan-
ning. De la Madrid, who was in charge of the Global Plan for Develop-
ment, holds a graduate degree in Public Administration from Harvard
University, has a long record in economic management, and is considered
to have strong ties to the business community. "^^^
By mid-October, 1981. just as de la Madrid was preparing to begin
his campaign as official candidate, the head of the PRI, Javier Garci'a
Paniagua, resigned unexpectedly. He was replaced by Pedro Ojeda
Paullada, a close friend of President Lopez Portillo who the Secretary
of Labor. In turn, Garci'a Paniagua took over the Secretariat of Labor.
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As the head of Mexico's ruling party directs and coordinates the cam-
paign of the Official candidate, this move could be seen as a consoli-
dation of the political group closest to the President, and the demotion
of Garcfa Paniagua, who had presidential ambitions of his cwn. Like-
wise, it would seem to show underlying tensions within the ranks of the
PRI, between the traditional politically-minded circles, and the emerg-
ing groups of technicians and bureaucrats . ^^'^
The clash between the traditional, established politicians, and
the new technocratic groups, has been brewing for some time, as a source
of discontent and lack of discipline within the PRI. These divergencies
have been underscored by the oil bonanza. A case in point was that of
Victor Manzanilla Schaffer. a PRI federal deputy member of the CNC.
from the state of Yucatan. Agriculture and petroleum exploitation have
been at odds since the intensification of Pemex's activities in 1977.
A rare act of dissent within the normally tightly knit PRI was staged
by Manzanilla. in October, 1977. when he voted against a constitutional
amendment which gave Pemex broad powers to expropriate lands needed to
proceed with petroleum exploration and development. In effect, this
amendment, which was passed eventually, formally placed the petroleum
industry ahead of agricultural development. After quite an upheaval
in the PRI-control led Congress, caused by this unheard-of dissidence.
Manzanilla finally remained in his post and the controversy died
138down. Nevertheless, in 1977 this incident already reflected sub-
jacent tensions beneath the apparently unruffled exterior of the gov-
ernment party apparatus, and may have played a part in redirecting
official attention to the plight of the peasants and the agricultural
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sector in general.
Parallel to the previous developments, a tug-of-war has developed
since the late 1970's within the new professional and technocratic
groups, directly related to contrasting views in regards to oil pro-
duction and exports plans. As Edward F. Wonder has pointed out.
"...the bureaucracy itself is organized along
lines that are more horizontal than vertical,
with numerous agencies, often displaying quitedifferent policy philosophies, involved in the
same policy area, frustrating planning, and
contributing to frequent shifts in policy empha-
sis, even during the same administration as the
President seeks to hold together his coali-
tion. "139
A result of the previous situation was the dismissal of Jorge D<az
Serrano as head of Pemex. on June 6, 1981. Since 1977. four Secretar-
iats have been involved in planning and implementing energy policy:
Patrimony and Industrial Development, Budget and Planning, Treasury,
and Commerce. These have often manifested diverging viewpoints in the
administrative councils of energy industries. To this must be added
the growing economic and political importance of Pemex, as the most
dynamic sector in the Mexican economy. The fact that Pemex is under the
jurisdiction of the Secretariat of Patrimony and Industrial Development,
helps explain the rift that developed between the head of the latter,
Andres de Oteyza. and Diaz Serrano. While the former head of Pemex ad-
vocated an ever-rising level of oil production and exports, de Oteyza
emphasized the need to curtail expansion of the industry within the
limits set by the Energy Program.
Until shortly before his dismissal, Dfaz Serrano was considered
to be the political figure closest to President Lopez Portillo, and a
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potential PRI candidate for the 1982 Presidential elections. By
.1d-
1580. political rumors In Mexico were ripe concerning the possible cre-
ation of a Secretariat of Energy, to be headed by Dfaz Serrano, and to
comprise the petroleum, electricity, nuclear, and coal industries.
This did not materialize. On the other hand. Dfaz Serrano was attacked
by Mexican leftist forces for his alleged association with U.S. politi-
cal and business 1nterests,l« and for "Invading the field of action of
Other government officials ."-^^^
By November, 1980. D<az Serrano appeared to be politically damaged
by the Presidential decision not to raise the domestic prices of leaded
gas and diesel. a measure long advocated by the former Pemex Director
in order to increase the financial base of the oil industry
. Never-
theless, in February. 1981, D<az Serrano was designated as official
speaker in the anniversary ceremony of the enactment of the Mexican
Constitution, a fact that seemed to underline his aspiration to the
PRI's Presidential candidacy. ^^"^
However, everything came quickly unraveled for ofaz Serrano as a
result of the worldwide petroleum glut of mid-1981. By April, 1981.
supplies were growing while demand declined in the international oil
market. Dfaz Serrano first reacted to the situation in late May, by
stating that Pemex would maintain its prices, in spite of oversupplies
145in the market. Then, suddenly, just a few days later, Diaz Serrano
announced that Pemex, after all, would have to reduce its prices in
order to maintain its clients. Pemex lowered its average price for
crude exports by $4 a barrel, from $34.60 to $30.60."^^^ On June 6,
1981. Diaz Serrano presented his resignation to President Lopez
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Portnio.-^^^
The official reasons for the dismissal of Pemex Director were re-
lated to his disagreement with members of the Mexican government's Eco-
nomic Cabinet, especially Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Develop-
ment. Jos^ Andres de Oteyza. over the price reduction measures. Other
critics mentioned that Pemex had turned into an autonomous bureaucracy,
and that petroleum policy had been increasingly divergent from Mexico's
national policy. At the root of the disagreement was Di^az Serrano's
persistant decision to continue raising oil production. The debate
over petroleum and general development policy in Mexico is bound to
continue for the foreseeable future.
The new Director of Pemex, Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid. is a
former Secretary of the Treasury and a close friend of President Lopez
Portillo. It is interesting to note that the PRI candidate for the
1982 presidential elections. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. was Under-
secretary of the Treasury when Moctezuma Cid held the top post. In
any case, the change of Directors in Pemex did not make Mexico immune
to international market forces. Attempts by Moctezuma Cid to restore
the price of Mexican oil during June and July. 1981, led to an abrupt
fall in exports. Likewise, policies under the new Pemex administration
might not differ too much from previous guidelines, including the ob-
jective of diversification of clients and products. However, there
appears to be at present a greater willingness to conciliate views with
respect to the pace of development of the petroleum industry. '^^^
Pemex 's workers union (STPRM), has benefited from the petroleum
bonanza. There has been a change of guard in STPRM 's leadership, from
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the .en who belonged to the generation that participated in the nation-
alization of the oil industry, and had traditionally opposed oil ex-
ports, and to the United States in particular, to a younger group of
leaders who see the fortunes of the union rising parallel to the rapid
expansion of the petroleum industry. Thus, the petroleum workers'
union is likely to support Pemex's official policy, but not without
proper compensation,
"In return for its consent. STPRM's primary condi-tions are that its members be guaranteed continuedhikes in relative wages, and benefits, coupled with
assurances of no layoffs. "150
But the activities of the union, and of Pemex in general, have
traditionally been mired by corruption. Corruption is by no means a
phenomenon exclusive of Pemex but, rather, an endemic characteristic
of the Mexican system. However, even in such a milieu, the situation
in Pemex has tended to be particularly serious. Some foreign assess-
ments are indeed glooniy:
"Some critics suggest that Pemex itself will have to
be overhauled before there is any chance for wise use
of Mexico's oil and gas .. .Riddled with nepotism, plagued
by graft and corruption, the company is a model of in-
efficiency, spending $9 to get each $13 barrel of oil
out of the ground (in August, 1978). The Petroleum
Workers' Union openly sells jobs, with the going rate
for a permanent post in the oil fields about $3,500.
And there are so many ghost workers on the Pemex pay-
rolls that roughnecks call them 'aviators 'They
only touch down here to get their checks. '"151
The members of the STPRM constitute, in fact, an elite within
Mexico's entire labor sector, and the oil boom is likely to reinforce
their privileged position. As Edward C. Williams has succinctly ad-
vanced: "Corruption has always been a part of the Pemex scene, but
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indications point to its increase as the economic pie expands." The
economic bonanza is bound to add fuel to
.anage.ent- labor disputes over
workers- benefits.^^^ So far. the issue appears to have been solved
through increasing concessions to the union. For example, in October.
1977. as news of the construction of the gasduct were spreading through
the Mexican press, it was publicly known that the STPRM would receive
2% of the total investments on that project. Critics kept asking for
reasons as to "why the first beneficiary of said works should be the
powerful and corrupt petroleum syndicate. "^^^
Oxford specialist Lawrence Whitehead has pointed out the dangers
of excessive centralization of the oil industry in the following terms:
"To keep Pemex as a state monopoly in the new
conditions set by the boom, will permit the pow-
erful and arrogant oil union to threaten the tran-quility of domestic interests, and the security
of the state itself. "154
An additional, and very visible indication of the importance of
Pemex's administrative circles, is the construction in Mexico City, at
present underlay, of a new. huge Pemex central building, to be the tall-
est in the city, and which will even include a he! i port.
"^^^
In the past, efforts to stam.p out cases of corruption, such as au-
diting Pem.ex's workers in order to stop clandestine sales of fuel to
sugar refineries and industries, have been turned down by union threats
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to strike. Accusations of corruption have been thrust not only at
union workers, but at the highest levels of Pemex's management, by left-
ist groups as well as by the independent National Petroleum Movement
(MNP). The latter, however, seems to lack any substantial support
within the industry. Allied to leftist political parties, the MNP has
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repeatedly denounced corruption in the STPRM. and its leader. Hebraicaz
Vazquez Gutiemez has referred to corruption as a cancer that "threatens
the independence of the oil industry.
Nevertheless, in his fifth annual report of September, 1981,
President Lopez Portillo announced a new "Law of Responsibilities,"
geared to strengthen fiscal instruments and to supervise the finances
of high public officials. p^^,^^^^^^^ November. 1980, the Mexican
President had announced reforms to the government's fiscal code, in
order to prevent tax evasion through the use of "name-lenders" (presta-
nombres)
.
Political tendencies. At present the State reigns supreme as the grav-
ity center of the Mexican political system. But the progressive demo-
cratization of the PRI, i.e. the expanding number and sources of its
components, as well as the proliferation of outside political actors,
might seem to pose a threat to its stability. The Mexican President
is still, by far, the keystone of the system. As Needier stated in the
early 1970 's, "...it is clear that in Mexico the leading political
actor is the President. The political system is thus one of executiv-
ism rather than single-party rule."^^^
But, in spite of oil resources, both the institution of the Presi-
dency, in its role as mediator between public and private interests,
and the PRI, as the main political arena for such a debate, are under
stress. Jorge Domfnguez has appropriately described the present politi-
cal crossroads, characterized by changes in its "internal economic,
social, ideological, and political factors:"
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states: greater real dependencyo the U.S in a political context of less supportfor such close relations. The needs of the Mexicaneconomy require, for Mexican officials at leastin the short run, such a deepened dependency, whilethe needs of Mexican politics require the oppositeD s coven es of hydrocarbon resources r,ay have beenthe Mexican miracle of the 1970's. The 1980"s m!J
require a political miracle that is as yet not
^
in evidence. "161 ^
It could be asserted that the conditions of a developing society
such as Mexico's, i.e. population explosion, rapid urbanization, social
dichotomy, economic inequalities, and political flux, among others, are
not conducive to effective party competition, if the overall objectives
are political stabil ity, sustained economic growth, and social develop-
ment in a evolutionary, rather than a revolutionary, setting.
One of the main foundations of Mexico's ruling party has been its
flexibility, i.e. its ability to accomodate different gro'jps or politi-
cal tendencies within its organization. During the 1970's. several
factors contributed to strain this flexibility, among them the reduction
in the rate of economic growth, with the consequent inability to sat-
isfy fully the demands of various groups, and the persistent deep in-
equality in the distribution of income. The continuing question today
is whether the PRI can handle the increased pressures of the process of
modernization, originating to a great extent in the petroleum boom.
The present political system may be undergoing a transition, but new
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forms are hard to visualize.
The social and economic situation in Mexico, seen not from the
beaming perspective of oil exports and income figures, but from that of
the living conditions of a sizable segment of the population, would
seem to be deteriorating. There is a "critical limit," i.e. inflation,
less consuming power, each of basic articles and services, beyond which
an increasingly aware urban population will not remain calm. It is
impossible to foresee at what conjunction of economic and social de-
rriands, on the one hand, and political awareness, on the other, this
"critical limit" might be.
The possibility that the Mexican government will carry on its pro-
grams in an atmosphere of political order depends on the question of
achieving a balance between economic growth and social justice. Oil
wealth is giving the government more time and resources to stage needed
reforms, but again, it might worsen the situation. Revenues from petro-
leum exports could aggravate corruption, inflation, and the inequality
in the distribution of income, and could easily be offset if agricul-
tural production continues to deteriorate. On the other hand, petroleum
might offer new perspectives to Mexico's political system, if resources
are channeled in the proper direction: into the agricultural sector,
efficiently and with an emphasis on domestic consumption; and into
labor-intensive middle-scale industries, to create more employment
opportunities. Thus, the internal impact of the oil bonanza still re-
mains to be seen. Oil wealth could lead to prosperity, or to a mirage.
James W. Wilkie has referred to the Mexican political system in
terms of a situation of "permanent revolution," which draws deep from
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its very basis of sustenance, ideologically and politically. This
would seem to give rise to a state of "permanent crisis," or political
convulsion, in the midst of which the system finds itself periodically.
With the danger of a final impasse. The previous situation underscores
a basic feature of the Mexican system, i.e. the need for continuous
bargaining. In the end, says Wilkie. "the Mexican political system
does not work smoothly . "-^^^
A parallel reflection on the issue would be the widely cited "pen-
dulum effect," as Mexican leaders swing from side to side of the politi-
cal spectrum, in search for stability. However, under the present ac-
celerated process of social mobilization, Mexico's political establish-
ment may be willing to dispense with abrupt political changes, notwith-
standing the rationale for ideological renovation, and embark instead
on a course of consolidation of more pragmatic, professional, and tech-
nocratic policies and styles of leadership. The selection of Miguel de
la Madrid Hurtado as the next PRI's presidential candidate, who is
likely to uphold the continuity of the present administration's poli-
cies, would tend to support this argument. Nonetheless, one must be
cautious, for in the past predictions about the Mexican political pro-
cess and Presidential successors have proved to be a dubious enterprise.
General Impact of the Oil Exploitatio n
The "Petroleum Syndrome." The impact of the oil exploitation is deter-
mined by endogenous factors, i.e. government policy, and exogenous
factors, i.e. world oil price levels. The euphoria about petroleum
wealth has so far prevented to a certain degree an analytic criticism
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of potential pitfalls. For all its magnitude, the oil boom could be-
come just a palliative, instead of a solution to basic structural prob-
lems, and could aggravate bottlenecks in the development process, such
as corruption, inflation, and the distribution of income. In this
respect, domestic critics have complained that Mexico's energy policy
lacks an organic relation with the needs for profound changes in the
country's socioeconomic structure, and that it is being increasingly
incorporated to the U.S. global energy strategy. However, an im-
partial assessment of the overall impact would also have to weigh in
the fact that it is unrealistic to expect overnight changes. In regards
to a short-term outlook.
"It does appear... that the major problems facing the
Mexican government today will still be there in 1^88.
regardless of the level of petroleum output. Infla-*
tion will still be high, income distribution and geo-
graphic development will still be unbalanced, unem-
ployment will still be high, and the country will still
have difficulty producing domestically all its food-
stuffs. To an extent, the continuation of these prob-
lems is simply an indication that 10 years is not a
very long time in the life of an economy. "165
The most crucial question regarding Mexico's petroleum exploita-
tion, since it could very well indicate the future direction of Mexico's
development, is whether the Mexican economy is becoming petroleum-
bound. From the evidence available in the early 1980 's. it would seem
that petroleum tends to overshadow the remaining sectors of the Mexi-
can economy, and is having a substantial impact on Mexico's social
fabric. An article for the August. 1979, issue of the prestigious
Mexican journal Comercio Exterior , concluded that "for the first years
of the decade of the 1980' s, Mexico would emerge as an economy
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fundamentally dependent on its hydrocarbon exports. "l^^
In a subsequent Issue of Con^ Extenor of June. 1980. Abel
Beltran del Rfo. director of Diemex. an econometric project for Mexico
from the Uharton Econometric Forecasting Association at the University
Of Pennsylvania, noticed the first symptoms of the "petroleum syndrome -
Beltran categorizes oil-rich countries as hybrid In their process of
development. That Is. due to their Indices of Inflation and their sec-
torial disequilibriums, they would seem to be less-developed countries,
while Signs such as a surplus in the balance of payments, abundance of
finance capital, high rates of savings, and scarcity of labor, place
them in the category of countries of medium development.
According to Beltran. the indicators that would Indicate the "pe-
troleum syndrome" in any given country include: high level of petroleum
production; an overwhelming participation of oil as a percentage of
their exports; a growing surplus in their external balance of payments;
a fast and unbalanced growth of the petroleum sector, with the subse-
quent bottlenecks; and accelerated inflation, generated by excessive
demand and currency-convertibility vis a vis insufficient supply. Non-
economic symptoms would include: politically, a more relevant presence
In the world scenario; socially, rising expectations and demands, as
well as a get-rich-quickly and speculative atmosphere; and culturally,
the introduction of foreign values and customs that clash with national
traditions. -^^^
By 1979. says Beltran. the first signs of the "petroleum syndrome"
were clearly detectable in Mexico, albeit tempered somewhat by the fact
that the process was just beginning, and that Mexico has a good-sized
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and semi-1ndustrialized economy. Some of these signs were a growing
participation of oil in Mexico's exports, a high rate of economic growth
based on the exploitation of hydrocarbons, persistent inflation, con-
gestion in Mexico's transportation and communication infrastructure,
land speculation, and growing foreign investments
There has been a general awareness about the negative effects of
an excessively rapid exploitation of oil. An editorial in the August.
1979 issue of Coninerxio against possible economic and
social distortions, i.e. the existence of two nations or economies
within the same national territory, due to their different degree of
development. It was necessary, said the editorial, to avoid the desta-
bilizing effect of excessive petro-funds, to prevent excessive imports
which could eventually destroy Mexico's industrial sector, and to con-
trol inflation.
The main official instrument to manage Mexico's petroleum industry
has been the Energy Program, with its production and exports platform.
On February 4. 1981. President Upez Portillo's decree approving the
Energy Program and ordering its implementation appeared in Mexico's
Official Diary. Thus, the Energy Program became a law. The exports
limit of 1.5 billion b/d until 1982, is expected to prevent an excessive
dependence on oil exports. ^^^
Some Mexican analysts emphasize the need on the part of the Public
Sector to reinforce its planning mechanisms, in order to condition the
oil sector to the global requisites of national development. Also
needed to avoid an excessive "petrol ization" would be a deep fiscal re-
form, a more effective industrial diversification, and a greater state
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participation, not only in the design and control processes of indus-
trial development, but in the production process itself. ^72
Reflecting official concern, by September. 1980. the Secretary of
Patrimony and Industrial Development. Jose Andrews de Oteyza. stated as
one of the bases of Mexico's economic policy the need to guide develop-
nient along the path of greater equilibrium, and to diversify the na-
tion's economic structure away from an excessive future reliance on oil.
Petroleum resources should, according to Oteyza: back Pemex's expansion
plans in order for the industry to finance its own growth; be channeled
through taxes to finance government programs in the fields of education,
health, basic infrastructure, and general Public Sector productive pro-
jects; and benefit the community through prices substantially lower than
those prevailing in the international market. •^''^
There are indications that government policy is not succeeding in
avoiding the "oil syndrome." Out of the official budget for 1981 Pemex
has one of the highest shares of 377 billion pesos. ^'^^ For 1981. Mexi-
can exports are expected to have a value of 25 billion dollars. Of this
amount, non-petroleum exports will only account for 6 billion. Accord-
ing to some sources, hydrocarbon exports, including crude oil, gas, re-
fined products, and petrochemicals, are expected to represent up to
82% of total Mexican exports. Total manufactured exports, including
petrochemicals, will amount to only 3.500 billion dollars. In spite of
oil exports, the Mexican balance of trade will still show a deficit of
2 billion dollars for 1981.^''^
Thus, it would seem that Mexico's present high rate of growth, is
to a great extent attributable to petroleum economics. In other words,
239
ng
gn
the recovery of the Mexican econor^ during the last few years would not
appear to be extraordinary at all, were It not for the sectorial Impact
Of the oil boon,. And ,t Is clear that petroleu. has become the medullar
center of f^exican exports. -^^^
Following the fall of oil prices In June. 1981, Mexico's magazine
froceso raised the alternative of a recession, as a result of falU
income which depends basically on petroleum exports, or a higher forei
debt to compensate for growing deficits in comnerce.^" The Secretary
of the Patrimony and Industrial Development. Oteyza, emphasized the need
to revise Mexico's exports plans, in order to avoid the trap of petro-
leum mono-exports. "^^^
However, in his fifth annual report of September, 1981. President
Lopez Portillo vehemently denied that the Mexican economy might be in-
eluctably tied to its petroleum industry, citing a number of figures:
petroleum accounts for only 7% of Mexico's GDP; the Public Sector re-
ceives only 28% of its income from petroleum; investments from the oil
sector account for only 12% of the total; and only 38% of total foreign
income derives from petroleum sales. Likewise. Bancomer (Bank of
Commerce) has pointed out that the Mexican economy is quite diversified
and does not depend on any single product for its exports. "^^^ In this
context, the preponderance of petroleum would be only a temporary phe-
nomenon, as a result of the urgent need Mexico had in the mid and late
1970 's to expand its production quickly to face the economic crisis. '^^^
Furthermore, there would seem to be a relatively positive element
in the midst of the generalized oil price drop of mid-1981, that is,
the halt to the process of higher reliance of the Mexican economy on
the petrCeu. 1„dustry.lB? Notwithstanding the fact that Mexico was
forced to reduce prices for Its oil because of Internationa,
.ar.et
forces, by July. 1981. this happenstance had allowed dissimilar polltl-
cal groups. I.e. the PRI. leftist and rightist opposition parties, and
an concerned Secretariats, to coalesce around the banner of reduced
levels Of petroleu. exports, quite a feat which Illustrates the vagaries
Of Mexican political life.
Fieglonal and ernlonlr.l in^t. Never before in Mexico's history has
any single economic sector, such as petroleum right now. been such a
determining factor in the Industrial location and organization of eco-
nomic activities. According to a Mexican analyst, the impact of oil
activities affected only cities before; now, the magnitude and nature
of their Impact is such that it tends to "dominate all the regional
space, that is. all the fonrs of zonal production... "'es jome indica-
tions point to the fact that the regional and ecological impact of pe-
troleum exploitation so far has not been balanced at all.
In the Mexican states that are the center of the present oil boom.
Tabasco and Chiapas, Pemex's activities have polarized conflicts such
as inequality in Income distribution and unemployment.'^'' A social
dichotomy Is emerging, between the native population, dedicated mainly
to agricultural activities and increasingly pushed out by oil projects,
and Pemex's workers, who enjoy a substantially higher standard of
185living. Since 1979, there have been frequent clashes between Pemex
and peasants in both states. In occasion, groups of armed peasants
have blocked Pemex's installations. In January, 1981, such an
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incident took place in the petrochemical complex at Cactus, Chiapas.
Pemex's industrial areas in Reforma, and various oil fields. Mili-
tary patrols were called in to evict the peasants and protect the in-
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stallations. Pemex. for its part, agreed in principle to pay an in-
demnization to the peasants for damages resulting from its activi-
ties. ^^B
The problems seem to have started during 1977. when the reform to
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution transferred to the Secretary of
Patrimony and Industrial Development the power to expropriate agricul-
tural lands. Ever since, questions have been raised in regards to how
well that Secretariat has fulfilled its role "to harmonize interests
and in its case to indemnify . "^^^ The Secretary General of the League
of Peasant Communities in Tabasco has denied that peasants oppose oil
exploitation, but that such activities must be undertaken carefully,
and just indemnizations paid to those who are affected by them.'^^'^ On
the other hand, Pemex has stated that it does not have direct responsi-
bility over the formation of "misery belts" in the southeastern regions
of Mexico where it operates. There are also "prosperity belts" propi-
1 01
tiated by Pemex's activities. In any case. President Lo'pez Portillo
declared in 1978 that Pemex's role is "to generate economic wealth, not
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to solve problems."
Nevertheless, these problems are indeed mul tifaceted. There have
been a number of accidents related to Pemex's activities, significant
both in terms of environmental degradation, and economic losses. These
would tend to underline either the haste with which Pemex has proceeded
with its explorations, the lack of proper caution, or both. The
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Mexican magazine Proceso. in an August. 1980. issue, was stating some-
what sarcastically that Pemex was discovering oil and gas through acci-
dents. Such have been the cases of the "Ixtoc I" well off in the
Gulf of Campeche. and "Giraldas 22" well, in the state of Chiapas. The
Ixtoc well exploded on June 3. 1979. and spilled millions of barrels of
oil into the waters of the Campeche Bay. one of the richest fishing
zones in Mexico. According to Mexican scientists, the damages to the
ecology of the zone, and thus to the fishing industry, have been Irre-
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versible. Due to a "technical error," in August, 1980, the explosion
of the "Giraldas 22" well provoked the spill of thousands of barrels of
oil and the burning of millions of cubic feet of gas, in an apparently
unpopulated area of Chiapas. -^^^
In both of these cases, there were economic losses to Pemex that
amounted to millions of pesos. But in some cases these losses are noth-
ing compared to the damages to agriculture in the Southeast. At present
there is literally a clash between the petroleum and the agricultural
industries in that region. Not only because of disasters such as those
described, but through the noxious effects of the burning of gas, var-
ious crops such as corn, cacao, and banana, as well as grasslands, are
being destroyed. This is happening in some of the most fertile regions
of a mostly arid country, Mexico. According to a December, 1980, re-
port by the National Research Institute on Biotic Resources, "Tabasco
is now a big swamp," devoid of all its former dense jungles, the remain-
ing Mexican tropical jungles of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Campeche, and Quintana
Roo are under siege, and in general, "Mexico is in danger of becoming
an extensive desert, a fact which could bring the country to an absolute
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food dependence. "^-^
Ixtoc I and Glraldas are not Isolated accidents. In July. 1980
^
huge f1.e at Salina Cruz refinery destroyed o1, storage tan.s, lefi
30 injured workers, and consumed 140.000 barrels of oil. with damages
estimated at 200 .lllion pesos. 70% of the population In that city
lacks all types of services.^" m October of that same year, the
Corlndon" well. In the northern state of Tamaullpas, went out of con-
trol and spilled oil and gas In an area 43 km. off Neuvo Laredo."8 The
causes of most of these accidents have not been satisfactorily deter-
mined. By mid-1980, peasant communities In the Huasteca region of
Hidalgo were bracing themselves for the feared negative social and eco-
logical effects of Pemex's i^inent exploitation of the Chlcontepec
fields. 59 In regards to accidents. Pemex officials have declared that
"they worry us. but do not scare us." reaffirming their confidence in
Pemex 's know-how.^""
Pemex periodically announces programs to prevent contamination,
build schools and housing projects for Its workers, and roads for the
nation's infrastructure. It has emphasized its commitment to undertake
a dialogue with the officials of the affected areas. In order to remedy
the problems generated by the accidents, and by Pemex's activities in
201general. Undoubtedly, there are positive contributions that are also
a result of the oil boom. But a balanced assessment of the relation
between positive and negative impacts remains to be made.
The Mexican sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, in 1978. foresaw
three possible scenarios for Mexico's development, based on the influx
of petroleum resources. The first scenario would lead to the exhaustion
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of petroluem reserves and a grave domestic crisis, with social and
political convulsions. The secoryj.to a temporary respite for the sys-
tem, at least for a generation, until the reserves are gone. And the
third, to integral development in the framework of democratic planning,
with diminishing dependence and a more real autonomy for Mexico as a
nation. In this third scenario, prosperity would be truly shared.
Some of the key factors that qualify the three scenarios would be: the
degree of dependence and vulnerability vis a vis the United States,
based on commercial transactions; the state of the foreign debt; the
domestic destiny of the petroleum financial resources, leading to an
improvement or a deterioration of the distribution of income; and the
role of the Mexican state, as a democratic and benefactor, or as an
authoritarian state.
The weight of evidence by the early 1980's points to a process
located somewhere around the second scenario
. Mexico has not been al-
together successful in avoiding past pitfalls of other oil-producing
countries. The influx of funds from oil exports tends to have destabi-
lizing social and economic effects that the Mexican government cannot
quite cope with. The fact that Mexico's international financial posi-
tion is considerably stronger than in the mid-1970's, cannot hide the
domestic distortions due to the oil boom.^^"^
However, at present this process would not seem to be irreversible.
There is, for one thing, the awareness of government officials as mani-
fest in their public expressions of concern. Also, there is the fact
that Mexico's diversified economic infrastructure and plain market size,
contrast favorably with those of most oil-exporting countries. There
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st,ll a t1.e
.argin available to Mexico, during which Its government
^1ght devise effective
.eans to deal with the effects of the o1l boo.
The Challenge is to utilize a resource that is crucially needed at
present. In order to build foundations for a sustained, Integral process
Of development in the future.
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CHAPTER VII
UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF THE DEBATE
Nature of U.S-Mpyir;, n Relations
The "Special Relationship ," For some ti.e now, both American and Mexi-
can analysts have tended to approach the subject of relations between
the United States and Mexico in the framework of what might be called
a "special relationship." Regardless of periodic official disclaimers by
both sides, the relationship between the two countries is indeed "spe-
cial." Some key elements illustrate this fact. Mexico and the United
States share an undefended 2,000 mile common border, through which
people and goods have moved back and forth in an uninterrupted flux
since the nineteenth century. In regards to trade, the United States
is Mexico's first commercial client, while Mexico is the third largest
trading partner of the United States.^ Additionally, a unique factor
is the large and growing population of Mexican origin in the United
States, which represents a permanent link that goes beyond the formal
country to country relations. Mexico's petroleum boom is straining the
scope of this traditional "special relationship."
David F. Rondfelt and Caesar D. Serenseres have defined the "spe-
cial relationship" between the United States and Mexico in regards to
three concepts: interdependence, intermesticity, and the special recip-
rocal rights of bordering nations. The validity of the concept of inter-
dependence can be ascertained by the close links between the two na-
tions, both in societal and economic terms. In addition to trade,
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economic Interdependence is underlined by the volu.e of U S invest
-nts in Mexico ($6.3 billion by 1980), the exports of Mexican petro-
leum and gas to the United States, and the purchases of American food-
stuffs by Mexico. I n ter.es ti c i ty refers to the fact that, because of
-portant, mutually shared problems, the usual distinction between the
international and domestic spheres tends to wane. And, finally, these
previous considerations add to the idea that neighboring nations have
a right to a reciprocal special treatment.^
Rondfelt and Serenseres advance the proposition that these factors
that tend to m.ake for "special relationship" between the United States
and Mexico, could likewise be applied to the relations between Canada
and the United States. This initial conceptualization of two special
bilateral relationships could very well be the stepping stone for a
"trilateral" vision of North America, i.e. an interdependence between
the United States. Mexico, and Canada, ^ not too far off from President
Reagan's idea of a North American Common Market.
If it is true that the United States and Mexico share many common
problems derived at least partly from their "special relationship,"
such as unemployment, inflation, and environmental pollution, it is also
a fact that their priorities are different. Calvin Pat Blair has re-
ferred to these differing perspectives in terms of a confrontation be-
tween a geriatric society, i.e. the United States, and a pediatric soci-
ety, i.e. Mexico. The United States worries mainly about its access to
energy sources and raw materials, and has to deal with an aging indus-
trial base that renders it vulnerable to exports from foreign nations
such as Japan, ready to encroach upon the U.S. domestic market. On the
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other hand. Mexico has an altogether different set of problems, such
as a Sharply unequal distribution of inccne. and ™st try to gain access
to
.arrets for its manufactures, as well as for capital and technologi-
cal imports, uphold the rights of Its migrant workers, and diminish Its
dependence on oil exports. Furthe™cre. says Blair, whereas the United
States lives in permanent fear of a radical leftist Mexico, the latter
1n turn dreads the possibility of U.S. oolicies such as stringent pro-
tectionist measures or an all-out campaign to deport Mexican migrant
workers
James W. Wilkie has summarized these "conflicting national inter-
ests" between the United States and Mexico in terms of a series of
"dilemmas" facing both nations in their relations with each other.^ Cn
the Mexican side, the structural dilemmas would be the following:
1- "Mexico's 'national interest' to encourage tourism vs it<; ' n;.tinn;,iinterest' to develop industrialization."
n^tiona}
2- "Labor intensive vs. capital economic activity."
3- "Need for U.S. investments vs. loans."
4- "Need for diversified trading partners throughout the world, in orderto achieve economic independence' and protection against U S re-
cessions vs. reliance on its northern neighbor, especially duringtimes of economic crisis."
m ^ u m
5- "Need for urban food and export food vs. need to distribute land."
6- "Need for an open U.S. border as escape valve for excess labor vs
need to retain in Mexico the ambitious rural worker."
And. among the U.S. dilemmas:
1- "U.S. 'national interest' to have a cheap reserve labor pool vs its
national interest' to close the frontier to 'excessive' immigration
from Mexico."
2- "Need to expand exports to Mexico vs. need to control imports from
Mexico."
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In conclusion. Wilkie believes that "change within and cooperation
between Mexico and the United States means that there are few 'solutions'
to common problems."^ Or. in other words, in what could be an unwilling
allusion to the Impact of the oH boo,, in the relations between the two
countries:
"Historically, U.S.
-Mexican relations have in-
volved the diplomatic resolution of common borderproblems causing temporary tension between the two
countries, but with the advent of the 197G's, newkinds of tensions that reflect structural changes
in the affairs of both countries pressage the rise
of issues in the 1980's and 1990's that are not
susceptible to traditional diplomatic solutions
that have marked U.S.
-Mexican relations in the
past. 7
There are at present varying opinions about the special U.S.-
Mexican relationship that reflect both acknowledgement of a de facto
situation and uneasiness about it. On the whole, on the American side
It is possible to appreciate a mixture of regard for Mexico's needs,
and an awareness of U.S. benefits from the relation. Mexican opinion,
on the other hand, tends to be qualified by apprehension about American
intentions and possible advantages.
U.S. policies towards Mexico have often been labelled by the latter
as "inconsistent." In the view of the U.S. Department of State these
relations are, rather, "very complicated."^ Richard Nussio, from
Williams College, has pointed at "bureaucratism" as one of the prevail-
ing realities in the bilateral relations between Mexico and the United
States. There are, says Nussio, more than 200 U.S. government agencies
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particTpating Tn decisions and matters pertaining to Mexico.^
Perhaps as a response to the increasingly complex relations between
the United States and Mexico, in April. 1979, the Carter administration
decided to appoint a Special Ambassador to Mexico, i.e. officially an
"Ambassador at large and U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs." directly
dependent from the President and the Department of State. The new Am-
bassador. Robert Kruger. was to assist the President and the Secretary
of State "in the development of effective national policies towards
Mexico and in the coordination and implementation of such policies."
Likewise. Kruger was to serve as Chairman of a Senior Interagency Group
on U.S. policy towards Mexico and as U.S. Executive Director for the
U.S.
-Mexico Consultative Mechanisms. As Coordinator. Kruger was to be
located in the Department of State, while the Director of the Office of
Mexican Affairs in that same Department would serve as Deputy Coordi-
nator.
Carter's Presidential Memorandum on the subject of coordination of
U.S. policy towards Mexico was delivered to his entire Cabinet, in an
effort to assure the integration of any "overlapping entities" into a
coherent process of policy development and formulation. Indeed, the
Presidential Memorandum seemed to reflect an official awareness of the
special relationship with Mexico, in view of the latter 's growing impor-
tance as an oil producer and exporter:
"In view of the increasing domestic and inter-
national importance of our relations with Mexico,
and of the intensity and complexity of those re-
lations in the years ahead, I have decided to
take steps to improve our ability to address
effectively all issues which affect U.S.
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relations with Mexico.... To ensure that all u spolicies toward Mexico, and all actions d recii;
U.S. national interests ard are consistent withour overall policy toward Mexico, I ask
-thateach of you accord a high priority to any and allmatters within your jurisdiction affecting Sexicoconsciously giving good relations with Mexico I
continuing high priority in your thinking andpanning; and
-that all proposed actions! whichhave an effect on Mexico, be carefully coordi-
nated so as to be consistent with overall u Spolicy toward Mexico, and based on the fullest
Sf^Mexico^^lr ^'^^ Government
A Mexican commentator. Joseph Hodara, had some specific views with
respect to the designation of a "Special Ambassador." This was a re-
sult, according to Hodara, of the strengths and weaknesses of Mexico's
oil boom. The fact that Mexican affairs had been translated directly
to the White House "reflected the strategic importance accorded by
Washington to Mexico at present." since such consulting and decision
mechanisms had been previously established only in the realm of detente
and Middle East affairs. "^^
However, the appointment of an additional ambassador, albeit "at
large," which in fact meant a duplication of some of the functions of
the regular U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City, seemed to contribute to a
situation of confusion and hesitation. Mexican government officials
did not know precisely whom to deal with in the various areas of bi-
lateral relations. By early 1981, the Reagan administration, congruent
with its goal of streamlining policy-making and eliminating excessive
bureaucratization, initiated the dismantlement of this special agency.
However, Reagan emphasized the importance be placed on the relationship
with Mexico by meeting with Lopez Portillo in Ciudad Juarez, in January,
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1981. breaking his previous promise not to confer with any foreign
leaders before he assumed the presidency. The visit underscored the
strategic and economic position of Mexico as the cornerstone of U.S.
foreign policy towards Latin America. Additionally Reagan stated that
he personally would handle relations with Mexico, without need of any
intermediaries.'^'^
The views of other American officials and scholars tend to reaffirm
the existence of a "special relationship" with Mexico. For example, in
1978 former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Patrick Lucey, caused a stir by
declaring that "there are not two nations on earth whose present and
future are as closely intertwined as Mexico and the United States. "^^
James W. Wilkie has qualified the U.S. relationship with Latin America
as a whole as "overdrawn and overdone," while affirming that this is
altogether different in the case of Mexico, where the United States in-
deed has a special relation with its southern neighbor. In this con-
text, says Wilkie, "...it is in the United States' best interests to
make it easy for Mexico to solve its own problems. "^^ Edward J.
Williams, David F. Rondfelt and Caesar D. Serenseres advance the opinion
that, while there are particular obligations that fall on the United
States, as a result of its "special relationship" with Mexico, such as
a greater understanding and sharing of the problem of migrant workers,
there has to be also a degree of Mexican reciprocity, in regards to
supplying petroleum and gas to the United States. An official analysis
for the U.S. Senate concludes that
"Although some feel that the concept of 'special re-
lationship' is theoretically outmoded in this day of
"global' perceptions of U.S. foreign policy, it
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remains a prominent concept to be considered in
understanding United States-Mexican re at^onsThe concept of "special relationship.' ?n facicould very well reach new prominence and import
erg""17
dimension of Mexican en-
Mexican official reaction, at least openly, tends to be one of
suspicion towards the concept of a "special relationship." According
to Rondfelt and Serenseres the necessary incentives are not present,
for both countries to embark upon a new special framework for bilateral
cooperation, and rather than upholding special bilateral guidelines,
Mexico would seem to prefer to deal with the United States on the basis
of legally accepted international principles and a multilateral frame-
work of discussions.^^ This view would seem to reflect, not an open
hostility to the idea of a special relationship, but a disenchantment
with it. Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations. Jorge Castaneda.
before his appointment and acting then as Ambassador at Large, declared
in late 1978 that, as a whole. Mexico did not believe any longer that
"there exists or can exist a special relationship with the United
States." Castaneda's comment was inscribed within a general framework
of Mexican official opinion, that as long as the United States proceeds
to act unilaterally in areas such as trade and migration, a policy of
"special relationship" is merely rhetoric.
The concept of a "special relationship" is based to a significant
degree on the existence of an economic interdependence between the two
countries. Hodara sees two possible results of a growing interdepen-
dence between the United States and Mexico, in the context of the
latter's oil boom. A first scenario would have petroleum enhance the
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mutual benefits accruing fro. interdependence, thus contributing to
solve accidental differences of opinion in regards to matters such as
trade and fishing rights; beneath a facade of diplomatic rhetoric de-
signed for public consumption, both nations would encourage more ex-
tensive commercial ties. A second scenario, however, would be qualified
by an asymmetrical interdependence, which would lead to an irreversible
Mexican subordination.^^
Some Mexican analysts tend to visualize the second scenario.
Carlos Rico F. plainly considers "interdependence" as a mechanism that
reinforces U.S. hegemony and responds to the logic of its foreign policy
objectives. A key objective here would be to transform Mexico into a
trustworthy and influential partner of the United States in North-South
21
negotiations. Heberto Castillo contemplates a conspiracy by the
Mexican government, which would be placing pro-United States and busi-
ness officials in central administration posts and along the Mexican
states bordering on the United States in order to "create a border
transition zone towards the eventual installation of an Associate
State.
"^^
Olga Pellicer believes that the idea of a "special relationship,"
while not offering concrete solutions to bilateral problems, has served
to legitimize close links between the two nations. By late 1978.
Pellicer could discern an effort by American diplomats to reach an
understanding with Mexico, under the slogan of "interdependence." which
would in reality strive to further U.S. priorities such as a steady
supply of Mexican petroleum and gas. According to Pellicer, various
political groups in the United States would be pressuring in favor of
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an "extraspecial relation" with Mexico, geared to propitiate the rapid
exploitation of petroleum and its commercialization towards the United
States. In this context, adds Richard Fagen,
'The importance of Mexican petroleum at present
IribSJion'ln^^' Percentaoe 0 -
nw ^ ''^l^ exports, but rather a very com-plex function related to Mexico's role as an
"'P^'^ expansion which, at the sametime, shares very close geographic, oolitical anH
'^r^^^^^ biggLt^et;ofet^Jo^^Jume^?^
By June. 1980, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Jorge
Castaneda. was emphasizing that Mexico does not wish a special treatrr,ent
from the United States but. rather, "...a relation based on mutual bene-
fit. taking into^account the relative degree of economic development of
both countries. "^^
Perhaps it would be pertinent, in order to clarify Castaneda's
statement to inscribe it within a conceptual framework developed by
Victor S. D'Souza. D'Souza distinguishes between three types of inter-
national relations: domination, interdependence, and common interest.
In the first type, the principal means to carry out policies on the
part of the more powerful nation would be to threaten the weaker coun-
try. In regards to interdependent relationships, the powerful nation
would offer help to solve a particular problem of the weak country, in-
asmuch as it affects the interests of the former. And, in relations
based on common interests, the objective would be to pay attention to
the basic problems of the weak country, among which the particular prob-
lems affecting the powerful nation would be only aspects of the overall
framework. In this last type of relationship the developed nation
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would leave aside Its role as a '.powerful nation." and behave Instead
as a "worried partner. "^^
D'Souza's classification would seem to cover quite appropriately
the attitudinal spectrum in U.S.-Kexican relations. While the Mexican
position tends to react against domination and suspect interdependence,
it does seem to coincide strikingly with the basis of a "cordon inter-
est" relationship.
Linkages. The concept of a "special relationship" between the United
States and Mexico is intimately tied to the global nature of their na-
ture of their relations. Even though petroleum permeates the entirety
of the complex amalgam of U.S.-Mexican relations, it is but one of many
issues, such as migrant workers, trade, and environmental degradation.
In the past, the Mexican government has preferred to deal with all these
problems in terms of a linkage, viewing them as a whole, while the
United States would rather treat them individually. Petroleum may be
changing the U.S. perception towards the concept of "linkage." For
example, in March. 1979. a Joint Commission in Congress asked the Fed-
eral Government to take into account, together with the issue of imports
of Mexican petroleum and gas, the problems of bilateral commerce and
migration, "in the context of a spirit of comprehension and cooperation
between the two nations." Calvin Blair has stressed that the various
topics in the agenda of U.S.-Mexican relations must be, by necessity,
considered as a package, which would tie the key themes and allow both
countries to obtain advantages in economic agreements. Mexico will in-
sist, says Blair, on tying petroleum matters, so important to the
271
United States, to those which are important to Mexico, such as Mexican
manufactured exports, access to American technology, and the treatment
Of Mexican migrant workers.
The present official Mexican position towards linkage remains vague
in regards to the theme of migrant workers. On the eve of President
Carter's visit to Mexico, in February, 1979, within three days of each
declaration. President Lopez Portillo alternatively put forth conflict-
ing statements on the issue. First, the Mexican President asserted that
all the problems that divide the United States and Mexico, such as pe-
troleum and gas price levels, illegal migrants, and commerce, must be
analyzed jointly. Two days later, Lopez Portillo emphatically de-
clared that he would oppose any attempt at blackmail, in tying the
issues of migrant workers and petroleum negotiations.^^ But the problem
of Mexican migrant workers is, indeed, an emotionally charged issue for
Mexican public opinion, commonly fused with a good dose of rhetoric.
In regards to other, more clearly cut issues such as trade, the Mexican
position becomes less diffuse. For example, reaffirming a crucial
"linkage" between trade and oil sales the Mexican Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Castaneda, declared in June, 1980:
"...would it not be useful for those who influence
on the definition of policies in the United States
to begin to consider the relation that exists be-
tween Mexico's economic development, sales of crude
oil and gas to the United States, and the growing
need we have of access to that nation's market on
a less restrictive basis, so as to export the pro-
duction from that industrial infrastructure that we
are creating. "32
At the same time, according to Mexico's view, the situation of
migrant workers is tied to the issue of trade. From this perspective.
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Mexico maintains that lesser trade restrictions on the part of the
United States would contribute to Mexican development and employment
creation, and would slow down Illegal migration to the United States.
Thus, from the Mexican perspective, trade would seem to be the corner-
stone of the global nature of U.S.-Mexican relations. As Lopez PortiUo
declared early in his administration:
"...We are extremely concerned that Mexican exoortc;
are confronted by a large number of resi"ct?S sapplied by our northern neighbor. We think the traripprob em should be viewed in'its entirety, in termsOf Us impact not on individual interests, but on theU.S.
-Mexican relationship as a whole. "33
Perhaps the most important recent single trade issue for Mexico,
during 1980, was the domestic debate over m.embership in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). President idpez Portillo had
previously defined Mexico's potential entrance to GATT as basically a
"substantial modality of commerce with the United States, since 7C% of
our foreign commerce is with that nation. "^^ In other words, the lib-
eralization of trade barriers would take effect mainly vis a vis the
United States. When, in March 1980, Mexico finally decided not to join
GATT for the present time, the official reaction from the United States
was one of disenchantment, not to say anger. Robert Kruger, Special
Coordinator for Mexican Affairs, described U.S.-Mexican commercial re-
lations as in a state of uncertainty. Kruger emphasized that trade be-
tween the two nations, which in 1979 reached the record level of 18.7
billion dollars, an increase of 46% in a year, would continue to expand,
but at a slower pace. The United States, said Kruger, was anxiously
looking forward to Mexican proposals regarding bilateral commercial
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relations, but negotiations to that end would be prolonged.^S
The reasons behind Mexico's refusal to enter GATT were closely
tied to its petroleu. exports. On the one hand, given the recent de-
cline in Mexico's non-oil exports,
.e.bership in GATT
.ight have hurt
further Mexico's protected domestic industry. Petroleum also gave
Mexican political leadership the necessary self-confidence to try to
pursue trade advantages without affiliating to GAH. Furthermore, the
decision was also meant to be for domestic consumption, quieting a con-
siderable nationalistic uproar.^^ But there was another important con-
sideration. Mainly because of the availability of oil. Mexico would not
be accorded guarantees within GATT pertaining to less developed coun-
tries. In other words, "it is not feasible to obtain a preferential and
differentiated treatment (for Mexico) within GATT."^'' Thus, the likeli-
hood of a disruption of the Mexican economy, at least in terms of in-
creased dependence on the United States, seemed to loom large in the
minds of Mexico's political decision makers.
In regards to trade. President Ldpez Portillo has emphasized that
Mexico is pursuing "global agreements of bilateral cooperation." i.e.
bilateral arrangements that encompass various issues. It seems likely
that for the near future Mexico will refrain from joining multilateral
trade accords such as GATT, concentrating instead on bilateral trade
packages. However, although Mexico refused to enter GATT. in 1980 it
lowered tariffs and imports permits in all activities in which domestic
supply was deemed to be insufficient."^^
The gasduct project in Mexico clearly illustrates the volatility
of U.S.
-Mexican relations, in the framework of the petroleum boom. As
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e ex
.cease. Us activities 1n .exlco. southeast, t.e.e «e.e
olu.es Of avalUMe natu.a, ,as t.at could not .e used do.estlcaU,
By.1d-m7. Pe.ex s1,ned a letter Of Intent to se,, the ,as to six ^ sprivate distributor cc.panles. at a price of S2.60 per thousand cu ft
'
(«F). The
.eans to transport the gas to the United States was to be
a gasduct. fro. Cactus. Chiapas, to Reynosa. Texas, which began to bebunt on October 7. 1977. There were conpelling economic arguments 1„
^avor Of the pipeline. In short, the cost for the project was estimated
to be 1.5 billion dollars, and the construction ti.e 24
.onths; at the
outset, the Pipeline would represent earnings in foreign exchange at the
rate of 3.3 million dollars a day. However as th<. a <uoji n . the duct neared comple-
tion. the U.S. government, acting on the specific reco^endations of
Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, refused to allow the companies
to buy the gas at the price they had previously agreed with Mexico. The
argument of the Department of Energy centered on the fact that the
United States could not pay Mexico 44 cents more than Canada for an MCF.
Also, there were fears that Congress would not approve the $2.60 price
tag. while American gas producers were only paid up to a ceiling of
$1.75, according to Carter's energy bill.^^
Reaction to both sides of the border was swift, and seemed to co-
incide in deploring the failure of the deal, with its subsequent detri-
mental repercussions on U.S.
-Mexican relations. In the United States.
The Wall Street Journal, among other major newspapers, harshly criti-
cized the lack of a more enlightened approach to the problem on the
part of U.S. government authorities.^^ Mexican reaction was twofold.
On the one hand, the Mexican government proceeded to redirect the
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Pipeline to distribute and use the gas domestically. On the other
Mexican officials took advantage of every opportunity to denounce the
lack of frankness and finesse manifest in U.S. actions concerning the
deal. The gas fiasco was the main factor that darkened the talks be-
tween L^pez Portillo and Carter in Mexico in February, 1979. During
Carter's visit, at a luncheon toast, Lopez Portillo lectured the Ameri-
can President on what he saw as a U.S. practice of treating Mexico with
a "mixture of interest, disdain, and fear," and added:
"Among permanent, not casual neighbors, surprise
moves and sudden deceit or abuse are poisonous
rruits that sooner or later have a reverse effect
No injustice can prevail without affronting de-
cency and dignity. "42
In June. 1980, the Mexican President still remembered vividly the
gasduct fiasco. At that time Lo^pez Portillo expressed his opinion that
"the ties between Mexico and the United States have deteriorated lately,
with respect to what they were in 1977." And. again, he recalled how
his good faith had been betrayed by the U.S. government when it can-
celled abruptly the deal between Pemex and the American gas companies.
After protracted, off-and-on negotiations, which in all amounted
to seven rounds of talks, on September 21. 1979. the two governments
issued a Joint Announcement to the effect that an understanding had
finally been reached. The agreement called for the sale of 300 million
cubic feet per day of natural gas by Pemex to U.S. purchasers, starting
as of January. 1980. at an initial price of $3,625 million btu, subject
to reconsideration if the price for natural gas from comparable sources
were to exceed that amount prior to the starting date.^^ By Novem-
ber 21, 1979, the Department of Energy received an application to import
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Mex,can natural ,as
,y a consoni™ called Bcder Gas. Inc..
.ade up of
-X U.S. energy co.pan1es.« and gave U final clearance on December 29
1979. after an order Issued by the Department's Economic Regulatory
Administration (ERA), which was responsible for approving Imports and
exports Of natural gas.« DOE officials stated that "these approvals
(were) a further step 1n establishing closer relations between the U S
and Mexico." a doubtful proposition considering the bitterness of the
preceding exchanges.
A case with serious environmental consequences has also affected
U.S..Mexican relations. From June. 1979. to March 24. 1980. when it
was finally capped,the Mexican oil well Ixtoc I blew out and spilled
millions of barrels of oil into the waters of Campeche Bay in the Gulf
of Mexico. Eventually, ocean currents carried the oil to the Texas
coast, affecting close to 200 miles of beaches. This environmental di-
saster affected the relations between the two countries, and resulted in
damages to sea life, beaches, tourism, and property in still unknown
proportions.
The Ixtoc I disaster gave rise to a series of public accusations
and discussions between the two governments in regards to delineating
responsibilities. By February. 1981. the U.S. government was trying
to determine the effect on its relations with Mexico of a possible law-
suit against Pemex for the damages caused in 1979 as a result of the
Ixtoc I oil spills. Lawsuits were filed by the U.S. Federal government,
the government of Texas, and private concerns against Pemex and firm
Permargo. a subcontractor in charge of drilling the well when the disas-
ter took place. However, a direct suit against Pemex would involve
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the Mexican government itself, with the possibility that general rela-
tions between the two countries would suffer.
In Mexico the Ixtoc I case aroused nationalistic sensibilities
Following his September 28-29. 1979, trip to Washington, President Lopez
Portillo declared that Mexico rejected liability damages, and compared
the issue to that of the salinity of the Mexicali Valley in northwestern
Mexico, Where the United States has never paid for damages to Mexican
agriculture from the high salt-content of the waters of the Colorado
River. Although Ixtoc I was a serious foreign policy issue for both
countries, the fact that other issues of greater importance might suf-
fer, i.e. the question of linkage, has contributed to keep the problem
from going beyond certain limits of diplomatic propriety.
From the preceding discussion, it would appear that a m.utually
binding package which takes into account the overall set of issues be-
tween the two countries is perhaps rather unfeasible. Both governments
would ultimately be opposed to such an agreement, albeit from a differ-
ent rationale. The United States remains committed to global policies
and multilateral accords, and the American political system itself is
not conducive to "package" deals, due to the multiplicity of government
agencies and lobbying interests operating on the context of U.S.-Mexi-
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can relations. From the Mexican perspective, nationalism and the
ever-present theme of increased dependence on the United States con-
stitute a formidable opposition to a permanent "package" arrangement.
However, the interrelationship between numerous issues also underlines
the fallacy of trying to approach them on an individual basis. In
this respect, Alfred Stepan has advanced the need for a "more integrated
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bargaining framework:"
"...a bargaining framework that recognizes thpcomp ete range of issues at stake! anS onewhich the United States, precisei; in order ?oadvance its overall interests, would aggres-sively seek out new form.ulas for responding toMexico's special needs, especially in the areasof migration and trade. "52
Oorth^rican Common Market! For some tim.e now. various public and
private sources in the United States have seemed to advocate, as a logi
cal extension of that nation's "special relationship" with Mexico and
Canada, a North American Common Market. For example. Redvers Opie has
developed this point, in terms of a "geographical division of labor:"
"Canada, the United States, and Mexico are in manv
respects complementary rather than competing eco-
nomies; and perhaps especially Mexico and the Unitedbtates are complementary. These two countries have
a mutuality of interest in protecting harmonious
development together. "53
Clark Reynolds, in a somewhat deterministic assessment of the situ-
ation, advances the idea that there is a "silent economic integration"
between the United States. Mexico, and Canada. This process could be
furthered, says Reynolds, by formalizing closer economic links through
mutual safeguards in regards to labor migration, and the establishment
of standing commissions to deal with the ample spectrum of problems
likely to arise between neighbors. Reynolds suggests, in order to
promote the idea of a common economic region, that the United States
should act as a partner, rather than as an overwhelming leader:
"I feel that the United States would be well advised
to reconsider the possibility of regarding the entire
North American Continent as an economic region in
which it is one important participant and in which
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it can play an increasingly relative rolp r;,+-ho.than absolute or dominant role. '55
^
Specifically, in regards to energy, Kenneth E. Hill, in a 1979
study called "A Proposal for a Common Market Between Canada, Mexico and
the United States." talks in terms of a crucial need for the United
States to foster, within a maximum time lapse of 10 years, a trinational
alliance between the three countries with the objective of solving the
U.S. energy problem, namely to help supply the U.S. energy demand of
19 million b/d of oil and 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas annu-
ally. The United States imports 45% of its petroleum and 5% of its
natural gas needs. Among the mutual benefits of such an alliance, says
Hill, there would be U.S. guarantees to buy Mexican and Canadian fuels
and stabilize prices, and to purchase agricultural and manufactured
products from Mexico, free of trading restrictions, as well as a solu-
tion to the problem of Mexican migrant workers, through an elimination
of some of the present migratory barriers. The Mexican and Canadian
currencies would continue to be tied to the fluctuations of the dollar.
Furthermore, the United States would guarantee the military security
of this economic corr^nity which would extend its operations into the
Caribbean.
There would seem to be sound economic incentives for such a common
market. For example, between them, the United States. Canada, and
Mexico drilled nine- tenths of all the wells in the non-communist world
during 1979, in a continuing unabashed drilling boom that has charac-
terized the petroleum industries of North America since 1973.^^ By
mid-1980, a U.S. business periodical was reporting that a broad trade
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but pacts for specific Industrial sectors
.Ig.t be possible. One oandl-
date for agreement would be petrochemiraU ;,nH
t-p
M L cnemicals, and the effects would be
profound. "
By August. 1980. In a series of meetings of the policy co^Utees
of the U.S. Senate and the Working Group on North American Cc^erce of
the National Association of U.S. governors, the need was stated for rec-
iprocity on the part of Mexico and Canada, in regards to allowing the
access of U.S. products to their domestic markets. The discussions.
Which included the participation of John Plunkett. President of the"
American Chamber of Comerce in Mexico, had as their main objective the
delineation of strategies relative to the establishment of a North
American Common Market.
President Reagan has expressed his support for the notion of a
North American accord. However. Mexico and Canada have both turned down
the idea as a scheme that would be mostly favorable to the United
States. ^0 By April. 1979, JesJs Puente Leyva, President of the Energy
Commission of the Mexican Congress, went public in denouncing the U.S.
goal of interdependence, or North American Common Market, as contrary
to Mexican interests. In mid-1980, during a visit to Canada, Lopez
Portillo tried to put an end to speculations in Washington regarding a
North American accord, by declaring that Mexican energy sources would
not be used to maintain the high standards of living of other nations.
From the Mexican perspective, progress on this issue seems to be
precluded by the disparity in levels of development and income between
the United States and Mexico, which would foreordain, apparently.
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American predominance and Increased dependency for Mexico. Again,
nationalism underscores the Mexican position. For example, in October.
1978. as a reply to the Interest manifested by Exxon and Texaco to par-
ticipate in the direct exploitation of Mexican hydrocarbon resources.
Pemex stated categorically that Mexico would not allow any such inter-
vention by American oil companies.
Geopolitica l and Stratpg ir j^n^n^.t ions
Mexico and the United States share the same geopolitical space,
i.e. the Caribbean and Central American Basin. There are common, as
well as contradicting, elements, values, and goals, in the Mexican and
American approaches towards this vast area. The Mexican position has
been reinforced by its new status as an oil-rich nation. Just as this
latter fact has impelled the U.S. government to seek closer relations
with its southern neighbor, Mexico has perceived, in its role as an oil-
producing and exporting country, a propelling factor for imprinting a
new dynamism into its foreign policy. This situation is shaping a sce-
nario fertile for joint initiatives, but also fraught with potential
conflict between the two governments, in regards to a series of security
and strategic points of contention.
Security a nd strategic questions . In 1976, at the petition of then
Undersecretary of Defense of the United States, Robert F. Ellsworth,
the Pentagon prepared a report on "Energy Geopolitics, 1976-2000,"
which could be considered to be one of the antecedents for present U.S.
policies regarding the establishment of a close energy relation with
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Mexico. Venezuela, and Canada. According to the document, the basis for
this relation were to be found In the fact that the United States 1s the
natural
.arket for petroleum exports fro. those countries, and the
source of financial and technological assistance. The authors of the
study. Melvin Conant and Fern R. Gold, believed that Canada would accede
to such an association rather willingly. However. Mexico and Venezuela
posed a problem, derived from their nationalistic sensitivities. Thus,
the United States should act with caution in its approaches to those
governments, in order to avoid any appearances of exploitation.^"
Specifically in regards to Mexico. Conant and Gold concluded that
politically it would be the most difficult case. In order to appease
Mexican opposition, a "special treatment" should be developed, related
not only to energy matters, but also to other bilateral matters such as
trade and Investments. According to the authors, access to petroleum
resources would be determined by an interrelation between geographic
factors and governmental policies, and by a complex assortment of po-
litical and economic variants.
By mid- 1981. the Reagan administration seemed to be pursuing,
still, the objective of an association with Mexico. Venezuela, and
Canada. Following an American initiative, the foreign ministers of the
four nations met in Nassau, at the Bahamas, to study the possibility of
launching a joint program of economic assistance for the countries of
the Caribbean and Central America. Commenting on the Nassau reunion.
President Lrfpez Portillo praised the efforts to achieve cooperation in
fostering economic development in the region, as long as the right of
the Central American and Caribbean countries is respected, "to decide
283
for themselves the .o^s of ,ove.„.e„t an. socUl o.,a„1zat,o„ to wMcH
they aspire.
In the present world energy context, the consolidation of a closer
relationship between Mexico and the United States fro. the perspective
Of the latter, is seen in ter.s of national security, m other words
^ex.co represents a secure source of energy for the United States
According to Richard B. Manege, two matters of consideration threaten
the national security of the United States: the disparity in political
and economic perspectives vis a vis a small group of countries, mainly
on; and the fact that this problem of reliance on distant sources is
compounded by growing Soviet naval strength. Thus,
finnTi^
'^"^
^PS""? °^ ^'^"'^^ and natural gas
Dermit ^\'n ^'"P^^^^ wouldp a political, economic, and geographicaldiversification that would, in part, alleviatethese threats and enhance the energy security
of the United States. "68
Besides these security objectives, i.e. prevention of political
threats and geographic diversification, Mancke has underlined military-
security benefits in case of conventional, limited, and undeclared naval
wars, in which Mexican oil could becom.e a life-saving link for the
United States. Furthermore. Mexico would be more secure in regards to
terrorist activities, because of shorter transportation routes and the
possibility of bilateral arrangements for the protection of Mexican
oil fields. In a late 1981 interview, asked about accessibility to
Mexico's petroleum for the United States, in case of an international
emergency such as a war in the Middle East, President Lopez Portillo
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declared that it was not a matter of
"conflict of int .^ ri interests but of a
convergence of purooses Uo n„= ,
' P™'<^"'^ty and interrelation
Hat assured,, there would
.e an understanding..... still, the Mexican
resident did not foresee such extreme cases for which there are no con-
tingencies in Mexico's petroleum plans.
Official awareness in the United States about the security impli-
cations of Mexican petroleum has been manifest in the last few years
Even in early 1979. at a time of low-ebb in U.S.-Mexican relations,
still in the midst of the controversy over the gas deal, President
Carter, while dismissing then the urgency for the United States of Mexi-
can hydrocarbons for i«diate co«rc1al use, recognized their strate-
gic value on a long-term basis, especially in case of war.^l By
September, 1980, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury recommended to "pay
careful attention" to bilateral relations with Mexico and Canada as a
means to assure a future supply of oil and gas. The report concluded
that "Mexico will probably be the primary source of petroleum and gas
imports by the U.S. during the next decade."" In October of that same
year, the American Ambassador to Mexico, Julian Nava, openly described
Mexico as a "key part of the U.S. security strategy. "^^
The Rand Corporation, in a late 1980 study called "Mexican Petro-
leum and U.S. policy: Implications for the 1980. s." recommended to the
U.S. government to increase U.S.
-Mexican interdependence, and not only
in regards to energy questions. The authors, David Rondfelt, Richard
Nehring, and Arturo Ga'ndara, stated three possible solutions, from the
the U.S. perspective, to improve relations with Mexico:
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Sarke?;!''"
'''''' '''''''''' ^'^-^ continued exports to U.S.
IfL'ItJi!'^^"' °' " '"^^^^ Which would include
^^Xl^::^ ^^^^^r-^r:^^ -^erceAmerican countries with refining capacUy!?4 '"^
The Rand Corporation has presented two alternative policy concepts
for future relations between the United States and Mexico. The first
places emphasis on "internationalism," that is, Mexico would be treated
much like any other developing country emerging as a '•middle-power."
The second underlines the concept of "con^unity." that is, Mexico would
be viewed as a special partner in the long-range development of North
America. According to Rand, the first approach assumes that Mexico's
development would make it more independent than interdependent vis a vis
the United States, and would result in restrictions to the process of
integration of both economies and societies. This approach would be
congruent with Mexico's desires to reaffirm its sovereignty and diver-
sify its foreign relations, and to conduct its dealings with the U.S.
on the basis of international principles .'^^
However, the "internationalist" approach would imply, according to
Rand, a denial of Mexico's "special relationship" with the United
States. Furthermore, the more independent Mexican development is, the
greater its economic competition with the United States, with the sub-
sequent added bilateral tensions. Thus, giving support to the tenden-
cies in official U.S. circles which seek to promote a "special relation-
ship," Rand suggests the second alternative, i.e. fostering U.S. poli-
cies based on the concepts of community, partnership, and interdepen-
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dence. According to Rand. 1f Mexico were to futHely persist In Ignor-
ing this possibility, in the end the result of such an attitude would
lead to a reinforcement of U.S. policies to render It as an increasingly
weaker and dependent client.^^
A work group created by President-elect Reagan in December. 1980,
to examine the present conditions of supply of strategic minerals to the
United States, warned of the precarious and vulnerable state of national
security, and recommended economic integration strategies and political
alliances with exporting countries that are geographically closest to
the United States, i.e. Mexico, Canada, and other Caribbean and Central
American countries. Another recommendation suggested the creation of
a National Strategic Reserve of thirteen basic minerals, eleven of
which are already supplied by Mexico to the United States.
In this context, Mexico has been selling the Pentagon crude oil for
the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve since 1978.''^ By August, 1981.
the U.S. Department of Energy had reached an agreement with Pemex to
purchase 106 million barrels of oil over the next five years for the
strategic reserve. The agreement included 200,000 b/d of oil at $31.80
per barrel from September 1, 1981, until the end of the year. After-
wards, deliveries will be reduced to 50,000 b/d of oil, and the price
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renegotiated. It should be underlined here that most of the Middle
Eastern producers have refused to sell oil for the strategic reserve.
On the other hand, the deal guarantees Mexico secure sales at a time
when it is still recovering from the lost reserves that resulted from
the June, 1981, drops in sales.
There is another angle of the U.S. problem of national security,
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intimately tied to
.exico^s internal processes. This is, according to
Richard R. Fagen. the "'ti.e bo.b" of Mexican development, with profound
implications for U.S. security. In other words, a distorted process of
development in Mexico, i.e. economic growth without any improvements in
the distribution of income, could eventually have grave domestic reper-
cussions in Mexico and destabilize the countrys political system, with
the subsequent multifaceted impact on the United States.
In a scenario of uncontrolled social and political disturbances,
the U.S.-Mexican border would be but a symbiotic membrane that would
bring unrest to both sides. The Rand Corporation is aware of this di-
mension of the problem, suggesting that Mexico should perhaps be a con-
servative petroleum country. However, in Rand's scheme of late 1980,
there was a calculated strategic perspective: even though it might re-
strict its total oil output for reasons of domestic stability, Mexico
would, nonetheless, widen its extraction, transportation, and exports
capacity. This excess production capacity could be incorporated rap-
idly during a sudden international energy crisis.
Another late 1980 report titled Petroleum Geopolitics , prepared
for the Energy and Natural Resources Committee of the U.S. Senate,
under the direction of James Z. Pugash, also recommended that the United
States should encourage Mexico to create such an excess production ca-
pacity, for strategic reasons. The report underlined the need for a
"mutually beneficial association that includes Mexican energy develop-
82
ment." These potential arrangements would seem to run counter to the
exploitation goals of Mexico's Energy Program.
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^^mmcs. There are a nu*er of questions that could be Inscribed
within the framework of the Mexican o1, boon,, which are at the heart of
a process of geopolitical reacco^odatlon under way at present between
the United States and Mexico.
Historically, a key point of the U.S. strategy for its in^ediate
sphere of influence in the Caribbean has been a transisth.ian
.eans of
transportation and communication between the Pacific and the Atlantic
oceans. Even though the strategic value of the Panama Canal has dimin-
ished somewhat in the nuclear age, it remains a crucial link in military
and political terms. For some time in the XIX century, the isthmus of
Tehuantepec in Mexico was considered by the United States as an alter-
nate and cheap means of communication. Due to the prospect of satura-
tion in naval traffic of the Panama Canal, by February 1980 the Mexican
government was reported to have initiated work for the project Alfa-
Omega, with the objective of linking overland the ports of Coatzacoalcos
in the Gulf of Mexico, and Salina Cruz in the Pacific. Parallel to the
oil ducts that cross the isthmus, various types of cargo, including
American goods, are to be transported in "containers," i.e. large metal
and wooden boxes, through 300 kilom,eters of Mexican territory. The cost
of the investment is estimated to be around one billion pesos. These
works constitute a new factor in the closely connected U.S. and Mexican
commercial interests, and additionally, a new potential point of geo-
political contention.
Another matter pending resolution between the two nations pertains
to the jurisdictional boundary limits in the Gulf of Mexico and in the
Pacific. On May 4, 1978, the governments of the United States and
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re-
Mexico Signed a draft treaty which, according to U.S. geologists,
suited "in (the) giving away (of) some 25,000 square
.iles of potential
albeit deep-water, petroleum areas in the Gulf of Mexico." It appears
that the west-central part of the Gulf of Mexico is a geological region
promising in terms of petroleum deposits, lying between the oil fields
of the Texas-Lousiana coast, and those of the Campeche-Reforma region
in Mexico.S^ By September. 1980. faced with a petition from the U.S.
Petroleum Geologists Association, the U.S. State Department had post-
poned the ratification of the treaty. However, according to a spokes-
man of the State Department, new "negotiations could fail, since it is
very difficult to make the Mexicans change their way of thinking. "^^
Early in 1981, a study by the U.S. geological survey indicated
that the deeper areas of the Gulf of Mexico whose jurisdiction has not
been established yet could contain more than 9 billion barrels of oil
and more than 18 billion cubic feet of natural gas. It is expected
that new technology will be developed so that the oil industry may be
able to operate at depths in excess of 10,000 feet, where more than
75% of the potential wealth would be located. Geologist John Hunt,
from the Woods Hale Oceanographic Institution, has emphasized that the
Gulf of Mexico as a whole could be one of the three major areas in the
world in terms of oil potential (the other two would be Alaska and the
USSR), once exploration and drilling techniques develop further.
These facts could well explain the delay in the ratification of the
treaty on Maritime Boundaries with Mexico. In any case, by April,
1981, Mexico's Secretariat of Foreign Relations was still officially
awaiting the ratification by the U.S. government.
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But. by far. the .ain geopolitical issue that threatens to perturb
dangerously U.S.-Mexican relations is the situation in Central America
and the Caribbean. Mexico regards the area as a natural region for its
own co«rcial expansion and. albeit not officially acknowledged, polit-
ical influence. Furthermore. Mexico sympathizes with "liberation move-
ments" such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the present insurrec-
tion in El Salvador. Undoubtedly, petroleum wealth has given Mexican
foreign policy an added ingredient of self-assurance and dynamism. In
this respect, from Mexico's position, petroleum serves somewhat as an
equalizer in its dealings with the United States.
Mexico does not share the United States' apprehension with respect
to communism. This could be partly related to the fact that the Mexican
government traces itself back to a revolution. It is pertinent to re-
member that Mexico never broke relations with Cuba, and helped Allende's
regime in Chile until its overthrow in 1973. Likewise, the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua are viewed with admiration. Though officially denied.
Mexico is striving to be a source of leadership in the Caribbean Basin,
and to play a larger role. Conversely, it views with suspicion American
political, and military, overtures in the Caribbean and Central America.
Needless to say, present U.S. perceptions of the situation in
Central America and in the Caribbean, as well as its actual policies,
tend to clash with Mexico's. According to a December, 1979, report by
Radio Liberty Research. Mexico is the Soviet Union's ultimate target in
Central America, and present disturbances in the area could determine
a scenario quite dangerous for U.S. national interests and national
securi ty:
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th^'c^rihi^:^''''"
nibbling in Central America and
of constraining the flow of Mexican o? to't e U Sat a time when anti-American forces already exer-cise a potential stranglehold on the oil-richPersian Gulf. "89
Lewis A. Tambs sees as a backdrop of the situation a "grand geo-
political game plan" by the Soviet Union. According to this view, the
USSR would be applying the classical principles of geopolitics, i.e.
encircle, isolate, and overrun, to the Caribbean area, in order to in-
terrupt American access to strategic minerals and petroleum supplies.
In this context, "even the oil fields of Mexico are under long range
90
attack." On the other hand. Moscow dismisses the "Soviet threat" to
the Caribbean as a propaganda veil the United States uses to disguise
its attempt to control the world's hydrocarbon reserves.
In any case, the Reagan administration would seem to agree with
the need for greater U.S. efforts to counter radical influences in the
region. With Reagan's election in November, 1980, some political
observers foresaw a definite shift in the balance of forces in Central
America, towards the conservative side, as the United States intensified
its involvement in that convulsed region. By late January, 1981,
official spokesmen for the State Department were talking about the
Caribbean as the "third border" of the United States.
It was highly significant that one of the first foreign visitors
to Reagan's White House was Edward Seaga, Prime Minister from Jamaica,
who defeated leftist Michael Manley in that island's 1980 elections.
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g
and has been singled cut by the Reagan administration as a source of
hope for the beleaguered region. In regards to Nicaragua, by late
November. 1981. Secretary of State Alexander Haig pointed out that "the
horns are growing rather short" to prevent the Sandinista government
from turning their country into "a totalitarian state like Cuba." Hai
accused the Sandinistas of staging a huge military buildup through
Cuban assistance, and supporting the insurgents in El Salvador. White
House counselor Edwin Meese, as well as Haig. had not ruled out by late
1981 any particular action, such as a naval blockade, that might be
taken against Nicaragua.'^
A specific point of contention is Cuba, visited by Lopez Portillo
in 1980. and with which the Mexican government has increasingly identi-
fied itself. Since January. 1981, during his confirmation audiences
in the U.S. Senate, confronted by a question related to Mexico's pos-
sible defense of Cuba if that island were attacked by the United States,
Secretary of State Haig opted for avoiding any confrontation, and de-
clared his intention not to enter into a dispute with Lopez Portillo.
The issue remains a stum.bling block in U.S.
-Mexican relations, as the
Reagan administration sees Cuba as the main focus of terrorist activities
in the Caribbean area, and has threatened to resort to even military
action to stop Cuba's meddling.
Geopolitical contention between the United States and Mexico could
be fueled, additionally, by the apparent existence of substantial hydro-
carbon deposits in Bel ice, which obtained its independence from Great
Britain in September, 1981, and where Pemex is undertaking exploratory
works, together with other international oil companies. Additionally,
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the intended construction of an interoceanic petroduct through Guatemala
by an American petroleum consortium, as well as indications that there
are significant deposits of petroleum in the Peten region of Guatemala
could likewise fully incorporate that Central American country into U.S.
political-military schemes
.. .and create another source of friction with
Mexico.^''
There is no likelihood for an early agreement between the United
States and Mexico in regards to a mutually accepted modus Vivendi in
these various foci of potential geopolitical confrontation. As if to
emphasize his views on matters related to Central America and the
Caribbean, and in a comment obviously directed at the United States, in
March, 1981. President Lopez Portillo declared that "for Mexico the
danger does not reside in ideologies, but in intervention," and went
on to add that Mexico cannot stand by passively in regards to such in-
tervention in the Central American and Caribbean countries. Said the
Mexican President: "(Mexico) wants a rational alternative, and not an
hegemonic fate."^^
Mexico's official support for revolutionary movements in Central
America and the Caribbean would seem to have a domestic implication,
too: the insulation of Mexico from that very same turmoil. In other
words, Mexican foreign policy would respond to domestic political needs,
i.e. as long as it sides with the insurgents in countries such as
Nicaragua and El Salvador, Mexico would expect to retain domestic tran-
quility. However, this is not an all-encompassing explanation. There
is also an element of genuine revolutionary consciousness and tradition
permeating the actions of a government such as Mexico's, born of
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revolution. According to Washington analysts. Mexico believes in the
inexorable course of revolutions.^^ In other words, the Mexicans be-
lieve that their society is the result of a revolutionary process, such
as that under way in Central America at present.
Some American analysts perceive a missing element in the logic of
the Mexican position, determined by the breach between rhetoric and
socioeconomic reality, i.e. Mexico's own vulnerability to contemporary
revolutionary tendencies. Despite the wealth and multifaceted expecta-
tions to be derived from its energy resources, the potential for social
unrest remains high in Mexico, due to factors such as the precarious
distribution of income, and high birth rates. U.S. worries in regards
to Central American turmoil could be possibly explained, as much in
terms of Soviet-Cuban meddling, as in relation to a Mexican indulgency
apparently not quite justified by its domestic situation.
In this respect, Jeanne Kirkpatrick. U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations and one of the main Latin American experts in Reagan's adminis-
tration, has lumped Mexico together with the rest of the Caribbean and
Central American countries, as governments with various degrees of in-
stitutional vulnerability, and "vulnerable and dependent economies."
"All these countries," says Kirkpatrick. "find themselves in permanent
risk of revolutionary destabil ization.""^^^
In this context, the Mexican pluralistic model, seen by some Mexi-
can officials as an alternative between U.S. capitalism and Cuban
marxism, i.e. in Mexican terms "the institutionalized revolution."
might be a unique consequence of historical processes that cannot be
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repeated. In any case, it remains to be seen whether Mexico's
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activist foreign policy in Central America and the Caribbean
.ay be able
to induce Viable
.odels of government that emulate some of the charac-
teristics of the Mexican system.
Under certain conditions, the Mexican position could be undermined
by the meaning of Mexico's energy wealth to U.S. national security.
During a late 1980 visit to Mexico, Clyde Mark, Assistant to the Foreign
Affairs Division of the U.S. Congress, declared openly that if Mexico
were to critically limit its supply of oil to the United States, or if
this supply were subject to domestic and/or external threats, Washington
would likely send military forces to gain control of Mexican wells. If
such a military occupation were to take place, said Clyde, a subsequent
return of the wells to Mexico would be most unl ikely.^*^^^
Olga Pellicer has somewhat substantiated the previous assessment,
by suggesting that petroleum wealth, as well as Mexico's foreign policy
towards Central America and the Caribbean, presage a frank intervention-
ist tendency on the part of the United States over the Mexican State.
The reasons are plain to see, according to Pellicer:
"Independently of whether the Mexican project to-
ward Central America is aggressive or not,... the
fact is that its foreign policy has become an
obstacle to the advancement of the project spon-
sored by other countries in the Continent. "105
As a sequence to the previous situation, Joseph Hodara has delin-
eated three possible scenarios, related to Mexico's emergence as a
petroleum rich country. The first would be the "finlandization" of
Mexico, based on the overwhelming control of the means of information
and intelligence by the United States, which would result in an inter-
mittent diminution of Mexico's freedom of action. The second alterna-
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tive would be for Mexico to "selectively disentangle" itself progres-
sively from the strategic project of the United States. The third sce-
nario would be, simply, a frank, reasoned, and "technologically and in-
tellectually guided" process of negotiation between the two nations.
In any case, the path to either scenario seems to be, at present, tor-
tuous and fraught with potential convulsions.
Petroleum and Mpxico's Foreign Pnliry
The bases of Mexico's foreign policy. Petroleum policy is not, obvi-
ously, the equivalent to foreign policy. Mexico has a long tradition
with respect to certain principles of international conduct. Neverthe-
less, its new role as one of the world's leading oil-producing and ex-
porting countries is having a definite impact on Mexico's formulation
and implementation of its foreign policy. Specifically, petroleum
wealth is serving as the propelling factor for the apparent consolida-
tion of a more aggressive, self-assured role in international forums.
The "continuance and coherence in regard to principles and objectives"
of the basic lines of Mexico's foreign policy is ascertained in the
Global Plan for Development, 1980-1982. Mexico's foreign policy is
geared towards
"...preserving our sovereignty, strengthening our
independence vis a vis the rest of the world, prac-
ticing international solidarity, supporting domes-
tic efforts at development, and participating in
the conformation of a world order that guarantees
these objectives and allows the development of all
peoples in this same international sovereignty,
equality, security, and justice that we wish for
ourselves. "107
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Within this framework, some key principles can be clearly under
scored:
another, and the principle of self-dete?latIo^:'
°'
-The peaceful solution of controversies.
'I'llilZrrlr.Z::. ''^ °^ - ^^-^^ in mter.
-The legal equality of states.
-International cooperation. "^^^
Mexico has traditionally practiced a basically defensive foreign
policy. The reason for this attitude is to be found in historical
precedent
,
i.e. the proximity of the United States, which has tended
to neutralize Mexico's potential for an independent foreign policy.
According to Mario Ojeda. various interventionist experiences through-
out Mexican history, during the XIX and into the XX century, which re-
sulted in the loss of territory, temporary occupations of national ter-
ritory, and interference in Mexico's domestic affairs, have resulted in
"an attitude of repudiation to contacts with foreign nations and isola-
tionism, self-determination and non-intervention became the fundamental
concepts of Mexican foreign policy." These basic principles have also
been reflected in the Mexican objective of trying to avoid foreign dom-
ination as a fundamental requisite for domestic economic development. "^^^
Since the beginning of the 1940's, mutual understanding and cor-
diality in the relations between the United States and Mexico seemed to
substitute for the tensions and conflicts of the revolution and post-
revolutionary period in Mexico, which climaxed with the oil expropria-
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tion in 1938. There were obstacles, related to issues such as trade
and migration, but both countries, on the whole, tried to reduce their
frictions to a minimum. To the United States, Mexico became a trust-
worthy neighbor, with a predictable behavior. From the Mexican perspec-
tive, the postwar period of relations with the United States seems to
have been qualified by a feeling of "geographic fatalism,- springing
from the fact of a continuous border with the most powerful nation in
the world, from whose economic and political influence it was impossible
to escape. It was during this period that the concept of a "special
relationship" took hold of the imagination of leaders in both govern-
ments.
"^^^
By the mid-1960's. Mario Ojeda could perceive a gradual shift in
the conduction of Mexico's foreign policy, from the traditional passive,
defensive, and isolationist attitude, towards a more dynamic presence in
the international scenario. This change, which seemed to have started
during the Lopez Mateos administration (1958-1964), was a result, accord-
ing to Ojeda, of the maturity achieved by Mexico, on the basis of sus-
tained economic growth and political stability. As the capacity of
Mexico to resist foreign pressures was enhanced, there was also a grad-
ual subsidence of the fear from domestic subversive movements. In
conclusion, said Ojeda:
"...it could be stated that Mexico's foreign policy
is in a transition stage... from a passive, defensive
and isolationist attitude, Mexico is passing into a
more dynamic and internationalist phase in its for-
eign relations But this transition is taking
place gradually. The country seems to be proceeding
pragmatically, testing the possibilities of a new
international status. The general conclusion would
299
However, during Echevern'a's administration from 1970 to 1976.
Mexico did attempt to conduct an extremely active foreign policy, based
on a Third World activism that brought it into conflict with the United
States. Domestic difficulties and an adverse international economic
juncture turned the experiment into a failure. By the mid-1970's. some
Mexican analysts foresaw the imminence of a return to "bilateral ity"
vis a vis the United States, in Mexico's foreign relations, due to the
critical weakness of the country's economic-political system at the
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time. According to Ojeda, the effort to diminish unilateral depen-
dence on the United States had resulted, paradoxically, in a n-.uch more
dependent country, and a drastic weakening of the structural bases needed
to follow a more independent course in foreign policy matters. An-
other Mexican analyst, Eugenio Anguiano, while lamenting the frustrated
experience, suggested nonetheless its continuing viability:
"In the end, it would be very costly, in political
and economic terms, to abandon the reformist efforts
of the last two decades, only because of the need
to solve the short-term crisis. The Mexican state
has sufficient human and material elements, as to
continue to pursue multilateral relations, without
impairing bilateral relations (with the U.S.). "115
Indeed, Mexico would have these elements, mainly in the form of
petroleum resources. As early as February, 1977, during his first
official visit to the United States, President Lo^Dez Portillo confi-
dently declared that "Mexico is not bankrupt...! did not come to ask
116for help." Petroleum would come to be the crucial element in trying
to renew the search for a more independent Mexico, domestically and in
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regard to foreign relations. By late 1978. Ih^EcoaM could assert
that petroleu. „as bringing about a
"...fundamental change In the egul-
llbrlun, Of power In the Western hemisphere. It Is a sudden change so
big and new that neither the Carter administration nor Mexico itself
have understood it yet."^^^
The initial fiasco in the gasduct negotiations see.s to have marked
a turning point in the attitude of the Lopez Portillo administration to-
wards the united States. In any case, by 1978 rhetoric had hardened in
regards to the inevitable new relationship with the neighbor to the
North. In October of that year, expressing his awareness that neither
Mexico nor developing countries in general have the priority nor the
respect they deserve from industrialized nations. Lopez Portillo would
declare that, on the basis of Mexico's natural resources, there would
no longer be a "master-client relation" vis a vis the United States, but
an equal partnership. Petroleum, he would say during an interview
with CBS in February. 1979. "is for Mexico, not for the convenience of
the U.S.." And, again, at that time LcTpez Portillo criticized the
wheeling-dealing of the U.S. government as the main reason behind the
failure of the gas negotiations. Shortly after the 1980 presidential
elections in the United States, the Mexican President would emphatically
comment that "Mexico's destiny is above the political fluctuations in
120the United States." An appreciation somewhat arguable, though under-
standable in terms of domestic consumption.
Parallel to the previous pronouncements, Mexican analysts were
underlining the need for coordination between Mexico's petroleum and
foreign policies. Mexico's petroleum strategy, said Samuel Berkstein K.
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in .id.l980.
.ust be geared towards an Increment of three basic criteria
-
the evaluation of foreign policy: security, welfare, and prestige
The objective of such a strategy would be to project into international
relevance the political dimension of the petroleum policies of the
Mexican state. -^^^
By mid-1980, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, Jorge CastafTeda,
could state with visible pride that in ten years Mexico's presence
amidst the community of nations had enlarged appreciably. Mexico, said
Castaneda, maintains relations with 138 countries and has presented in
various international forums initiatives in favor of justice and peace.
In spite of new international pressures, especially in the case of pe-
troleum, and other limiting factors, Mexico's foreign policy is more
active, and has gained elements for negotiation that make it less depen-
dent on subjective appreciations such as sympathy and conveniences.
Specifically, in regards to relations with Washington, Castaneda
has attempted to tread a middle course, conciliatory to the United
States but at the same time definite about the objective of a greater
autonomy for Mexico. CastafTeda recognizes that "the principal element
of Mexico's foreign policy is the nature and degree of its relations
with the United States," because of obvious multiple causes, i.e. geog-
raphy, multiple exchanges, and the global im.portance of the United
States. This, says Castaneda, "cannot be denied by past problems or
historical experiences, it is simply a fact of life." Parallel to this,
however, Castaffeda underlines the idea that Mexico has abandoned the
"cautious and up to a degree defensive attitude" that tended to charac-
terize its foreign policy, and has begun to play an increasingly active
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role in International affairs. This constitutes a need 1n order to up-
hold traditional principles and to defend specific interests
In other words, the fact that relations with the United States are
the key component of Mexican foreign policy, does not
.ean a passive
acceptance by Mexico of political, economic, and cultural dependence
The United States, according to CastafTeda. is a "key element." an
-'i..
Portant factor." but not a "factotu." in Mexico's foreign policy. Thus,
for example, to Mexico economic diversification represents an essential
national goal, and not an action directed against the United States. ^24
In this context, petroleum constitutes an invaluable ally:
"...petroleum... must be seen not only as a simoleproduct to be sold at the going world price bSt
rather as something in such demand that an addi-
tional value could be affixed to it. This could
consist
-as it happens with other nations- of an
extra cash price. But in our case it has a much
more essential character. "125
U.S. and Mexican mutual expert^tinn. Mario Ojeda has correctly noted
that Mexico's strategic value for the United States increases in periods
of political crisis in the world and, particularly, in the Western Hemi-
sphere. The United States, says Ojeda, has usually
.recognized and accepted the need for Mexico to
dissent with North American policy in all that is
fundamental for Mexico, even though for the United
States it may be Important, but not fundamental.
In return, Mexico gives its cooperation in all that
is fundamental or even important for the United
States, and not so for Mexico. "126
Ongoing processes, in particular those in Central America and the
Caribbean, may be changing this set of perceptions, as Mexico emerges
as a "middle power," with a growing influence on the national and
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seen
international policies of the United States. Petroleu. would be
as the key factor in a scenario for U.S.-Mexican relations, qualified
by a .ainly technical and strategic perspective of matters by the United
States, in contraposition to a vision by Mexico according to national-
istic priorities and tested principles of international behavlor.^^^
Some U.S. analysts believe that Mexico's new assertive foreign policy
carries a number of ominous implications for the United States, espe-
cially in regards to the crisis in the Caribbean and Central America,
and the stage would seem to be set for a potential clash between the
contrasting interests of Mexico and the United States.
The Reagan administration perceives the crisis in Central America
and the Caribbean as an East-West confrontation. Thus, the socioeco-
nomic situation of the countries in the area must be subordinated to the
exigencies of the global U.S.
-Soviet conflict. From this appreciation,
American foreign policy should be geared, primarily, to contain Soviet-
Cuban expansionism through military assistance to friendly governments
such as that in El Salvador. There seems to be an urgency to prevent
the "domino effect," according to which revolutionary movements akin to
Cuba's would extend their field of action from Nicaragua to Mexico
itself. Indeed, by November, 1981, the Pentagon announced the formation
of a new U.S. military command for the Caribbean, whose area of respon-
sibility will include waters and islands of the Caribbean Sea. Gulf of
Mexico, and "portions of the Pacific Ocean bordering Central America."
Pentagon officials declared that the move "reflects the continuing U.S.
interest in the vital Caribbean area."-^^^
However, as the American mood towards the crisis in the Caribbean
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Basin turns increasinqlv aaarp<;cix/o ^Tiyiy ggress ve, the means to carry out a tougher
policy are not clearly discernible. Alfred Stepan has noted a deterio-
ration of the traditional instruments of U.S. foreign policy in the
area. For example. U.S. military assistance programs in Latin America,
which flourished during the 1950's. were by 1979 barely in effect any-
where in the region. Bilateral economic assistance to Latin America,
which under USAID programs played an important role in the 1960's. had
been discarded by the late 1970's by "middle income" countries such as
Brazil and Venezuela. U.S. military intervention faces significantly
greater obstacles in the 1980's than in previous decades. Stepan also
emphasizes the "domestic dimension" of U.S. policies towards Latin
America, i.e. the 17 to 22 million Hispanic Americans, largely Mexican
Americans, who are close to become the largest minority in the United
States, and are reaching for growing political power. Finally, there
is the fact of the emergence of new power centers in Latin America, of
which Mexico is possibly the most relevant due to its oil wealth, which
are bound to significantly shape American foreign policy in the re-
gion.l^^
Mexico is opposed to a reprise of U.S. reliance on military means
to achieve its objectives in Central America and the Caribbean. By
mid-November, 1981, President Lo'pez Portillo declared that it would be
a "gigantic error" for the United States to stage military actions
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against Nicaragua or Cuba. The Mexican government sees the crisis
in Central America in terms of a North-South dimension, i.e. develop-
ment. Socioeconomic conditions are primarily the cause for the up-
heaval and, thus, only a political and not a military solution is
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feasible. There 1s a difference of approach between the Mexican and the
An-erlcan positions,
.ore noticeable now that Mexico has come out of Its
Shell 1n foreign policy matters, simply, whereas U.S. policymakers be-
lieve that conservative, old-fashioned regimes would be more convenient
for Its Interests In Central America. Mexico seeks to strengthen Its
role as a regional power through the support of more progressive govern-
ments. ^
Nevertheless, both the Mexican and the U.S. governments realize
that they must work together. During the years of the Carter adminis-
tration, an important factor that led to a deterioration in the rela-
tions between the two countries was the subjective dimension of leader-
ship perception. Lopez Portillo and Carter were definitely incompatible
in character, and they developed a mutual anim.osity that was to be re-
flected at the wider level of bilateral relations. With the advent of
the Reagan administration, this personal equation of politics has im-
proved greatly. The personal chemistry between Lopez Portillo and
Reagan is, indeed, warm, and both leaders feel at ease with each other.
This fact is contributing to create a new, improved climate for negotia-
tions. The Mexican President, as previous Mexican leaders sensitive to
nationalistic motivations, believes that mutual respect and dignity must
pave the way for a better understanding. "The problems are the same,"
has said Lo''pez Portillo, "but the attitude toward them has changed radi-
cally, and this means that treatment of them is possible. ""^^"^ For his
part, Reagan is seeking to personally gain the sympathy of the Mexican
leaders, through personal charisma as well as through well geared
publicity.-^^^
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Fro. the American perspective. U.S. overtures towards Mexico
.ust
seen, somewhat as a component of a tug-of-war. WHereas Mexico 1s puUed
by US self.concept1on as part of Latin America, and as a developing
country
.e.ber of the Third World. I.e. the 'South." fundamentally In
agreement with the Non-aligned Movement, the Reagan administration be-
lieves that Mexico's ties with the United States and plain, basic geo-
politics are bound to solidify its identification with U.S. policies
and objectives.
An important element that would tend to score this latter reason-
ing is the role of Mexico's private sector in bilateral relations. The
Latin American policy of the Reagan administration, following the norm
of previous Republican governments, reflects a symbiosis between the
interests of the Public and Private Sectors in the United States. Ac-
cording to this appreciation, U.S. policy must be closely coordinated
with private American business interests in the region, and by extension
with the latter's liaison with Latin American private concerns.
Former Ambassador to Mexico Robert H. McBride has noted that the
relationship between Mexico's private sector and its U.S. counterpart
is thriving. According to McBride,
"...there seems to be a harmony of objectives and
an ability to work together on the part of U.S. and
Mexican industry and banking which are absent from
government-to-government relationships. The power-
ful business groups in Monterrey have been closely
associated with major U.S. corporations for most of
the post-World War II period, as have most of the
Mexico City business groups, the banking groups of
Banamex and Bancomer, and others. The intense desire
of the Mexican government to diversify its investments
sources in order to prevent 'dependence' on the U.S.
does not seem to be reflected in attitudes of the
private sector. "136
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Mexican analysts concur that, indeed, the Reagan administration is
Placing its trust on U.S. entrepreneurs to reach a better understanding
between the private sectors of both countries, which would be expected
to have a beneficial impact on governmental circles as well.^^^
McBride has underlined the special situation prevailing along the
border, which is bound to foster a growing association of interests from
both sides, stemming from factors such as trade, commerce, and the
Suiladora program.^^S
^^^.^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^.^.^^^
tion. there is the Agreement for the Exchange of Electric Energy signed
in May. 1980. as well as joint projects regarding agricultural transac-
tions. Olga Pellicer sees as the obvious attraction of these projects
for the United States "the possibility to transfer the political handling
of relations between the two countries from the federal government to
local governments. "^^^ According to Pellicer:
"This permits to find, on the Mexican side, inter-
locutors less reluctant to the open acceptance of
greater Mexican-U.S. ties. The lesser responsi-
bility of local political leaders in the mainte-
nance of a defensive and nationalistic ideology,
allows them to proceed, without great political
costs, on an openly friendly dialogue with their
American counterparts . "140
On a broader scale, the re-emergence of Mexico as an oil exporting
nation has underscored its economic bonds with the United States. Trade
between the two countries is soaring. By 1980, new investments had sur-
passed the billion dollar mark, up from $374 million in 1978. Projec-
tions for 1981 indicated that, only in the manufacturing sector, new
.S. investments would be well above the billion dollar mark, geared
nly towards the automobile industry. '^^^ In short, the economic
U
ma1
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panorama would not see. to bear bad presages for political relations
between the two nations.
In this context, U.S. expectations of Mexico's role in Central
America and the Caribbean would seem to be especially high in regard to
diffusing the politically explosive situation in the area. Curiously,
the Mexican government seems to willingly pursue this role. too. The
differences between the respective positions, of course, spring from the
degree of independence of Mexico's foreign policy, and the diverging
appreciations of issues by the two governments.
The previous proposition is not new. McBride has noted that in
earlier U.S. administrations the Department of State had envisaged a
greater Mexican presence in Latin American affairs. Specifically, it
was thought that Mexico could play a part in hemispheric "bridge-build-
ing," regarding the Central American region. ^"^^ niid-1981, the Mexican
government was apparently trying to carve a niche of its own for its
potential role as a "common communicator" in international relations. "^"^^
In reference to the view by the U.S. government of the situation in
Central America and Cuba, Mexico believes it can ultimately help to nar-
row the gap in perceptions and lessen misunderstandings. President
Lo^'pez Portillo maintains that
"...because we have open and frank relations, these
relations could be useful in communicating with two
parties that frequently do not communicate, provided
there is political goodwill to relax the area. "144
By November, 1981. during Secretary of State Haig's official visit
to Mexico City, Mexican officials reiterated their opposition to any
precipitate action by the United States against Nicaragua. Mexican
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Secretary of Foreign Relations, Oorge Castaneda, underscored that
-anti
interventionist" feeling was widespread throughout Latin America, and
added that "a sharp response (to Nicaragua) could be counterproductive "
However. Mexico was ready to act as a "communicator" in order to improve
relations between Washington and Managua.^^^ For its part, a spokesman
for the Department of State declared that the United States and Mexico
'...clearly do not have identical views but thevshare a co^on concern in the search for ways ofdealing with the problems of Nicaragua. "146
Petroleum as an instrumpnt of Mexico's foreiq n.^oiic^. The suddenness
with which Mexico has been catapulted into a prominent position as an
oil-producing and exporting country raises a num.ber of questions. There
is the suspicion that the "discovery" of the petroleum fields in the
southeast during the mid-197C's may have been merely the official an-
nouncement of a fact already known by the inner circle of top Mexican
government officials. One of the explanations for the secrecy would be
related to the fact that fonner President Echeverrfa. who apparently had
ambitions to become Secretary General of the United Nations, viewed the
announcement of the existence of huge oil deposits as indirectly harming
his candidacy with respect to OPEC countries, which might then have seen
Mexico as a relief source for oil imports by the United States and West-
ern Europe.
"^^^
On the other hand, former Pemex's Director Dfaz Serrano underlined
the technical difficulties which had to be overcome just for Pemex to
undertake drillings up to 5,000 meter deep in order to find the new
deposits. Only when these operations were possible could the finds be
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confl™ed.l« According to Information obtained by France's UHc^
the secrecy was maintained because Mexico wished to avoid an
011 consumption as In tbe Middle East countries, and to conserve Its
hydrocarbon resources."' m this respect. President Lopez PortlHc
declared In March. 1978. that Pemex's technicians had deliberately with-
held info^atlon pertaining to the new deposits, because of fear of
squander by Mexican pol Itlclans.
,t Is pertinent to re.ember that
the Mexican political system Itself tends to secrecy, and neuralgic
issues are not openly discussed. Additionally, an obvious reason for
the reluctance to divulge Information about oil reserves could have been
wariness of growing economic and political pressures by the United
States.
In any case, the economic crisis of 1976. and the subsequent need
to court external and internal confidence in Mexico's process of develop-
ment, led to a complete turnabout in the previous policy. The adminis-
tration of Lopez Portlllo aimed to augment and verify the claims concern-
ing Pemex's reserves.
In general terms, Mexican policy orientations are significantly
conditioned by U.S. strategy and, in certain cases, are a direct re-
sponse to that strategy. The actions by the Mexican government on the
issue of oil reserves illustrate this causal relationship. U.S. sources
were among the first to publicize the existence of sizable hydrocarbon
deposits in Mexico. Whereas by May, 1978, the Energy Commission of the
Mexican Congress had tried to disprove what it deemed to be an exagger-
ate estimate of Mexico's oil reserves by the CIA, in contradiction with
Pemex's lower figures, a year later Pemex's former Director Dfaz
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Serrano was busy disclaf.ing "a campaign 1n the United States to under-
estimate Mexico's petroleum reserves. ""^ By November, 1980, D<az
Serrano once again denied assertions by the U.S. Department of Energy
that questioned Pemex's figures.
The previous scenario serves as a background for the role of petro-
leum as an Instrument of Mexico's foreign policy. It Is a scenario
qualified by restraints, as well as by Increasing flexibility for Mexi-
can initiatives.
^^5a Pellicer has analyzed Mexico's foreign relations in
terms of two possible outcomes: interdependence with the United States,
or a national project of development. In the process of redefinition of
its foreign policy. Mexico faces a series of conditions set by the ex-
pansion of its petroleum industry, such as incoming pressures from the
United States, and the contrasting policies of domestic groups in regard
to the possibilities of further integration with the U.S.. or the pur-
suit of a national project. From the American perspective, interdepen-
dence would seem to be the most appropriate path. And here is found a
net source of conflict between the two countries, that springs from
nationalistic feelings commonly expressed in Mexico through an anti-
American attitude. Nationalism remains, indeed, the most powerful
political ideology in Mexico, closely tied to the fortunes of the petro-
leum industry.
But the search for a nationalistic course of action in Mexican for-
eign relations must take into account a series of structural limiting
factors. Jorge Domiliguez has aptly referred to a "triple dependency"
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that constrains Mexico's overtures:
"Considerable continuities are shown in the international implications of Mexican internal affair^
re" e^^clanv1i%H""'^""'^^'?^
in econo^^c""uc-Lu , specially in the economy's general vulnprability and in its links to the U.s:.!'?here hasalso been a deepening of a triple d^o^ndency wellbeyond historical standards. Mexico relies in!
ZrfVlf^ °" ^ single fam " o? pro-
? Lrn Jionaf'''°"^^^ °" ? Single country for i sInternat economic relations (the United States)
?or such rlulT'' """^r "^'^^'^ " X COT elations.... The autonomy of foreign oolicv
consequentlydeclines. To an unparalleled degree
ne'eds'\nd'nn'" ''''' '^'''^
'^ Economic
mncrK ^"^^"^onTeconomic foreign policy objectivesmu t be subordinated to serve them.
. .^The moreMexico relies on petroleum exports to meet its in-ternal economic needs, the more important it will
coiitries '
"'^
In sum, says Domi'nguez, "the deepening of Mexico's triple dependency has
constrained the independence of the Mexican government in the conduct of
foreign policy."^^^
The constraints on petroleum as an instrument of Mexico's foreign
policy are well illustrated by the convulsions of the industry during
mid-1981, as a result of the worldwide oil glut. There events had cru-
cial domestic, as well as external, repercussions.
By late 1980, Pemex was actively embanked on a course of increasing
levels of oil exports, and higher sales prices. In December of that
year, Pemex raised prices for its exports even above the levels than
prevalent in most OPEC countries. At that time, the crude denominated
"Istmo" was selling at a price of $38.30 per barrel, and the "Maya"
crude at $34.50 per barrel. Most of the Mexican reserves correspond
to these two types of oil: "Istmo," which is a light crude of 34°
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157API and 1.8% sulfur content; and "Mara." a heavier crude of 23° API
and 3.42. sulfur content. Increasingly. Mexican exports correspond
.ore
to the "Maya" crude, extracted mostly from the Gulf of Campeche.l=8
Likewise. Pemex was successfully continuing Its policy of markets diver-
siflcaticn. By January. 1981. Pemex exported, or had plans to export
oil to nineteen countries . '^^^
By April, 1981. the international petroleum market was feeling the
impact of lower levels of demand, and a growing surplus in supply. The
big Western importers had been successful in reducing consumption, at
the same time that Saudi Arabia raised its production in order to pres-
sure other OPEC countries to agree to a common price level. These fac-
tors contributed to force OPEC to tentatively cut production down by
some 2.5 million b/d. a measure that had no appreciable effect on world
prices.
Starting in May, 1981, the previous situation unleashed in Mexico
in rapid succession, a series of events which were to demonstrate the
degree of vulnerability of Mexico's economy and polity to international
market forces. By late May. Pemex announced that it would not alter its
program of production and exports, nor its price structure, in spite of
OPEC's decision to reduce output. Shortly afterwards, by early June,
Pemex Director Dfaz Serrano had reconsidered the matter, and acknowl-
edged the need for Pemex to lower prices in order to retain its cli-
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ents. At the time, the Secretariat of the Treasury estimated that
Mexico would have to contract an additional external debt for $1,200
million, to compensate for lost reserves. '^^"^ The reduction in prices,
of $4 per barrel, was expected to bring about a loss of m.ore than
14
60 billion pesos for 1981. 1„ relation to previously estimated reserves
By early June, exports were already down to 1.4 million b/d. 560.000
"Istmo" and the rest "Maya."^^^
The decision to lower prices, albeit perhaps unavoidable from an
economic standpoint, was politically explosive. On June 6. 1981, D<az
Serrano presented his resignation as Director of Pemex. The decrease
in prices had not been, apparently, unanimously approved by the Economic
Cabinet. Behind the dismissal of Diaz Serrano loomed the fact of Pemex's
independent course of action vis a vis other Secretariats and the con-
tinuing debate over production levels. The pursuance of bureaucratic
autonomy and an ever-increasing petroleum output ultimately cost ofaz
Serrano his post.^^^ commenting retrospectively on the episode. Presi-
dent Lo'pez Portillo would express his belief that "a precipitate action
reduced the exports price of our crude, with a chain reaction over the
world's oil market. "^^^
By mid-June, 1981. the Mexican President was attempting to restore
stability to the petroleum industry, by declaring that the production
goals would be kept, as delineated in the Energy Program, and that the
sudden drop in prices would be corrected. secretary of Patrimony
and Industrial Development, Jose Andres de Oteyza, reiterated the objec-
tive of revaluating the price of crude oil, even if it meant a "depura-
tion" of Pemex's list of clients. "^^^
The new Pemex Director, former Secretary of the Treasury Julio
Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid, was soon to realize the difficulties of trying to
manage a product such as petroleum, subject to the fluctuations of the
international market, according to considerations of national interest.
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Moctezuma Cid proceeded to prepare a program to overcome the crisis the
proposals included: to undertake a more dynamic and flexible con^ercial
ization policy in the international market, in order to obtain more fa-
vorable prices and sales conditions; to uphold the production goals in
the Energy Program; and to achieve a greater coordination between pro-
duction, commercialization, infrastructure, and operation of facilities.
By late June, 1981, Pemex announced it intended to raise prices
back to their former level, and that the possibility of reducing exports
was under consideration. ^70 On July 1. as a result of "difficult nego-
tiations" with its clients, and as a step in recuperating from the eco-
nomic effects of the drop in revenues, Pemex proceeded to increase its
prices by $2 per barrel of oil."^^^
The attempts by Pemex to raise prices resulted in a series of can-
cellations of purchases by a number of clients. The French Petroleum
Company, which had been buying 100,000 b/d from Mexico, notified Pemex
that it would reduce its purchases by half.^''^ Companies from other
countries, i.e. United States, the Philippines, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and
India, also cancelled orders, bringing the total of lost sales up to
310,000 b/d by late June. This meant financial losses of 230 million
173pesos daily for Pemex. By early July, the previous cancellations had
become official. These included four U.S. petroleum companies: Exxon,
Ashland Oil, Charter Oil, and Clark Oil and Refining Co. Lost sales
continued to mount, to 550,000 b/d.^^^
Parallel to the previous developments, on July 1, in San Francisco,
Pemex signed an agreement with 82 banks from eleven countries, in order
to obtain credits for $4 billion, the highest amount ever contracted by
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any country for a single operation. The Bank of America was to be the
agent and twenty other banks, including seven from Japan, would admin-
ister the operation. The Japanese banks were to contribute $1,200
million, thirty U.S. banks were responsible for $1,500 to $1,600 million,
and 28 European banks would account for the remainder. Pemex officials
declared that the loan was a transitory measure, while payments for
exported oil arrived. Likewise, part of the credits was to be destined
to acquire additional exploration and drilling equipment.
According to Alicia Girdn. in a study for the Economic Research
Institute of Mexico's National University, by early July 1981, Pemex's
foreign debt amounted to more than $13 billion. Between 1970 and early
1979. Pemex's debt increased from $438.6 million to $6,213 billion.
Shortly before the record $4 billion credit operation, the total had
surpassed the $9 billion mark."^'^^
Faced with the possibility of financial disaster, the Mexican gov-
ernment retaliated against France, which had been purchasing 100,000 b/d
of oil from Mexico since February. 1979. By early July, 1981. the French
Petroleum Company communicated to Pemex its intention to cancel purchases
altogether for the rest of the year. Apparently, the French were ap-
plying one of the clauses of the contractual agreement with Pemex, which
allowed any of the two parties to suspend operations for a trimester, if
disagreements developed over price levels. '^'^^ In any case, on July 4,
1981, the Mexican government proceeded not only to suspend the petroleum
deal, but to eliminate all French companies from participation in Mexico's
projects of national development, as a reaction against France's cancel
-
178
lation of oil purchases.
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Nevertheless, negotiations between Pen,ex and the French Petrol eu.
Company were resumed shortly afterwards, with the personal intervention
Of President Francois Mitterand. who stated that it was essential for
France to deepen relations with Mexico.^" By
.id-Ouly. both sides had
announced that the oil contract regained in effect, and that France
would continue to buy Mexican crude, pending further negotiations.
In the end. the episodes of raid-1981 demonstrated to the Mexican
government the high volatility and unpredictability of the international
petroleum market, and the corresponding obstacles to relying on petro-
leum for domestic development and activism in foreign policy matters.
The storm subsided as quickly as it had arrived. By early August. 1981.
Pemex was able to announce that it had recovered its petroleum market.
Sales were up to 1.250 million b/d, at an average price of $31.25 per
barrel. This latter figure was the combination of sales prices of $34
for "Istmo" crude, and $28.50 for "Maya" crude. Pemex's production
schemes were geared to a 50% mixture of each of these two basic types
of oil.
Total sales for 1981 were expected to amount to more than $15
billion, i.e. an increment of up to 50%, over the 1980 income of $10.4
billion. In retrospect, events resembled a cycle, from euphoria to
• 19,9deception back to euphoria. °^ As a result of OPEC's new price struc-
ture agreed upon by November, 1981. Mexico raised the price of its
light "Istmo" crude by $1, to $35 per barrel, and held the price of its
heavy "Maya" crude steady at $28.50.-^^^ By September, 1981. President
Lopez Portillo could speak of the drop in prices as a "transitory phe-
184
nomenon."
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Nevertheless, the Mexican government remains wary of potential
future developments. There has been a proportionally quicker Incre-
™nt of production and reserves of heavy "Maya" oil. especially fro. the
wells off the Gulf of Campeche. over the lighter "Istmo" crude from
Tabasco and Chiapas.185 ^his fact could strain the flexibility of re-
fining facilities in customer countries, which might be an obstacle to
growing Mexican petroleum exports, under soft International market con-
ditions.
In his annual report, President Upez Portillo summarized Mexico's
tentative initial steps in the world of the big oil exporters:
"The expectations raised by petroleum and our suddenpresence in the world of its conflicts, took us by
surprise, and we do not yet fully understand its
meaning. We graciously accepted the upwards price
movements, and at the first downwards change became
discouraged and bitter this resource (well)...
gave us the opportunity for progress if we know 'how
to administer its abundance; if we organize work. "186
The selection of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado as the PRI candidate
for the 1982 Presidential elections would seem to indicate that Mexico
will slowly but steadily increase petroleum production and exports,
albeit attentive to the need for planning and efficiency in the midst
of uncertain international market conditions for the rest of the decade.
Conversely, market realities are bound to act as a constraint to the
determination of the Mexican government to continue utilizing petroleum
as a key lever to spur domestic development and to substantiate the
projection of Mexico's foreign policy objectives.
Mexican initiatives
. In spite of the built-in constraints, petroleum
constitutes a formidable element in policy formulation and implementation.
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Based on its petroleum wealth, Mexico has embarked upon a highly ambi-
tious course in its foreign policy, which has both points of continuity
and contrast in regard to previous stances.
According to Olga Pellicer, the foreign policy project of the
Lopez Portillo administration has followed three basic directions,
clearly manifest since 1980: in the first place, towards a diversifica-
tion of its foreign relations, both economic and political, on the basis
of the negotiating power afforded by petroleum; secondly, a somewhat
more discreet solidarity with "Third World" positions, parallel to a
selective strengthening of relations with key countries in terms of re-
gional influence and prestige, such as Sweden, Canada. Brazil, and India,
and a more solid presence in international forums such as the U.N. Secu-
rity Council, where Mexico accepted a post after 30 years of declining
participation there; and thirdly, contrasting with the pragmatism of the
two previous lines, support for ideological pluralism and a maintenance
of the commitment to its revolutionary origins, through its support of
revolutionary regimes such as those in Cuba, Nicaragua. Thus, says
Pellicer, there is a mixture of pragmatism and revolutionary tradition in
Mexico's foreign policy, with petroleum as the basic pillar for its ac-
tions.
Officially, Mexico has denied any attempts at exerting a subregional,
or Latin American leadership, but this seems to be an impending role.
Mexican analysts abound in the concept of a "sleeping giant," to describe
Mexico's leadership potential . "^^^ According to Edwin Deagle, from the
Rockefeller Foundation, the Reagan administration must recognize the
status of Mexico as an "emerging leader. "^^^ The President of Costa
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R1ca. Rodrigo Carazo, has openly acknowledged that Mexico exerts "in a
certain way a leadership role In Central America, at the tl^e econo.1.
This leadership, or at least the potential for it, is demonstrated
by a series of actions on the part of the Mexican government, that con-
fir, the efforts to delineate a .ore assertive foreign policy. In regard
to the objective of economic diversification, the achievements would
seem to be substantial. In 1976, Mexico sold all its hydrocarbon exports
to the United States. By January, 1981, Pemex was exporting oil to
eleven countries, and had plans to extend the list to eight more.^^^ By
July, 1981, the following were the most important Pemex 's clients, with
their respective levels of purchases: the United States, with 658,000 b/d;
Spain, 198,000 b/d; Japan, 100,000 b/d; France, 100,000 b/d; Israel and
Brazil, 60,000 b/d each; Canada and Sweden, 50,000 b/d each; Great Bri-
tain. 30,000 b/d; the Philippines. 10.000 b/d; and Yugoslavia. 6,000 b/d.^^^
Some additional factors illustrate the attempts to diversify exports
markets and operations. By January. 1981, Pemex announced that it had
acquired a total of 34.29% of the stock of the Spanish refining company
Petronor, with facilities in Bilbao. Spain. This action not only
strengthened Pemex's operations in Spain, but also gave it a firm vantage
point to consolidate and expand its European operations .'^^^
By November, 1980, President-elect Reagan invited Pemex to establish
itself in U.S. territory, and to compete with its products in the Ameri-
194
can market. The Mexican government received the proposal in a "posi-
tive way," and Pemex announced that Mexico would commercialize its gaso-
line and petrochemicals in the United States through independent producers
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rather than through the big U.S. refineries.l^^ 3^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
had plans to establish plants of its own to distribute gasoline and
diesel fuel in California, Arizona and Texas. These operations were
expected to compensate for the problem caused to Pemex by the fact that
up to 40% of the total volume of gas and diesel it sends to the Mexican
northern states, along the border with the United States, is acquired
by American citizens who cross the border. -^^^
An area in Pemex's expansion plans that has resulted in misunder-
standing with the U.S. government is that related to dealings with
Cuba. In 1978, during his visit to the Soviet Union. President Lo'pez
Portillo raised the proposal for a triangular oil supplying agreement,
through which the Soviet Union would supply petroleum to a Mexican
client, Spain, while Mexico would supply it to Cuba. By May. 1980. the
idea had been discarded, dur to the fact that Cuba would have to pay
substantially higher prices, since the Soviet Union sells oil to that
island at discount prices. '^^^
However, Mexican cooperation with Cuba has continued. By December,
1980, Pemex announced that through a protocol on cooperation agreed upon
by both countries. Mexican technicians would explore Cuba's sea platform
198in search for oil. In February. 1981. the Chicago Tribune published
news in regard to a "secret agreement" between Mexico and Cuba, through
which the former would supply Castro's regime with petroleum machinery
manufactured in third countries. -^^^ Pemex emphatically denied this
version.
President Lo'pez Portillo has acknowledged that disagreements be-
tween Mexico and the United States possibly lie in the diverging orien-
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tation towards certain critical countries in Central American and the
Caribbean, such as Cuba and Nicaragua. But the Mexican President be-
lieves that
f?h^i'?''.
friendship with Cuba is not a condition(t at interferes with friendship between Mexico
and the United States. The United Stages has
rnendships with many countries of the left withpractically all of them except Cuba, wh ch m^ke
one suppose that there are very special reasonstor It. and not ideological ones... But Cuba and
tu^y'^"20r^
""^'^^"^ sixteenth cen-
However, increased cooperation on petroleum and general matters between
Mexico and Cuba is bound to underline U.S.
-Mexican differences over
approaches to the problems of the Caribbean and Central American region.
The Mexican government has repeatedly underscored its vital in-
terest in the Caribbean and Central America. By February, 1981, the
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, Jorge Castaffeda, in a specially
arranged meeting with the Mexican ambassadors to the countries in that
region, emphasized the "maximum priority" accorded by Mexico to the
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situation there. In regard to the mid-July, 1981, Nassau meeting be-
tween the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, the United States, Venezuela, and
Canada, to define programs of cooperation for the development of Central
America and the Caribbean, the Mexican government strongly made the
point that any form of assistance must be free of political and/or mili-
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tary components.
The Mexican position is particularly forceful in the case of El
Salvador, where Mexico is trying to promote a political solution among
the warning factions. Late in August, 1981, the Mexican and French gov-
ernments issued a joint statement recognizing the Salvadoran rebels as
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[so
)re
a representative political force" the French-Mexican declaration al
called for a restructuring of the armed forces in El Salvador befo
the scheduled 1982 elections are held, and raised the possibility of
bringing the issue of the civil war In that country to the United Natior
Security Council.
The U.S. government expressed anger and indignation at the French-
Mexican initiative. Likewise, several Latin American nations reacted
unfavorably. By early September, 1981, Argentina, Columbia, and Vene-
zuela issued a statement supporting the government of Jose Napoledn
Duarte in El Salvador, and criticizing Mexico and France for interfering
in that country's internal affairs. The previous action raised the
possibility of an attempt to diplomatically isolate Mexico, if the
Mexican government were to harden its position in the matter.
In his annual report of September, 1981. President Lopez Portillo
reiterated his government's support for Cuba, Nicaragua, and the leftist
insurgents in El Salvador, in the following terms:
"...during the last year we have centered our action
on the nearest area, geographically and politically,
to our own essence: Central America and the Caribbean
holding high the banner of nonintervention. We have,
on repeated occasions, made clear publicly, privately
and in many ways, our disagreement and opposition to
all types of interference in the area, especially by
the superpowers By further tightening the links
of friendship and cooperation that bind us with the
revolutions of Cuba and Nicaragua, we have under-
scored Mexico's attachment to the political principle
of the free determination of peoples. . .because of
sympathy and affinity with the essence of their strug-
gle-social justice-(Mexico) has helped them and will
continue to do so. "206
A key component of Mexico's foreign policy is the Energy Coopera-
tion Program for Central America and the Caribbean, i.e. the San Jose
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Pact, created by Mexico and Venezuela in August. 1980. The program
provides approximately 160.000 b/d of oil to nine countries, at 70%
Of the going market rate, and the rest payable through long-term, low-
interest loans.207
^^^^^^^^^ ^ .^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^
011 terms for developing countries represents a solid step "in the con-
struction of a new economic order not dominated by the superpowers,
riexico^also intended to set an example for Venezuela's fellow CPEC mem-
bers. I, ^,g^3^^ ^53^^ ^^^.^^ yenezue^. renewed the accord for
another year. At that time the countries benefiting from the program
were: Barbados. Costa Rica. El Salvador. Guatemala, Honduras. Jamaica,
Nicaragua. Panama, and Dominican Republic. Savings for these countries
represented a total of one billion pesos per year.^^^
The San Jose' Pact must be inscribed within the context of Mexico's
strategy to promote a global energy agreement. On September 27, 1979
in his address to the United Nations. President Lopez Portillo unveiled
a nine-point World Energy Plan, which would guarantee the sovereignity
the participating states and create an agency to finance the energy
needs of hard-pressed developing countries
. The objective of the
Plan would be "to insure an orderly, progressive, integral, and just
transition between two epochs of humanity," i.e. the era of petroleum
and that which will be based on new energy sources.
This proposal followed the international objectives of former Pres-
ident Echeverrfa's "New Economic Order," based on more equal and just
economic exchanges between developed nations and "Third World" countries,
which Mexico has tried to promote through its sponsorship of the "Char-
ter of Rights and Duties of the States." In November, 1979, 113 devel-
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oping countries (the Group of 77), presented in the United Nations a
project for international economic cooperation that included the World
Energy Plan as a medullar part. Industrial nations accepted the proj-
ect as an adequate framework for negotiations .^^^
In September, 1980, the United Nations proclaimed a new interna-
tional strategy for development during the 1980's, which included a
restructuring of the global energy market, on the basis of the Mexican
World Energy Plan.^^^ However, opposition to the Plan developed from
some OPEC's members such as Algeria, since it could diminish the bar-
gaining power of petroleum vis a vis the industrial nations. Mexican
initiatives in the field of energy have included regional schemes as
well. By early April, 1981. the Mexican and Venezuelan governments
proposed the formation of a Latin American Multinational Petroleum
Enterprise, which would refine and distribute all the crude contributed
by both countries, according to the terms of the San Jose Pact.^^^
Since late 1980, the Canadian government has expressed its interest in
participating in the Mexican-Venezuelan petroleum cooperation programs
towards Central America and the Caribbean.
By mid 1980, as a result of President Lo^pez Portillo's visit to
Brazil, commentators in both nations believed that the energy crisis and
Mexico's willingness to cooperate with Brazil, were likely to bring a
complete turnabout of previously coldrdations between "the two most
developed Latin American countries," in what could be on a long range
basis "the most important step taken in the last years towards Latin
217
American integration." In October, 1981, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela
officially announced the signing of a joint agreement on Latin American
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potential oil extraction and exploration projects. This trilateral
effort is designed to promote schemes of technical and financial assis-
tance to Western hemispheric countries. The accord is to be carried
out through the participation of Pemex. the Brazilian Petroleum Corp.
(Petrobras), and Venezuelan Petroleum, Inc. (PDVSA).^^^
A tour d'horizon of Mexican initiatives must include the Interna-
tional Meeting on Cooperation and Development, informally known as the
North-South Conference, which took place at Cancun, Mexico, on October
22 and 23, 1981. Under the sponsorship of the Mexican and Austrian
governments, leaders of eight industrialized and fourteen developing
nations met to discuss international problems related to issues of
food, energy, trade, and finance. "Third World" countries would like
to obtain more favorable terms of trade, a stronger voice in the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and in general better bargain-
pi q
ing conditions.
The position of the United States on these issues, as expressed by
President Reagan at Cancun, relies on free trade and free enterprise
as the key to development. Reagan emphasized that discussions must re-
main within the framework of international agencies, contrary to the
wish of delegates from developing countries of consolidating the debates
into a single forum, ideally the United Nations General Assembly. By
contrast. President Lo^'pez Portillo stressed the need to move towards a
transfer of resources from the North to the South, and to establish guar-
221
anteed prices for raw materials and easier access to finance.
Specifically, one of the demands of developing nations, their eco-
nomics strapped by the high cost of imported oil, refers to the estab-
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lishment of an energy agency connected to the World Bank, with a $30
billion fund to promote exploration and development of energy resources.
Mexico strongly supports this scheme. At the end of the conference,
spokesman reported a "near consensus" in favor of the creation of the
energy affiliate. However, the Reagan administration opposes this
idea, emphasizing rather the efforts by private enterprise.
In the end, even though no specific agreements were reached con-
cerning energy, nor in regard to food distribution, financing and
trade, the conference was unanimously hailed as constructive and posi-
tive. The presence of President Reagan at Cancdn pleased and encouraged
Third World delegates, and a vague compromise appeared to develop, as
well as the apparent decision to meet again in the future. As host to
the meeting, Mexico reaped very definite diplomatic rewards. Presi-
dent Ld'pez Portillo, in September, 1981, referred to the North-South
Conference at Cancur as
"the most important international action attempted
by Mexico during the last year, and that which best
reveals the active and dynamic character of its
realistic policy to influence events and not only
to invoke principl es . "224
Mexican policies and increasingly important not only in regard to
North-South, but also South-South relations. This is clearly illus-
trated by Mexico's stand vis a vis the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries. There are several points worth mentioning here.
Pemex has considered OPEC's prices as the basic reference for adjust-
ments in its price and exports levels. In this respect, the presence
of Mexico in the international petroleum market could be argued to rep-
resent a stabilizing factor, as long as Mexico follows a policy consonant
with that of OPEC.^^^
On the other hand, Pemex's growing exports since the mid 1970's
have tended to diminish the bargaining strength of OPEC. Mexico has
refrained from selling its oil in the "spot" market, where i«diate
delivery schemes determine prices according to the supply and demand of
crude outside official national and international controls. However,
by July, 1981, the OPEC Bulletin, the official publication of that or-
ganization, was denouncing that Pemex was, in fact, selling "Istmo"
crude directly to companies and governments, in Notterdam, London, and
New Y) rk. The "spot" market is anathema to OPEC since it lessens that
organization's control over the market. Pemex insists that it only
sells petroleum through bilateral accords, and that no significant
volumes of Mexican oil have been detected in the "spot" markets.
Some Mexican analysts argue that Mexico should join OPEC, as a
measure of solidarity with "Third World" countries, and in order to
strengthen the position of that organization in other questions such as
international trade and financing. However, while indirectly support-
ing the price-levels set by OPEC, the Mexican government has no plans
to enter that organization. The reasons for this attitude are to be
found in the traditional Mexican policy of self-reliance and independence
in foreign matters. Furthermore, in the past Mexico has publicly crit-
icized the "oligopoly commercialization practices" prevailing in OPEC,
especially as these have adversely affected development programs in poor
229
countries. It is not likely that there will be any variations in
Mexico's policy of remaining outside OPEC.
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Mexico is delineating a coherent connection between its regional
and global policies. In September, 1981. President Lopez Portillo ex-
plained the reasons for Mexico's greater attention to international
relations:
"...(there is) the clear conscience of an activeinteraction between domestic and international
affairs Much of what occurs in the rest of the
world affects us decisively, and a great part of
the principal solutions to our problems lies
outside. "230
In his Annual report. President Lopez Portillo underscored Mexico'
opposition to "a new and unacceptable bipolarity." based on a huge weap-
ons buildup by the super-powers. Likewise, he lamented the apparent
demise of the Salt II treaty as a return to "Cold War" conditions, and
singled out the ominous neutron bomb as an added threat to mankind. In
regard to Mexico's traditional support for non-intervention, the Mexican
President demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan
and Cambodia, and a peaceful resolution of the Middle East crisis, ac-
cording to United Nations resolutions. He also expressed the support
by the Mexican government of the independence of Bel ice, which Guatemala
does not recognize as a sovereign state, and the censure of South Africa'
occupation of Namibia and its apanther'd policies.
As Mexico pushes on with a more vigorous foreign policy, it would
appear that growing differences with Washington might undermine U.S. -Mex-
ican relations Mexican stands on certain worldwide issues and regional
pop
questions are at odds with those of the Reagan administration. The
Mexican government has made friendly gestures towards the Soviet Union
which, according to some American observers, means that "Mexico is more
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fearful of the United States." due to geographical proximity.233 j^e
Mexican position on Central America has echoed in NATO, as several
European allies of the United States, i.e. Greece, Denmark and the Nether-
lands, have supported the French-Mexican resolution urging the ruling
junta in El Salvador to negotiate with the guerrilla forces there. ^^4
However, visible areas of dispute may obscure the underlying fact
that, ultimately, both the United States and Mexico share views on the
need for political stability as the basis for peaceful development. In
this regard. President Lopez Portillo has expressed that,
"the relations between Mexico and the United
States must transcend their traditional mold
and look for shared criteria and solutions. "235
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CHAPTER VIII
PERSPECTIVES
Forces a t Work in Mexican Developmpnt
By the early part of the 1980's, Mexico's process of develo
ment appears to have reached a crucial juncture, propelled to a
great extent by its petroleum resources. A number of factors
qualify the situation.
It Is clear by now that Mexico has substantial oil and
natural gas reserves, which guarantee for the short and medium
ranges a steady expansion of its petroleum industry. This fact
represents a wide flexibility for governmental policy, in regard
to both the rate and modalities of production of hydrocarbons,
and the overall process of development. Conversely, petroleum
exploitation is having a strong impact on development, which
remains unbalanced, and its fruits unevenly distributed.
Furthermore, the exports sector of the Mexican economy relies
overwhelmingly on petroleum and its derived products, with the
subsequent inflationary effects on the domestic market, and
the danger of "petrol ization" of the economy.
Mexico remains today a dependent society, in economic,
social, and cultural terms, with its corresponding political
implications. This dependency takes place primarily vis a vis
the United States. However, Mexico has also achieved by now
a significant degree of national integration. Nationalism is
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the most powerful political force 1n Mexico. Historically, petrol
has been a rallying point of Mexican nationalistic elan, and is likely
to persist. Thus, paradoxically, a consolidation of dependency,
linked to petroleum exploitation, would exacerbate nationalism.
The Mexican State, obviously, is bound to play a critical role in
such a scenario, both as a promoter of, and benefactor from
nationalism.
Mexican nationalism is reinforce by the perception of a U.S.
official approach that borders on ethnocentrism. American official
and academic circles still, and inexcusably, tend too often to see
Mexico as just an extension of the American model of development.
This is, clearly, a biased perspective that does not engender good
will among Mexican decision-makers and public opinion in general.
There is a need to approach Mexico, and Mexican domestic and foreign
policy, on their own terms, for what the country is intrinsically
as a society and a polity.
Likewise, the imperative and momentum of economic growth can not
explain everything in Mexico. Due partly to that same economic growth,
stability and orderly change are being constantly challenged by social
and political tensions. Ideology, for example, whether in substance
or just rhetorically, plays a wider role in Mexico than in the United
States. All these factors, nationalism, dependency, social and
political forces at work towards greater participation, ideology,
must be taken into account in order to better understand Mexico as
a nation, the import of its petroleum resources, and the shape of its
foreign and domestic policy.
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Most important, it is crucial to recognize that solutions to
these problems must originate starting from Mexico's own reality,
from its historical and societal processes. In this context,
dependency represents a source of stress and tension for the system,
since it undermines the very basis of the nationalism which glues
together Mexican society. Mexico's stability and orderly develop-
ment are directly related to whether its political system can overcome
the gnawings of domestic and international flux, and whether it can
be flexible enough to accomodate new groups and sectors of the
population into an "inclusionary" scheme. One of the keys to the
viability of the system will be the degree of success in achieving
a more just distribution of income during the 1980' s.
The possibility of greater equilibrium for the Mexican system
is directly bound to the facts of dependency. To the degree that
dependency increases, tensions are likely to mount, too, out of a
basic discord between external influences and Mexico's unique
characteristics. The project of the Mexican State is geared to
achieving the stability of the polity under conditions of rapid
development, and a peaceful adjustment among its component groups.
An abatement of dependency would give the Mexican government more
maneuvering room in the charting of an appropriate and more equitable
course of development. In this context, the resources from hydro-
carbon exploitation may propitiate a more acceptable level of
economic and political autonomy. However, this objective emerges
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wUhin a narrowing historical margin of action, the result of a
confluence of domestic and global trends, and the scenario for a
reappraisal of U.S.
-Mexican relations.
Prospects for U.S.
-Mexico relations
There appears to be an overriding tendency in the United States
to equate increased Mexican oil production with closer U.S.
-Mexican
relations, and a healthier process of development in Mexico. This
view, widely spread among officials as well as academic circles,
is highly simplistic, and misses the general, complex dimension
of the problem.
Representative of this position is Richard B. Mancke. Mancke
argues that rising oil production and exports by Mexico would imply
benefits for the United States in strategic, economic and
environmental terms. Additionally, a deeper reliance on expanding
Mexican oil and gas production would mean that the United States
could postpone the costly search for alternative domestic fuels,
which require high-risk, long-tertn capital investments. On the
other hand, an increase in petroleum output would foster economic
growth and general prosperity in Mexico, which in turn would help
reduce the flow of illegal Mexican workers to the United States.
Mexico, says Mancke, unlike other oil -exporting countries such as
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has a sizable population and a relatively
developed infrastructure, which would allow it to spend its oil
earnings in acquiring foreign goods and services.^ Explains Mancke,
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sLt!c ' ^2^^ ^^^'*^° the United
production nfPj;°^-^ r"'" ' to expand
al? .J Ih J- ^^^1^°^ c^ude oil and naturalgas at the highest technically feasible rate,
Irl ,^,^,^Jj^^,^^ftion
becomes: what policies
a e available to each country for promoting
achievement of this goal?...:The princ?pir
constraints slowing down the rate of long-
term expansion are current shortages of
wh-^J^lu^^n
technical expertise
-resources of
which the United States has an abundance,
bince both countries would reap large gainsfrom accelerating the rate of expansion,
policies should be aimed at alleviating
these constraints. "2
Like so many arguments caught up in the fallacy of the "growth
paradigm." Mancke's views suffer from serious shortcomings, and can
not stand the weight of evidence. At first sight, the United States
would indeed seem to gain 1n economic and strategic terms, from a
rapidly expanding Mexican oil production. But, on a middle and long
range basis, possible advantages are likely to amply offset by a
series of potential dangers to the stability of U.S.
-Mexico
relations.
The view that intensified oil exploitation will redound in clear
benefits for both the United States and Mexico can be effectively
challenged in regard to two criteria. First, the present domestic
situation in Mexico would seem to lead to the conclusion that the
more petroleum-bound its economy and society become, the more likely
th?t dcrmant social and economic tensions will reach a critical level,
with the obvious negative political implications. Of course, it could
be argued that this would be the situation even more so without rapid
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oil exploitation. But the point is that petroleum might easily tend
to aggravate disequilibriums present in Mexican society, and to
become, indeed, a mirage of apparently "easy" solutions to deep-
seated structural problems.
Looking at the strategic questions more carefully from the
previous perspective, it is clear that a restless Mexico would
be a thorn for U.S. security and strategic interests. In other
words, the benefits accruing to the United States from a Mexico
somewhat less formidable as an oil producer and exporter, but
politically stable, would seem to outweigh by far the ephemeral
benefits of a larger flow of petroleum, at the expense of a politically
volatile situation.
In this respect, a word of caution has already been expressed
by several respected critics of U.S. -Mexican relations. In a 1977
article, Richard R. Fagen acknowledged that oil represents, indeed,
a way out for Mexico from its immediate social and economic problems,
but also warned that
"Oil may allow Mexico to slip away from the IMF
but not from history. Oil exports, the related
relaxation of debt limits, and the easing of some
aspects of the austerity program give breathing
space, another chance for hard-pressed Mexican
politicians. But oil by itself cannot respond
to peasants' demands for land; nor can it
create hundreds of thousands of new jobs each
year; nor can it keep millions of Mexicans from
crossing the border; nor make rapid inroads on
redressing a distribution of income that is
one of the most unequal in the world; nor
reduce public and private corruption; nor
deal with the human and social problems
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generated by a population that doubles in
In",
^^-^toil can Jo
-a d this is not to be scoffed at- is soften
and perhaps postpone for some years the
sharpening of the contradictions that areinherent in the Mexican development model.
It cannot solve them. "3
Reinforcing the previous views, in another 1977 article, George
Grayson pointed out that, unless decisive political leadership was
effective, by the middle of the twenty-first century Mexico might
find itself with exhausted oil reserves and the same distorted
4
economy.
More recently, David F. Ronfeldt, Richard Nehring and Arturo
Gandara, in a study prepared for the Rand Corporation, have warned
that, under high production levels, Mexican oil reserves might wane
within 15 to 20 years. On a long range basis, for the United States
to see Mexican oil primarily as a cheap and convenient solution for
its energy-related security problems, might prove to be very costly.
The danger lies, say the authors, in the political and economic
instability that might result from an excessively rapid development
of the oil industry, and which might turn Mexico from a secure to an
insecure source of petroleum.^
In this respect. 01 ga Pellicer has emphasized the need for the
United States to be aware of these ominous possibilities and to
contribute to prevent them. It is a question, says Pellicer, for
American political leadership to place the goal of balanced Mexican
development before certain U.S. particular interests that favor
short-range capital expansion and fully irrestricted trade. In the
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long range, U.S. security will be better protected by paying due
attention to the requisites for a peaceful, stable development of its
southern neighbor.^
Secondly, it would seem that the more important Mexico becomes
as an oil producer and exporter, the more likely that its government
will continue to pursue an assertive and dynamic presence in inter-
national affairs. Mexico's foreign policy, partly because of a
defensive reaction due to wariness of the overwhelming U.S. proximity,
and also because of an impulse born of its nationalistic propelling
elan, will probably be antagonistic, or at least not acquiescent to
U.S. overtures in Central America and the Caribbean. And it is here
that the greatest danger to the relations betv/een the two countries
resides. Paradoxically, but only seemingly so, the more economically
dependent Mexico becomes on the United States, the greater its
compensating efforts will be to implement an independent foreign
pel icy.
There would seem to be a cause-and-effect relationship between
Mexico's foreign policy and its domestic situation. At present,
the two are negatively related. That is, a tenser and more unstable
internal situation is bound to result in a more forceful and
nationalistic foreign policy. Already, from the American perspective,
Mexico's foreign policy towards Central America and the Caribbean,
in spite of following traditional principles, would appear to be going
beyond the limits of propriety established in the past in the
relations between the two nations. But, it must be remembered that
this is a region very close to Mexico's national interest, too.
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In other words, Mexican foreign policy is, at least partly, the
counterbalance to Mexico's uneasy domestic cauldron. The Mexican
government, with growing oil revenues, is bound to try to patch up some
of its shortcomings in the domestic milieu, through a more aggressive
presence in the international scenario. On the other hand, because
of that same nationalistic behavior, and because it follows the price
policies of that association without the political hindrances of
formal membership, Mexico will not join OPEC. Such a move would
be feasible only under conditions of an extreme deterioration of
its relations with the United States.
A Recapitulation
By the early 1980 's, the Mexican government would seem to be
caught in the vicious circle of high levels of oil production-
recrudescence of shortcomings in old and new economic sectors as
well as in regard to the social situation-and still higher levels
of oil production. This impasse will prove to be hard to overcome.
In spite of the Energy Program, and the protestations of Mexico's
political leadership in regard to a firm oil production and exports
platform, self-imposed levels of output are likely to be surpassed.
Increases in oil production and exports are bound to take place
because of the distortions in Mexico's process of development, and
the need to earn foreign currency to pay for domestic programs.
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The fact is that Mexico's model of development remains deeply
unbalanced and distorted. Easy oil money is bound to underline
the negative aspects of the Mexican system. The challenge to Mexico's
political leadership, still, is to create a proper model of develop-
ment, congruent with Mexico's traditions, available means, and
national goals.
The Mexican State has been evolving since the Reform period in
the 1850's. Petroleum wealth represents a big, and probably the last,
opportunity for the Mexican State to give new sustenance, and justice,
to the national process of development, under its auspices. If it
fails, then the initiative will pass to private enterprise, or to
the military. The potential implications of either course are grave:
deep instability originating in Mexico's nationalistic and leftist
groups as they see the private sector take over increasingly the
control levers of the economy, or repression a la South America, with
its impact on Mexican migration to the United States, and other
various border problems.
These ominous possibilities should motivate the U.S. government
to devise and implement comprehensive policies that take into account
the entire scope of its relations with its southern neighbor, and
promote the maintenance of a moderately fluid interplay of political
forces within Mexico. At present, U.S. policies that encourage
increasingly higher levels of oil production in Mexico, and at the
same time thwart Mexican foreign policy initiatives, are myopic and
counterproductive.
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U.S.
-Mexican rapprochement must tread, by necessity, a path
geared towards conciliation and compromise. This path is located
somewhere between Mexico's hypersensitive historical memory, and
the U.S. historical amnesia, between American attempts to achieve
total control of its sphere of influence, and Mexico's need to
uphold its sovereignty. A true partnership is required. As the
stronger partner, the United States must have, at the center of its
Mexican foreign policy, a special concern for the process of develop-
ment in Mexico. As Fagen asserts,
"At one level this means a frank recognition of
the 'specialness' of the U.S. relationship
with Mexico by virtue of the 2,000-mile frontier,
the weight of the U.S. presence in the Mexican
economy, and the scale and importance of Mexico
to the United States an even greater challenge
in the long run will be to find ways of supporting
those aspects of Mexican development and political
practice that promise to increase social justice
....to fail to understand that a Mexico in which
the fruits of development are not more equitably
shared is also a Mexico which cannot indefinitely
continue to be a 'good neighbor' is to misread
history and to ignore geography."?
In any case, confrontation over foreign policy matters will
continue to be a fact of life in U.S. -Mexico relations, at least in
the short run. The challenge for both countries is to keep
confrontation within manageable limits, and to set the basis for
more amicable and mutually satisfying relations in the long run.
In this context, U.S. energy needs must not blind Washington to the
increasingly complex scenario in Mexican domestic politics, and
its external reverberations.
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Ultimately. Mexican nationalism does not need to be incompatible
with the national interest of the United States, as long as the latter
understands the nature of ongoing changes in Mexico, and the need to
go beyond dependence towards a new form of interest association.
Mexico is trying to consolidate its political and economic autonomy,
and to widen the radius ot its external actions. But a strong, self-
reliant Mexico, and not a dependent Mexico, is the best insurance
for good, stable bilateral relations.
On the other hand, Mexican initiatives in foreign policy matters
may pave the way for greater cooperation. Under a more imaginative
policy framework, the U.S. government would encourage Mexico to play
a greater role in bringing peace and reconciliation between the
warring factions in El Salvador. Likewise, it could be argued that,
perhaps, American interests would be best served by improving
relations with Cuba, and thus reducing its reliance on the Soviet
Union, or by increasing economic and political contacts with the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In both scenarios, Mexico would
play an extremely useful role as a mediator.
In any case, petroleum constitutes a watershed in U.S. -Mexican
relations. For the United States, it means a change it its conduct
and patterns of action towards Mexico and, for the latter, a
definition of its project as a nation. This will require the
demise of ethnocentric approaches on the part of the United States.
In the words of Michael and Nanneke Redclift:
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...If Mexican policy is characterized by a
search for greater economic independence,
more attention to resource conservation,
redistributive policies at home, and an
active foreign policy in Central America
and the Caribbean, Washington should
recognize that these policies are consistent
with long-term U.S. interests. "8
If an association based on mutual interests and benefits is to
evolve, the U.S. government must understand and accept the changes that
are taking place in Mexico, and the emergence of the Mexican State
as a middle power with autonomous goals of its own. Under other
circumstances, the temptation of economic and political interventionism
may effectively obstruct this unique opportunity.^ The setting is thus
ready for closer friendship or escalating confrontation in the relations
between Mexico and the United States. In this context, petroleum
constitutes both a source of confidence, and a quandary. It may turn
out to be a propelling force, or a quagmire. It corresponds to
decision-makers in both nations to seize this historical challenge
and turn it into a stepping stone for cooperation.
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